This phenomenon is not merely a return to old habits or rural mysticism. It has become a nationwide consumer frenzy, driven by the very demographic the Communist Party hoped would be its most rational constituency: the young and educated. In chasing these modern symbols of hope, they are losing more than just money.

[…] In today’s China, the most popular “spiritual” items aren’t books or teachings but small objects—especially crystals. These are sold not only as fashion items but as tools for cosmic power. Supposedly, they bring wealth, block bad energy, and balance inner forces. Livestreams offer quick lessons in “crystal basics,” and influencers promote them with the excitement once shown for new tech.

[…] Along with the crystal craze, astrology, tarot, and fortune-telling have become small but growing businesses. Highly educated youth—graduates, civil servants, tech workers—are quitting their jobs to become full-time “mystics.” On platforms like Taobao and WeChat, paid readings are everywhere. In many cities, you’ll find stylish little shops doing tarot readings, often run by baristas turned fortune-tellers.

This is happening despite—or maybe because of—government crackdowns. In 2021, China banned religious content on e-commerce sites and tightened rules on spiritual services. But the demand only adapted. Tarot readers now call themselves “emotional consultants.” Horoscope sellers move to foreign platforms like Discord. The state fights superstition with censorship, and loses every time.

[…] It would be wrong to see this wave of superstition as a uniquely Chinese flaw. But since 2024, China’s superstition boom has become a pressure cooker where many deep problems have gathered: economic slowdown, job stress, burnout, pushy online systems, and a desperate need for meaning.

Young Chinese are not naturally more superstitious. But they are trapped in an unstable system, and with no clear future, they are buying ready-made ones. These crystals and tarot cards aren’t ancient traditions—they’re quick-fix stories built from what’s left in the marketplace. Meanwhile, sellers and platforms continue testing how much people are willing to pay to ease their fears. [Source]

The Economist in January similarly described trends such as app-based horoscopes and fortune-telling and offline “metaphysical bars,” fueled by frustration at “a sluggish economy, a tight job market and intense competition in many aspects of life.” (Another Economist report the week before noted similar phenomena in the U.S. and India.)

The Communist Party has long tried to rid itself of what it calls “feudal superstition”. Last year the Central Party School, a training academy for officials, expressed concern about the number of members and cadres “believing in ghosts and gods”. It tried to clarify the party’s restrictions by publishing a Q&A on the matter. Occasionally participating in local folk customs or consulting a fortune-teller on a name for your baby? That’s fine. Spending a lot of time and money, especially public funds, on superstitious activities? Unacceptable.

The masses are also discouraged from embracing such practices. A notice issued by the city of Sanming in 2023 stated: “The public should improve their scientific literacy, enhance their psychological immunity to superstitious activities and not seek spiritual comfort through ‘fortune-telling’ when encountering real setbacks.” Other cities have followed suit. Last year some local governments cracked down on the burning of fake money and other paper offerings to the dead during the annual grave-sweeping festival.

State censors, with the help of internet firms, have tried to curb the spread of superstitious beliefs and divination services online. Search terms such as “astrology” and “fortune-telling” have been blocked on Taobao, an e-commerce market. But on Weibo, a social-media site, popular astrologers have accumulated tens of millions of followers. Some speak of playing a cat-and-mouse game with the authorities. A 24-year-old tarot-card reader in Shanghai jokes that she tries to divine her own fate—to see if jail time is in the offing. [Source]

There is also online hay to be made from confronting superstition. In April, South China Morning Post’s Zoey Zhang reported on Shandong-based influencer Zhang Shulin, who has built a following with video stunts debunking beliefs such as hauntings, shamanism, and ghost marriages. This, too, can be a hazardous approach if targets include traditional practices favored with official endorsement, however. Mixed martial artist Xu Xiaodong was hit with censorship, travel restrictions, financial penalties, and forced apologies following his efforts to puncture the inflated claims of purported kung fu masters, some of whom he flattened in bouts lasting only seconds. In 2022, a number of prominent online voices were silenced in apparent retaliation for their criticism of Lianhua Qingwen, a traditional Chinese medicine-based herbal product promoted by Chinese authorities for treatment of COVID.

A pair of translations at CDT last month described how other frustrated young Chinese are turning to another old ritual: the annual civil service exams.

However, the real winner might be China’s military-industrial complex, according to some analysts and Chinese nationalists. Pakistan’s government claimed to have shot down three of India’s new French-made Rafale jets (at least one was confirmed) using Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets. Over 80 percent of Pakistan’s military equipment comes from China, while India’s military is increasingly reliant on Western countries. The conflict seemed to give Chinese weapons a significant boost in credibility, with the Chinese manufacturer of the J-10 announcing that its shares had risen by over 40 percent in two days. “There’s no better advertisement than a real combat situation … This came as a pleasant surprise for China … the result is quite striking,” Yun Sun from the Stimson Center told the Financial Times. Eric Olander at the China-Global South Project noted that some analysts described this as China’s “DeepSeek Moment” for military technology:

There was a palpable sense of euphoria in China this weekend as Chinese-made J-10C and JF-17 fighter jets saw combat for the first time over the disputed Kashmir region — and performed impressively.

The J-10C’s successful use of electronic jamming and reports of downing several Indian Air Force Rafale jets (the exact number remains disputed) were widely celebrated in Chinese media. Many likened the moment to another "DeepSeek Moment" — a reference to China’s growing confidence in its domestically developed technologies.

But beneath the excitement was also a deep sense of relief. These jets had never been tested in actual combat, and despite public bravado, few could say with certainty how they’d perform under pressure.

[…] Now, it appears China has succeeded — and the world should take note. [Source]

On Weibo, the hashtag “US officials claim J-10 shot down at least two Indian warplanes” attracted over 35 million views, and state-affiliated media published promotional content about the Chinese aircraft. Perhaps the most notable example of nationalism to emerge from the Chinese internet was a viral video by a Chinese influencer “Brother Hao” mocking India’s downed military jets, featuring Chinese actors dressed up in Indian costumes singing along to a remix of the Indian song “Tunak Tunak Tun.” Yuanyue Dang reported for the South China Morning Post:

The minute-long parody video, which has even gone viral overseas, has fuelled a new wave of nationalist fervour in China. Similar videos have appeared on Pakistani social media, while Indian social media users expressed anger.

The video is the latest celebration among Chinese netizens over the performance of the J-10C fighter jet in last week’s India-Pakistan conflict, although Beijing has remained cautious about commenting on the issue.

[…] “Brother Hao” has nearly 16 million followers on Douyin, China’s version of TikTok, and is known for creating videos in which he adapts songs from other ethnic groups and imitates people from those cultures, including Indians and Arabs.

The influencer is no stranger to controversy. His parody videos often show him wearing Indian clothing, sporting a small moustache and painting his face brown, with frequent references to “curry”. In 2023, an Indian TV channel accused him of racism.

Some people have expressed concern that the video could harm China-India relations, but nationalist influencers have defended the content creator. [Source]

While the majority of comments under Chinese social-media posts sharing Brother Hao’s video were supportive, some criticized the video as being racist. CDT Chinese editors published a compilation of some of these critical comments, which referenced past incidents of double standards applied to Chinese citizens’ tolerance of discrimination. Some examples include the recurrent blackface skits aired on CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala, racist fan encounters during iShowSpeed’s recent China tour, and nationalist deflections of Chinese-commissioned African “shout-out” videos. The CDT Chinese article about the Brother Hao video analyzed some of the dualities surrounding racial and ethnic discrimination in China. One netizen comment referenced online speculation about whether Ms. Dong, a trainee doctor involved in the recent “4+4” medical scandal, benefited from nepotism in her career by being born into a family of "Beijing Brahmins"—in other words, a well-educated and well-connected family:

Some netizens have commented that Chinese people exhibit both hypersensitivity to racial discrimination (when accusing others of insulting China) and extreme insensitivity (when casually insulting others). "They are outraged when others racially discriminate against them," wrote one, "yet take unmitigated glee in racially discriminating against others". […] Of course, many Chinese also expressed strong criticism of Brother Hao’s video. As one said, "This willingness to resort to anything just to generate online hype is a disgrace to all Chinese people." Another wrote, "If the shoe were on the other foot, would Chinese people be considered the victims of racism, or just hypersensitive?" One netizen observed sharply: "We ourselves are guilty of dividing people into hierarchies. Just last week, we were talking about whether Miss Dong had been born into a family of ‘Beijing Brahmins,’ but now we’re suddenly finding some kind of ethnic cohesion in insulting Indians." [Chinese]

The India-Pakistan conflict also revealed certain similarities between those countries and China when it comes to media control. Jon Allsop at the Columbia Journalism Review wrote about the “fog of war” resulting from both governments trying to control the narrative. The Indian government blocked thousands of social media accounts belonging to prominent figures and media outlets, removed Pakistani audio-video content from platforms, blocked news websites, and arrested journalists who reported critically on the conflict. The Pakistani government, ironically, lifted a long-standing ban on the social-media platform X in order to enlist its citizens in the battle to control the global narrative. Government-backed disinformation has been propagated by both sides. (All of these media censorship tactics are common in China.)

Other pieces highlighted the narrative front of the conflict. Global Voices provided an analysis of the narratives regarding Kashmir. And the Eye on China Substack, produced by the Takshashila Institution, a research think tank based out of Bengaluru, India, argued in a recent article that the Chinese government’s public messaging during the conflict expressed implicit support for Pakistan. The author, Anushka Saxena, stated that coverage by Xinhua and CCTV was notably similar to that of Pakistani media. She also noted that Chinese military analysts had eagerly written that a hot war would be an opportunity to test all of the “Made in China” defence products acquired by Pakistan’s military.

Translations by Cindy Carter.

On Thursday, the Made in China Journal (MICJ) published its latest issue, titled “Chinese Journalism is Dead: Long Live Chinese Journalism!” The issue traces transformations in China’s media landscape over the past decade to demonstrate the ways in which journalism has both deteriorated and adapted to the Party-state’s tightening grip on information. One article, by Dan Chen, analyzes how Chinese local television news "performs governance." Chen focuses on a genre of local television news called minsheng xinwen (民生新闻, literally “news about people’s livelihood”), which highlights “citizen grievances and bureaucratic failures, framing them within a narrative of governmental accountability and responsiveness.” While these sorts of programs reinforce the state’s legitimacy, their top-down orchestration has also eroded public trust in media:

This practice of ‘controlled criticism’ allows limited critiques of governance to flourish within carefully delineated boundaries. Minsheng xinwen programs use investigative reporting to expose problems such as delayed services, poor infrastructure, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Yet, far from threatening the regime, this critical reporting reinforces its legitimacy by positioning the state as both responsive to citizen concerns and capable of delivering solutions.

[…] In the early years of minsheng xinwen, many reports arose organically, driven by journalists who independently identified compelling stories through citizen complaints, hotline calls, or grassroots investigations. These organically initiated stories often reflected the agency of journalists within the constraints of state control. However, as political oversight tightened under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, this space for spontaneity has steadily diminished.

[…] The shift towards orchestrated reporting carries significant implications for the credibility of local television news. Early iterations of minsheng xinwen enjoyed widespread public trust, as their investigative tone and tangible outcomes made them appear authentic advocates for citizen concerns. Over time, however, the increasingly performative nature of orchestrated reports has eroded this trust. [Source]

At a smaller scale, a similar sleight of hand by the state can be seen in the evolution of print media. Last month, Jianbing Li, Jiakun Jack Zhang, Duoji Jiang, and Weifeng Zhong published an article in the Journal of Contemporary China titled, “Domestic Politics and Editorial Control Over Foreign News Coverage in the People’s Daily, 1993–2022.” The article found that, particularly under Xi Jinping, news coverage of foreign affairs in the People’s Daily has been steadily replaced by editorializing about foreign affairs:

This study examines the dynamics of foreign coverage in China’s official media as the country becomes more globally active. Many scholars argue that China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy and positioned itself as a global leader under Xi Jinping. Yet, analysis of over 1 million People’s Daily articles from 1993 to 2022 reveals that official Chinese media have notably reduced foreign news coverage during his administration. The authors suggest that foreign coverage is influenced more by domestic politics than by China’s growing international interests. As Chinese leaders consolidate power in their second terms, they exert greater editorial control, replacing foreign news coverage with commentary on foreign policy. This trend is not unique to Xi, but it is particularly pronounced during his tenure. [Source]

Our analysis reveals that foreign coverage is influenced more by domestic politics than by China’s growing international interests.

As Chinese leaders consolidate power, they exert greater editorial control, replacing foreign news coverage with commentary on foreign policy. pic.twitter.com/BFBt9WAV2m

— Jack Zhang (@HanFeiTzu) April 21, 2025

Many journalists are also deterred by their lack of autonomy and grueling work conditions. The South China Morning Post recently highlighted the story of a young woman who obtained a master’s degree in journalism from Peking University, interned at prominent state media agencies, and then swapped her high-paying media job for working at the university canteen. She stated that at the media outlets where she had worked, she chafed at the rigorous performance indicators and pressure to reply to messages from her boss at all hours of the day and night. “Compared to those jobs, working as a canteen auntie brings me more joy,” she said. In an article for Initium Media, translated by China Media Project, Xiaobai Yu described how many state television stations not only impose arduous working conditions but also force journalists to solicit advertisements in order to alleviate financial pressure, which corrupts their journalistic work and erodes public trust in the media:

In China today, there are 389 broadcasting and television stations at the prefecture-level and above, according to early 2024 data from China’s National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA). There are 2,099 county-level television stations, and 33 educational television stations. Each television station broadcasts across several channels, and some operate 10 or more. But in 2024, as rumors circulated on social platforms that “nearly 2,000 local television stations are on the verge of collapse” (有近2000家地方電視台行將倒閉), the veneer of viability seemed to slip.

Regarding this figure, an individual working in a propaganda management department of a central government institution told Initium Media that while the above statement may to some extent be exaggerated, the fact that numerous local television stations face financial difficulties is undeniable. “Everyone is living like beggars, including China Central Television and leading provincial satellite TV stations,” they said.

[…] The gradual “salesification” (銷售化) of reporters has become a trend for television station workers in China, including at major state-run outfits like China Central Television (CCTV). To alleviate financial pressure, many television stations assign business tasks to their staff, meaning that directors, editors, and reporters must actively solicit advertisements. This, in fact, has become the primary standard for assessment when it comes to key performance indicators, or KPIs.

[…] “Under the current atmosphere of high-pressure control and political prioritization, television will gradually die out,” [said the aforementioned source working in the propaganda office of a central government institution]. “This is an inevitable end.” [Source]

In the face of these challenges, many Chinese journalists have ventured abroad to pursue media initiatives in the diaspora. Vivian Wu, founder of the media platform Dasheng (大声), wrote in MICJ about how the influx of fresh talent through migration has made Chinese diasporic media more diverse and active in offering uncensored content that both complements existing news from mainland China and offers its own unique perspectives. Last month, Oiwan Lam at Global Voices sampled several Hong Kong exile media outlets, among hundreds of Hong Kong journalists who left the city since the National Security Law. She also noted their struggles for financial sustainability (Flow HK announced it will shut down) and against transnational repression (numerous media workers are among those wanted for national security cases).

Land sales measures, foreign investment data and unemployment indicators have gone dark in recent years. Data on cremations and a business confidence index have been cut off. Even official soy sauce production reports are gone.

In all, Chinese officials have stopped publishing hundreds of data points once used by researchers and investors, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.

In most cases, Chinese authorities haven’t given any reason for ending or withholding data. But the missing numbers have come as the world’s second biggest economy has stumbled under the weight of excessive debt, a crumbling real-estate market and other troubles—spurring heavy-handed efforts by authorities to control the narrative.

[…] Some data are still publicly available but harder to get. Beijing passed a law in 2021 that caused data providers to make certain information—such as corporate registry data and satellite images—accessible only in mainland China.

[….] Some information that has disappeared defies explanation. Data providing estimates of the size of elementary school toilets stopped being released in 2022, then resumed publication in February. Official soy sauce production data stopped appearing in May 2021, and hasn’t returned. [Source]

Another reminder of the unreliability of China’s official statistics came in March after the U.S. announced that its embassies around the world would cease publishing data about local air quality. This long-running transparency initiative began in 2008 when the U.S. Embassy in Beijing shared real-time information about toxic levels of PM2.5 microparticles in the capital’s air. The Chinese Foreign Ministry later complained that because the U.S. data conflicted with China’s (which measured only larger PM10 particles), they were causing “confusion” and undesirable “social consequences.” Under pressure, the Chinese government eventually established its own PM2.5 monitoring system, admitted that air pollution was a significant problem, and took greater corrective measures. However, there is still insufficient transparency in this domain. A recent paper in the journal Nature revealed notable discrepancies between China’s annual and monthly official statistics regarding CO2 emissions between 2014 and 2020 when calculating near real-time estimates of those emissions.

Shaky statistics such as those help Chinese state media’s external propaganda. In an article from March titled “Fact Check: What Western media get wrong about China’s economy,” Xinhua argued that “Western media’s relentless fixation on peddling narratives of China’s economic doom demonstrates their entrenched bias and agenda-driven reporting. Contrary to those claims, […] key economic indicators showed significant improvement” in China’s economy. Western reporting aside, China’s official annual GDP growth rates have been widely seen as misleading, generating doubts about the true state of the Chinese economy. In March, Nicholas R. Lardy and Tianlei Huang at the Peterson Institute for International Economics noted that while China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has improved the quality of certain macroeconomic data—such as fixed asset investment, international trade in goods, household income and expenditure, and value-added in financial services—it continues to selectively withhold other important information:

The paradox of China’s economic data thus lies in its dual character: The disappearance of certain data points, sometimes those related to economic weakness, raise concerns about the authority’s selective transparency. Yet at the same time, Beijing has better aligned its data with international standards and improved their quality. While its push for quality improvements shows its commitment to more reliable statistics, its selective withholding of information inevitably undermines confidence in the overall picture. If Beijing really wants to build trust in its economic data, it needs to ensure greater transparency, even though some statistics may expose vulnerabilities in its economy. [Source]

Last November, Vincent Brussee published an article in The China Quarterly about the “missingness” of Chinese policy documents. Among the hundreds of thousands of policy documents he scraped from official sources between 2021 and 2023, nearly 20 percent were unavailable two years after their publication. Within the latter group, 10 percent were unavailable due to issues uploading the websites, 7.7 percent due to broken links, and 1.9 percent had been intentionally deleted. Brussee described the implications of these findings for researchers’ knowledge base of China:

As this paper demonstrates, there is significant variation in policy transparency and document availability over time. Transparency originally improved between 2008 and the mid-2010s. Today, however, transparency is in decline in several fields, especially in fields where there are related geopolitical tensions. There is also significant variation among types of documents, with top-level policies seeing significantly higher disclosure rates than lower-level documents. Variation among topics appears primarily in the extent to which a topic is related to national security or citizens’ daily lives. Finally, disappearance of documents is a real challenge for research. Thus, studies working with policy data must be open about how they mitigate missingness.

[…] This paper invites broader reflection on the fragility of our knowledge base and the use of convenient datasets in China studies. Policy documents are not propaganda, yet the fact that all these data are available to “us” also suggests that their availability serves a political purpose. The developments highlighted throughout this paper suggests that this curation of information sources is only likely to intensify. Understanding the context in which these sources are produced and what can – and, more importantly, cannot – be learned from them is crucial. [Source]

CDT has covered numerous incidents of Chinese sources publishing, and often later censoring, official data in ways that many netizens deem questionable. The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples from the past two years.

• January 2025: After online sleuths found numerous examples of data fraud in clinical trials for generic drugs in China, China’s National Medical Products Administration claimed the data irregularities were simply “editing errors” and then blocked access to the data.
• December 2024: Viral video and transcripts of two unusually critical speeches about the accuracy of official statistics on the Chinese economy—by economists Gao Shanwen and Fu Peng, respectively—were deleted from multiple Chinese social media platforms, and the economists’ WeChat accounts were shut down.
• August 2024: After the State Council Information Office hosted a series of press conferences intended to showcase government accomplishments using optimistic statistics, some netizens sardonically mentioned “launching Sputniks” or “10,000 catties per mu,” phrases that reference the insanely optimistic targets and grossly exaggerated rice and grain yields reported by localities during the Great Leap Forward.
• July 2024: Public access to a tanker-truck tracking app was suspended after investigative reports revealed that cooking oil was being transported in fuel-oil tanker trucks that were not washed between transports.
• April 2024: The NBS announcement of a high nationwide average per-capita disposable income led many netizens to mock this “daily dose of humor” and wonder, “When can I expect to receive my portion of this increase?”
• February 2024: A Guangzhou research center’s public opinion poll on the state of the private economy, the outlook for employment, and current incomes showed the largest drop in public satisfaction in 30 years. A post about the poll was deleted from WeChat.
• August 2023: After youth unemployment hit a record 21.3 percent, the government stopped publishing data on the subject and online censors targeted discussion of unemployment.
• July 2023: A report on provincial cremation statistics was removed from Zhejiang’s government website and discussion of the statistics were censored on Q&A site Zhihu, after the central government stopped publishing cremation data.
• June 2023: A series of infographics from Sohu News highlighting poverty, youth unemployment, and other social issues, using statistics mostly drawn from government sources, were scrubbed from Weibo.
• May 2023: Media outlets reported that China’s top financial data provider, Wind Information, began restricting foreign access to its data in 2022, and company information databases Qichacha and Tianyancha also shut down access for foreign users.
• January 2023: After the NBS announced China’s sharp population decline, the state-affiliated Beijing Business Today reported on a survey purporting to show that “80% of university students would like to have two children,” drawing online mockery about the misleading results.

For more on this topic, see CDT’s archives related to data and statistics, and our interview with Jeremy Wallace about data manipulation in China. (This CDT post from May 2024 also contains a related timeline about censorship of economic content in China, which includes but is not limited to content about official statistics.)

1. There can be no “national rejuvenation” without systemic political reform
2. The People do not want a political party with unchecked power.
3. China does not need someone to “point the way forward.” Democracy is the way forward. [Chinese]

The three banners hanging from a pedestrian overpass near Chengdu’s Chadianzi Bus Station. Local netizens confirmed the location of the photo, which is close to Chengdu’s Third Ring Road, based on the street layout and the illuminated signs visible in the background.

The date of the protest is significant because it was the anniversary of the April 15, 1989 death of former General Secretary Hu Yaobang—who for many symbolizes a more progressive, possibly even more democratic “path not taken.” (In the spring of 1989, mourning for Hu’s death coalesced into the massive protests that would later be crushed in the June 4 Tiananmen crackdown.) The language used in the slogans is quite measured, and references the CCP’s oft-lauded goal of “national rejuvenation.” Although Xi Jinping is not mentioned by name, the third slogan is a clear reference to the standard Party formulation of Xi Jinping “pointing the way forward” on various policy issues (at least 240, by one recent count).

Although such offline expressions of political dissent are rare in China, they are not without precedent. CDT Chinese editors have documented three other solitary protests that have occurred over the past three years. The Chengdu protest called to mind antecedents such as the January 2022 “Luohu Warrior” protest in Shenzhen. It also echoed the October 2022 Sitong Bridge banner protest in Beijing, in which solitary protester Peng Lifa displayed banners calling for more freedom, an end to pandemic lockdowns, and for work and academic strikes to topple Xi Jinping. The Chengdu protest also recalled the banner and loudspeaker slogans of Fang Yirong’s one-man protest on a pedestrian overpass in Xinhua county, Hunan province in July 2024.

The protester in Chengdu contacted several well-known whistleblower accounts on X—including Teacher Li (@whyyoutouzhele) and Yesterday (@YesterdayBigcat)—to amplify his message. He sent them his protest slogans, photos of the scene, and even a photo of his ID card, which revealed his identity as Mei Shilin, age 27, from Muchuan county in Sichuan province. Mei soon fell out of contact and his whereabouts are unknown; it is likely that he has been detained by public security officers. (Mei’s name and photo were only shared on social media after he had disappeared and after his identity had been revealed on YouTube.)

Content related to Mei’s protest has been thoroughly scrubbed from the Chinese internet, and CDT editors have noted that his name is now a sensitive word on numerous Chinese platforms and social media sites. Some Chinese netizens who learned of the protest via overseas sites voiced admiration for Mei’s bravery and expressed concern for his safety. A selection of Chinese-language comments from X about Mei’s bold protest have been translated below:

DEMAXIYA159: He’s a hero. It takes a lot of courage for an individual to do something this big. If every city had such a hero, the government would have to face up to its problems. If everyone had such courage, then dictatorship wouldn’t dare raise its head. Democracy means that everyone has the courage to raise their own voice.

President_JC23: Respect to that lone warrior. I hope he can stay safe.

wulijin11: Brave warrior, you did what I lacked the courage to do.

Running_Program: It takes a lot of courage to do this “within the wall.”

leaf_sen: It’s impossible to see this [news] in China because the internet is so completely controlled.

Mrdoorvpn: That brave warrior will definitely go down in history, whether you agree with him or not.

geleilaoshi: You are not alone!

rt_cou66416: Whoa, Peng Lifa has returned!

Fulefull: All of society is stagnant, but now and then, there’s a little spark.

wudiniu7764: The security guards in Chengdu are screwed. They’ll have to guard the bridges again. [Chinese]

Many observers and human rights groups are justifiably concerned for Mei Shilin’s safety. In a recent article titled “Another ‘Bridge Man’ in China Forcibly Disappeared,” Human Rights Watch China Researcher Yalkun Uluyol called on the Chinese authorities to immediately disclose Mei Shilin’s whereabouts. It remains unclear when and where Mei was detained, where he is currently being held, and whether he has access to legal representation. An update this week from Qian Lang, reporting for RFA Mandarin, discussed what steps the authorities might take next in a case that they almost certainly wish to suppress:

One of the two sources [familiar with the case], Qin from Chengdu, said if Mei was found by investigators to have overseas ties, he would be handed over to the State Security Bureau and transferred to the Municipal State Security Bureau Detention Center.

“If no substantial evidence of collusion with foreign forces is found, he will be handled by the Chengdu police,” added Qin, who wanted to be identified by a single name for safety reasons.

Legal experts believe authorities may charge Mei with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” – a common criminal accusation in China that authorities level against political, civil, and human rights advocates.

“They (the prosecution) may file a case for the crime of picking quarrels and provoking trouble because they don’t want to give him a more glorious charge, such as inciting subversion of state power or subverting state power,” Lu Chenyuan, a legal expert in China, told RFA.

“They are now more inclined to depoliticize (the Mei Shilin case) and want to reduce its political significance,” added Lu. [Source]

The safety and whereabouts of many previous protesters remain unknown. In the case of the “Luohu Warrior,” even his real name is unknown to the public, and for over three years, there has been no official information about where he is being held or whether he has been or will be tried. The most widely known of the protesters is Peng Lifa, dubbed “Bridge Man” after the famous “Tank Man” of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Peng Lifa disappeared soon after his Sitong Bridge protest and has not been heard from since. Peng’s courageous lone protest—which in turn inspired the late 2022 “White Paper Protests” that led to the end of China’s pandemic lockdowns—continues to resonate with a new generation of Chinese citizens. Fang Yirong, the young man in Hunan who used a banner and a loudspeaker to make his political demands heard, has likewise not been heard from since his protest in July of 2024.

The US Empire’s confidence has three roots: the USD, its armed forces, and high technology.

Our confidence has three different roots: tree bark, wild herbs, and Guan Yin clay! [Chinese]

Tree bark, wild grass, and Guan Yin clay (so-called for its use in Buddhist figurines, and potentially fatal to ingest) were three things widely eaten to stave off hunger during China’s Great Famine, in which as many as tens of millions are estimated to have died.

State media have sought to paint a rosier picture of the trade war. A recent report from state broadcaster CCTV, for example, focused on a Zhejiang manufacturer of home appliances which said its overseas orders had actually increased slightly since it turned toward other markets in response to U.S. tariffs. CCTV plugged the story with the hashtags “#Number of overseas orders actually increased after loss of U.S. orders” and “#For Cixi Home Appliances, the East Brightens as the West Dims.”

The story became a “rollover scene” (翻车现场 fānchē xiànchǎng), attracting widespread attention and mockery. CDT Chinese editors compiled a number of reactions from Weibo and X, ranging from the apparently convinced to sarcastic endorsement to outright scorn. Several of the comments play on the tendency for state media to wring claims of victory for China out of any new development.

蔚蓝的白日梦： If we’re winning this much after losing the U.S. market, imagine how much we’d be winning if we lost all of them.

用户130000： Winning this much, and still filtering the comments … our country is modest indeed.

股海东方不败： The point of this news is to convince everyone that even though we’ve lost the American market, business just keeps getting better and better.

心向阳光-奔跑吧少年： China May Be The Biggest Winner

花衿茵梦： Orders drying up? Cixi Appliances says just change the packaging and sell, sell, sell!

长安静轩阁主： Out of respect, I’ll take your word for it. In the meantime, you do you.

财金条： Supplier defeats customer

崇正视角： The days when they could swindle the masses like a bunch of fools are long gone. Unfortunately our bureaucrats are still deluding themselves about their prowess.

zrw2017： Striking first brings swift victory; striking harder brings more wins. Apparently in this trade war they struck too softly, too late.

bodyno214755： Isolated examples can’t show the big picture. This is just a typical propaganda play.

Momo20240808： This is just one very specific, unrepresentative example. What are things like for the majority of businesses?

轻风细雨大叔新号： Looks like everything’s great—raising tariffs boosted exports. The more sanctions, the better!

五更不惑： Looks like it’s a good thing, so let’s have more of the same!

W因紫而来： Whatever you do, don’t tell Trump about this—he’d blow his top.

OL1EiqcQJpZL9nr： Actually this isn’t impossible. According to the article, they relaxed the minimum orders, i.e. they started accepting smaller orders, and lowered the required quantities. The claim is that the number of orders increased, but it didn’t say anything about profits. If a factory does smaller production runs, then unit costs will go up. It’s obvious whether this is a good thing or not.

冲浪冠军很多年： I haven’t seen a single news report so far describing adverse effects from the trade war on domestic businesses.

jenner70873905： "A bit more suffering for the masses"—Ming Dynasty 1566 [A historical TV drama: "During the Ming dynasty, as economic prosperity masked social unrest, the corrupt official Yan Song’s oppressive policies spark a power struggle and intrigue within the imperial court."] [Chinese]

As part of the investigation, ICIJ coordinated reporters across five continents to interview targets and analyze their cases. ICIJ also reviewed a 2004 Chinese police textbook and confidential guidelines for domestic security officers dating to 2013. The reporters then compared the tactics described in the internal documents with the experiences of the 105 targets, as well as with secretly recorded police interrogations, and phone calls and text messages between 11 security officers in China and nine targets overseas. The comparison shows the tactics recently deployed against the subjects mirrored the guidelines on how to control individuals labeled as domestic security threats.

Half of the targets interviewed by ICIJ and its media partners said the harassment extended to family members back home, who suffered intimidation and were interrogated by police or state security officials one or more times. Several victims told ICIJ that their family members in China or Hong Kong were harassed by police shortly after they had participated in protests or public events overseas. Sixty said they believed they had been followed or were targets of surveillance or spying by Chinese officials or their proxies; 27 said they were victims of an online smear campaign, and 19 said they had received suspicious messages or experienced hacking attempts, including by state actors. Some said their bank accounts in China and Hong Kong had been frozen. Officers from both the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security — two of the Chinese agencies with intelligence capacity — were responsible for intimidating some of the targets and their families, the testimonies show. Twenty-two people said they received physical threats or had been assaulted by civilian CCP supporters.

Most of those interviewed by ICIJ and its partners said they had not reported state-sponsored threats to the authorities in their adopted countries, explaining that they feared retaliation from China or didn’t have faith in authorities’ ability to help. Of those who had filed a report, several said police did not follow up on their case or told them that they couldn’t do anything because there was no evidence of a crime. [Source]

The ICIJ investigation described the phenomenon of Beijing-backed “GONGOs” (government-organized non-governmental organizations) that monitor and intimidate human rights activists critical of the Chinese government. During China’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session at the U.N. Human Rights Council last year, CDT reported that the number of China-based “civil society” organizations listed in China’s UPR summary report nearly tripled over the course of two UPR cycles from 2013 to 2024, which may have dampened criticism of China’s human rights record. At The Washington Post, reporting in partnership with ICIJ, Greg Miller, Jelena Ćosić, and Tamsin Lee-Smith described the scale of Chinese NGOs at the U.N. that have hidden ties to the CCP:

The ICIJ investigation identified 106 NGOs that have received U.N. accreditation and are registered in or affiliated with China. At least 59 appear to violate U.N. rules meant to ensure that NGOs testifying in Geneva aren’t doing so under government influence or pressure.

More than 50 of the 106 NGOs included language in charter documents pledging loyalty to the CCP, with some acknowledging that they defer to the party on decisions of hiring and funding, the investigation found. Forty-six listed directors or others in leadership roles who simultaneously held positions in Chinese state agencies or the CCP. Records show that at least 10 received the bulk of their funding from Chinese government sources.

[…] The number of Chinese organizations with U.N. credentials has nearly doubled since 2018, the year of the initial U.N. report on Xinjiang. Many of these organizations were formed at least a decade ago but only sought NGO accreditation after 2018. The surge reflects an effort that has been backed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and involves nearly every level of government in China.

[…] Last year, 33 Chinese NGOs made nearly 300 appearances at Human Rights Council sessions, according to data gathered by the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), an independent nonprofit group. An examination of their statements and testimony found not a single instance in which any had uttered words that could be construed as critical of China. [Source]

Ethnic minority groups are often targets of Beijing’s transnational repression, as the ICIJ highlighted. Alongside the investigation is a report by Citizen Lab detailing how Uyghur-language software was hijacked to deliver malware that was extremely well customized to reach the target population of Uyghurs in exile. The report states that the cyberattack replicates a pattern of Chinese-government-aligned threat actors digitally targeting marginalized communities. Earlier this month, CDT documented other reports on the expansion of China’s digital repression of Tibetans, including those in diaspora, via a Chinese state-owned digital forensics firm that provides offensive cyber-operations training for Lhasa’s Tibet Police College. The Guardian, another ICIJ partner, recently uncovered an online campaign of transnational repression against Hongkongers in the U.K. The campaign included 29 accounts that published over 150 posts last August doxxing Hongkongers and exhibiting similarities to other online influence operations by a Chinese security agency. ICIJ partners provided other local case studies, as well.

Another focus of the ICIJ investigation was the Chinese Party-state’s attempts to instrumentalize Interpol. The Chinese government has increasingly used Interpol red notices to target a wide range of its citizens abroad, and China “does not appear to be among the countries currently subject to Interpol corrected measures for alleged misuse of the organization’s system,” the ICIJ wrote. Along with other ICIJ partners, Simon Leplâtre at Le Monde described how Interpol is used as a tool in China’s arsenal of transnational repression, using the story of Huang Youlong (referred to as "H."), a close confidant of Jack Ma:

Like H., hundreds of individuals whom China considers to be persons of interest have been targeted by abusive red notices. In collaboration with 42 media outlets and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), Le Monde investigated several cases that illustrate China’s use of Interpol and the lack of safeguards within the institution. Despite attempts to reform it, Interpol, based in the French city of Lyon, still lacks transparency in its procedures and never publicly holds countries that abuse it accountable – a boon for authoritarian regimes.

Our investigation shows that Interpol is one of the components of China’s arsenal of repressive measures used against its targets abroad, whether they are political dissidents, members of minorities that are oppressed in China – such as Uyghurs or Tibetans – businesspeople and political leaders, either corrupt or the victims of purges.

[…] Ted Bromund, a researcher and expert witness in legal cases involving Interpol procedures, explained that "Interpol is a tool. So is sending text messages to people. So is stalking them physically. So is revoking their passports. (…) By itself, it’s not generally particularly effective with China. But the way I like to put it with the Chinese is that Interpol is like a pin through a butterfly in an insect collection. It holds someone down, locks them in place so they can’t get away. And then it’s much easier to apply all of these other tools because you’ve got someone located." [Source]

Responding to the ICIJ investigation on Bluesky, Jeremy Daum at China Law Translate shared a thread urging caution with the terminology and framing of the term “transnational repression” when contemplating appropriate responses to the phenomenon:

🧵Happy to see continued attention on the ways that China harasses and surveils abroad– hard to find the bandwidth today, but it remains a real issue that impacts people's lives.A few thoughts that I've raised elsewhere on how best to think about it and address it: www.icij.org/investigatio…

— China Law Translate / Jeremy Daum (@chinalawtranslate.bsky.social) 2025-04-29T14:53:30.795Z

Other aspects of the Russia-Ukraine war that have received widespread coverage recently are the role of foreign fighters—including a small number of Chinese mercenaries—in the conflict, and the extent to which Chinese companies are supplying Russia with “dual-use” goods that might be used in the war effort. At The Kyiv Independent, Lucy Pakhnyuk reported that this week, Ukraine presented China with evidence that Chinese citizens and companies are providing the Russian military with manpower and munitions to assist in the invasion of Ukraine:

During a meeting with Chinese Ambassador to Ukraine Ma Shengkun, Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgen Perebyinis shared evidence that Chinese citizens and companies are involved in the war in Ukraine.

[...] Perebyinis also called for China to "take measures to stop supporting Russia" in its aggression against Ukraine, and assured that Ukraine "values ​​its strategic partnership with China and expects that China will refrain from taking steps that could hinder bilateral relations."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry on April 18 rejected Zelensky’s claims of weapons deliveries as "groundless," insisting that Beijing remains committed to a ceasefire. The same day, Zelensky announced sanctions against multiple entities based in China.

Although China has officially claimed neutrality with regard to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has deepened economic ties with Moscow, supported Russia against Western sanctions, and emerged as a top supplier of dual-use goods that feed the Russian defense sector.

Earlier this month, Ukraine captured two Chinese citizens fighting for Russia in Donetsk Oblast. President Volodymyr Zelensky has claimed that "several hundred" Chinese nationals are fighting on Russia’s side in the war. [Source]

As CNN’s Andrew Carey and Victoria Butenko reported last week, although the extent to which foreign fighters participate in the war remains murky, Ukraine has undoubtedly captured a number of non-Russian POWs, including small groups from former Soviet republics, China, North Korea, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, plus individuals from Somalia, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Egypt, and Syria. A Ukrainian press conference featured two captured Chinese POWs who stated that they had signed contracts with the Russian military for personal reasons—an attractive monthly salary in one case, and the promise of Russian citizenship in the other. Unlike North Korea, whose government has sent over 14,000 of its soldiers to fight on the Russian side, the Chinese government does not encourage its citizens to get involved in the war, and may even criticize them if they do. In Part One of investigative journalist Chai Jing’s video interview with “Macaron,” a Chinese citizen fighting on the Russian side in Bakhmut, one Chinese mercenary complained that the Chinese embassy refused to help him because it claimed he had made a “personal decision” to enlist in the Russian army. Despite this, it is likely that China’s “no limits partnership” with Russia, strongly pro-Russia state-media coverage of the war, and tolerance of bellicose social media content has fueled the desire of some Chinese men—particularly the unemployed, indebted, or estranged—to go and fight for Russia in Ukraine.

Part Two of Chai Jing’s YouTube interview with Macaron is translated in full below. (It begins at the 22:47 timestamp in the YouTube video.) Their wide-ranging conversation, conducted by video from a bunker in Bakhmut where Macaron was bivouacked, is interspersed with copious photos, videos, and social media posts from Macaron and other Chinese soldiers involved in the Russia-Ukraine war. This second part covers such topics as drone and trench warfare, landmines, battlefield deaths and injuries, mental health, abandoned homes and animals, the role of foreign mercenaries in the war, and larger moral questions about the morality of warfare. (For more CDT coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war, see “Four Censored Essays on the Ukraine Crisis,” “Netizen Voices on Ukraine,” and a censorship directive with instructions to “keep Weibo posts on Ukraine favorable to Russia.”)

Chai: Would it be possible for you to escape on your own, to just leave the battlefield, say, and walk off? Could you do that?

Macaron: No way. There are checkpoints everywhere. And to be honest, in the areas around us, there’s nothing to stop anyone from just shooting and killing you. This place, there’s no law, no morality, no constraints against … [There is a long pause, as the video becomes choppy and voices are audible in the background. Macaron moves into what looks like a different area of the bunker.] There’s none of that here.

Chai: Our interviews were often interrupted by Russian soldiers. As someone fighting in a foreign army, someone who doesn’t understand the language, Macaron’s constant tension, vigilance, and uneasiness is palpable.

Macaron: This isn’t a good place to be a foreigner. For example, when we’re being shelled, they’ll tell you to get down on the ground, but you won’t understand (the order). They say to turn left, but you turn right instead. The language barrier is a huge obstacle. Once when I was coming back from the bathroom, I saw this wire on the ground. It was a tripwire, and if I’d stepped on it, I would’ve been dead for sure. It was connected to a landmine. Luckily, I stepped over it. When I got back inside, I asked (the other soldiers), “Why didn’t you tell me there were mines out there? Why didn’t you say you’d planted mines outside?”

Chai: Did no one else in your unit know about the mines, besides the person who planted them?

Macaron: Someone might have. Or maybe the person who planted it was already dead.

Chai: It all sounds extremely disorganized. Would that be fair to say?

Macaron: Yes, that’s how it is in war. It’s complete chaos.

Chai: In the [Russian-occupied] Southern Military District, [another Chinese mercenary named] Zhou Zhiqiang described a similar level of chaos. During a battle in the trenches, one of the men in his unit, a Nepalese mercenary, started firing his assault rifle indiscriminately and killed some of his fellow soldiers. Abandoning his injured comrades, the man tried to escape, only to step on a landmine. While fighting in the trenches, Zhou Zhiqiang also came face-to-face with a Ukrainian soldier he dubbed “Grandpa.” During the confrontation, the elderly Ukrainian soldier abandoned his gun, with the safety still on, and fled.

Chai (V.O.): According to the U.S. Department of Defense, as of October 2024, Russian forces had sustained over 600,000 casualties. But Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive has also exacted a heavy toll. In August of that same year, Zelenskyy stated that 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed, and another 370,000 wounded.

Macaron (V.O.): [in a video showing bowls of chicken soup] Last night, we stormed and captured a position, so our commander’s rewarding us with some chicken soup. Despite our lousy equipment, we put up a good fight. But both sides suffered heavy casualties. I won’t even go into the details, it’s too gory.

Chai: Before you made the choice to see these people as “the enemy,” did you ever think to yourself that maybe instead of being the enemy, they’re just victims?

Macaron: Honestly, from Ukraine’s perspective, we are the invaders. Because we’ve attacked their soldiers, we’ve occupied their territory. But from Russia’s perspective, it’s about maintaining peace in the Donbas region and preventing NATO’s expansion. Personally, I don’t have a particular stance.

Chai: But by choosing one side over the other, aren’t you essentially deciding who your enemy is, and whose values you’re defending?

Macaron: For me, it’s not about values. It’s just a job.

Chai: But Macaron, you must realize that a big part of your job involves … killing people.

Macaron: But since we’re an assault unit, most of the time, when we’re far from the enemy, they usually spot us first. Because they have drones. When they spot us, they launch drones—suicide drones—and artillery attacks against us. It’s rare that we really get that close, close enough to see them face to face. That sort of thing is rare. It hardly ever happens.

Chai: I feel like you’re dodging the question a bit. In fact, you are aware that they’re there, and you do come face to face with them, don’t you?

Macaron: Yes. In certain situations, yes, that’s true.

Chai: In that moment when you’re face to face with another human being and you raise your gun at them, do you ever ask yourself if what you’re doing is wrong?

Macaron: In combat, just a few seconds can determine whether you live or die. It all happens so fast, I don’t have time to think about things like that. What I spend most of my time thinking about is how I can get out of this brutal war alive.

Chai: Is it that you don’t have time to think, or that you’re afraid if you start to question things too much, you’ll lose your resolve, and that will put your life in danger?

Macaron: Both. If I hesitate, or overthink, or let my emotions get the better of me, it makes me vulnerable. And that means I could end up like them (other soldiers who have died). Over time, I’ve become numb. Now I’m just numb.

Chai (V.O.): Bakhmut, where Macaron is stationed, was the site of the bloodiest and most protracted battle of the Russia-Ukraine war. This city that was once home to 70,000 residents is now a trench-scarred wasteland. Its schools, hospitals, and churches lie in ruins, and stray cats and dogs wander the streets.

[Chai’s voiceover is accompanied by a photo of a fire in a building in Bakhmut; a video of a huge explosion leveling a vast swath of the city; a photo of a man squatting down to embrace a large stray dog lying in the middle of a road; and a video surveying the collapsed, rubble-strewn interior of a building.]

[In another video, Macaron pets a purring, grey brindled cat standing on the ground near his feet.]

Macaron (V.O.): This is my cat. He’s really friendly. Sometimes when I go out on patrol, he comes along. Look how happy he is to see me. I feed him canned food whenever I can, whatever I can find. Sometimes he even sleeps with me at night. It’s nice. See right there, where his fur is singed off? He got too close to the stove and burned himself.

Chai: But you know you’re standing in someone else’s home, in someone else’s city. You also know that what you’re doing is destructive. Since you have such sympathy for a cat, I would guess that you still have some sympathy for people, too.

Macaron: Actually, I saw this post on Xiaohongshu [Red Note] a while ago. You know Xiaohongshu, right? This post was from a Ukrainian talking about Bakhmut, where I am now. [a video taken by Macaron in Bakhmut shows broken trees, deserted roads, collapsed buildings, and ground littered with debris] He said, “Bakhmut, where my family lived for generations, used to be my home. But now, because of the war, I’ve had to leave.” I sent him a reply saying I was in Bakhmut, and asked him where his house was. He told me it was long gone, just ruins now. I said that’s just how war is. Even though I knew there was nothing I could do to change things, it stirred up a lot of feelings, and I really did want to be his friend. Because if this were my hometown being destroyed, my house being captured by the enemy, I’d be devastated, too. That’s just a normal human reaction. All I could do was try to console him, and maybe I was also trying to fool myself, to numb myself, by saying, “Yeah, that’s just how war is.”

Chai: Macaron, it feels like there are two personalities at war within you.

Macaron: Yeah. Right now, I’m part of this army, so I have to behave according to its rules. But I also have my own thoughts and feelings. And I’ve been treated unfairly, unjustly, and even cruelly by Russians, too. So yeah, I do feel conflicted. It’s complicated.

[The screen fades to a darkened video, with a voice speaking in Russian and explosions in the background.]

Chai (V.O.): When he’s not fighting, Macaron spends most of his time sitting in the dark, listening to the ceaseless gunfire and explosions. Before enlisting in the war, he had cut ties with his parents and broken up with his girlfriend. Over the past year and a half, nearly all the foreign fighters he trained with have died in battle, and those still alive are exhibiting signs of mental breakdown.

Macaron (V.O.): [in another video, showing several pots of instant noodles] There was this Russian guy with a red beard who just disappeared. You could tell he was already fucking starting to lose it. [a fellow soldier shouts incoherently in the background] You get used to it. People just vanish.

Macaron: [speaking with Chai Jing again] A lot of guys here get injured, sent to hospital, and start drinking on the sly. When they drink, it’s like they’ve gone totally insane. I think a lot of soldiers here are like that. Because some have been fighting for two, three years, and it drives them to extremes. Some even use drugs.

Chai: Can you get drugs on the front lines?

Macaron: I don’t know, but some people must have connections. I’ve heard that in the fields around some Ukrainian cities, they grow stuff, but I’m not sure. Me, I don’t normally smoke tobacco, but if we’re taking fire on the battlefield, I need a cigarette just to calm my nerves.

[In another video, Macron speaks to a rat perched on scaffolding against a gray concrete wall.]

Macaron (V.O.): Hey, little buddy, you’re back. What are you doing here? [As the rat scuttles away, there is a booming explosion in the distance.] Fuck.

Chai: I can imagine that when you’re trapped underground like that, in complete darkness, it must be easy to fall into despair.

Macaron: Yeah, it was dark and damp, and you couldn’t even relieve the stress by talking to anyone. It was pretty awful. But by now, I don’t really care anymore, because I’ve gotten used to it. Sometimes I just feel lucky I’m still alive. And if I don’t survive, that’s fine, too. Just make it a quick death, you know? Don’t torture me, just make it quick. I can deal with that. What I can’t deal with is being alive but wanting to die and not being able to. They don’t kill you straight away. First they might blow your leg off, leave you crawling on the ground, then blow away your arm. Then they’d … that’s what they’d do. [Macaron falls silent and looks down. Chai gives a long sigh.] That’s just how war is. It’s the same for soldiers on both sides.

[A photo of a soldier reaching out a hand as if to stop the military drone hovering above him.]

Chai (V.O.): Dreading that kind of suffering, Macaron always carries a grenade with him.

Macaron (V.O.): [in a video, Macaron holds a grenade in one hand] Going into battle, I always keep one last grenade for myself, just in case.

[A photo of a soldier raising both hands in the air as a large military drone approaches. Chinese social media posts about drone attacks.]

Chai (V.O.): Many Chinese mercenaries have been killed by drone strikes. According to Zhou Zhiqiang, after his unit captured a trench, they were struck by explosives dropped by unmanned drones. Afterward, Zhou found [his friend and fellow mercenary] Zhao Rui covered in blood, dead on his back with eyes open, staring at the sky. Zhou, whose leg had been blown off, managed to escape by first playing dead, and then crawling out of the combat zone. It took him six hours to cover the one-kilometer distance.

Zhou Zhiqiang: [In a darkened video, Zhou wears a military-green muffler that covers his neck and mouth. Only his nose and eyes are visible.] Our trenches were bombed. We were bombed, and a lot of people died. I was hit seven times, and it was a miracle I survived. I made it back alive to tell you: don’t come here. Whatever you do, don’t come. My friend Zhao is dead, and it wasn’t a peaceful death.

Chai (V.O.): Zhao Rui had once told Zhou Zhiqiang that his final wish, if he died in battle, was for Zhou to bring a lock of his hair back to his parents, so his “soul could return home.” But there were no scissors at hand on the battlefield, so Zhou only managed to bring back his friend’s ID. [a photo of Zhao Rui in uniform with other soldiers, above a photo page from his passport] It reads: “Zhao Rui. 38 years old. Unmarried. Resident of Chongqing.” This is the last video that Zhao Rui recorded before he died.

Zhao Rui: [In a video, Zhao speaks to the camera. He is dressed in a green camouflage jacket with a hood and a tan mask over the lower half of his face.] Here’s some advice for you guys who’ve messaged me about coming here: don’t come. There’s nothing for you here. Get a job back home. If you work hard, you’ll earn just as much as you would here.

[As Zhao continues speaking, the video switches to grainy drone-based footage of a lone man trudging through the wilderness along a dirt path. The man wears a large backpack, and carries what appear to be two heavy jugs of water. A bomb of some sort falls from the drone, and the man begins racing down the path, raising clouds of dust. Another bomb falls toward the man, and the footage fades to black.]

Zhao Rui (V.O.): It’s been so long since I’ve had food from my hometown. I miss it so much, and wish I could go back. [sigh] I think about what I miss eating the most. I just keep thinking and thinking about it. I think about how much seasoning you’re supposed to add, and how long you should stir-fry it. [laughs]

Chai (V.O.): Zhao Rui was the first confirmed Chinese casualty in the Russia-Ukraine war. There are no reliable statistics on the total number of Chinese mercenaries killed or injured, but Macaron estimates that out of a hundred-plus Chinese fighting there, more than half have been killed or wounded.

[During Chai’s voice-over narration, we see various images and videos: a selfie of Zhao Rui in fatigues with two other foreign soldiers. A video Zhao Rui took upon his arrival in Moscow of a military-themed display of funeral wreaths, photos of fallen soldiers, and various flags, including a flag from the PMC Wagner Group.]

[Another video just shows the ground, and a shadow on the ground. A man speaks, and loud explosions are audible in the background.]

Man in video (V.O.): Every day there’s bombing. Why would you want to come to a place like this?

Chai (V.O.): Macaron made a public announcement about the deaths of four of those men.

[A black-and-white screenshot shows a social media post and video from Macaron, asking for help informing the families of four Chinese men who died in the fighting: Liu Jie, Liu Hongwei, Xu Hang, and Pan Da.]

Chai (V.O.): On August 1, 2024, 20-year-old Liu Jie and his friend Liu Hongwei were both killed by landmines and bombs. It was their first day on the battlefield.

Macaron: [speaking to the camera, in a video he posted to Douyin] From what I heard, four days ago, Liu Jie and Liu Hongwei were carrying out a mission. Liu Hongwei stepped on an IED that injured his leg. Then a drone dropped five bombs and he was killed. The other guy, Liu Jie, the little guy, was killed by bombs from two FPV ["first-person view," or radio-controlled] drones. If anyone out there knows their families, friends, or classmates, please contact me, and I’ll do my best to communicate with the Russians here, so that at the very least, their families can get some closure.

Chai: Back home, some of these guys had seen your videos. So on some level, you may have inspired them, or been a factor that influenced their decision to come here. How did you feel when you heard they had died?

Macaron: I think it’s probably true that I did mislead them, to some extent. But after I reported what happened to them, after I exposed their deaths, Douyin straight up banned my account.

Chai: Why do you think that happened?

Macaron: Maybe because they didn’t want people to know that Chinese soldiers were dying here.

[Close ups of the photos of Liu Jie and Liu Hongwei in uniform.]

Chai (V.O.): Did the families of those soldiers who were killed in action ever receive the 5 million rubles (less than 400,000 yuan, or $55,000 U.S.) in compensation that Russia had promised them? Macaron isn’t sure. No one ever contacted him.

[More photos of Liu Jie and Liu Hongwei in uniform, followed by a screenshot of journalist Lu Yuhuang’s online letter to Putin.]

Chai (V.O.): Phoenix TV journalist Lu Yuguang later wrote a letter to Putin, which was published online. The letter stated that a month after Zhao Rui’s death, his parents had yet to receive their son’s remains, or even an official notification. Lu urged Putin to “handle the matter as promptly as possible to ensure that the deceased can receive a dignified burial.” Macaron has some experience helping with the disposition of the remains of soldiers who died in action, but he is reluctant to talk about it.

Chai: Some families didn’t get the promised compensation, did they?

Macaron: Yeah, I think that’s true. A lot of Russian families can’t even find the bodies of their dead relatives. And if there’s no body, they’re considered “missing in action.” It’s a mess, the chaos of war.

Chai: If you were fighting for your own country, maybe you wouldn’t be so … forgotten. You’d be remembered as a martyr.

Macaron: I know. But here we’re nobodies, like flies. From a psychological or moral standpoint, there’s nothing remotely meaningful about this. That’s why I say I have no particular stance. I’m just an ordinary guy who made the wrong choice and got involved in this war. My role is to be a grunt, or maybe more accurately, to be cannon fodder. [chuckles]

[Aerial footage of a Russian soldier in a trench, reading a note dropped from a Ukrainian drone urging him to “follow the drone and surrender.” In subsequent footage, the soldier is seen communicating with the drone via gestures, and later, following the path of the drone in order to surrender to the Ukrainians.]

Chai (V.O.): I’d seen videos of Russian soldiers surrendering to Ukrainian drones. I once asked Macaron why he didn’t do the same: Why not just surrender to the Ukranians, so he could go home?

Macaron (V.O.): Because I’m not Russian. It’s that simple. If you’re Russian, you might have been drafted or conscripted, just like the Ukrainians. Some of these guys were forced to fight, they had no choice, so there’s some mutual understanding there. But for foreign soldiers like us, the Ukrainians are going to wonder why we decided to come here. Was it for the money, or maybe for the thrill of killing? They’re going to feel more hostile toward us.

Chai (V.O.): Macaron believes that unless the war comes to an end, neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians will allow him to leave.

Macaron: [speaking to the camera, in a video posted to social media] They won’t let you leave this place alive.

[Screenshot of the Chinese-language New York Times website with a photo of Presidents Trump and Zelenskyy gesturing at each other during Zelenskyy’s February 28, 2025 visit to the White House.]

Chai (V.O.): Macaron says his only hope is for the war to end. But with the current level of geopolitical instability, ceasefire negotiations will be an uphill battle. The day after our interview, Macaron told me he had finally been transferred out of the assault unit, and allowed to lay down his weapons.

Chai: What do the Russian soldiers think about the current situation?

Macaron: Most of them think the war will be over soon. They don’t want to fight anymore. They just want to go home. All of us feel that way, to be honest. We’re sick of this war.

Chai: How so?

Macaron: Anyone who’s experienced battle, who’s seen war up close, never wants to experience it again. And they don’t tend to glorify it, either. It’s the people online hyping up war and acting all heroic that I find most disgusting. In war, there are no heroes. Everyone’s a villain, because you have no choice but to kill.

Chai: Would you include yourself in that, too?

Macaron: I’d say so, yeah. I made a mistake, a wrong choice, and now I’m stuck fighting this Slavic war. Every inch of territory here is paid for in blood. It’s not at all cool or fun. It’s inhumane and immoral. Especially the way rank-and-file soldiers get treated if they’re captured. Some are humiliated, tortured, or killed. That sort of behavior just goes against basic human decency and morality. It really sucks.

Chai: Before this program aired, Macaron sent me a message saying that he had been injured in a bombing while helping to evacuate the wounded. He had suffered injuries to his arms and legs, and had been sent to a hospital far from the front lines. But for once, he sounded hopeful. He said that of all the things that could have happened to him in this war, this was the best outcome he could have hoped for.

Chai: [speaking to Macaron again, before his injury occurred] After this war is over, would you ever fight in another?

Macaron: I just want the war to end. And if it does, I’d much rather help people than hurt them. Haven’t we been hurt enough? And haven’t we hurt others enough? I think so.

Chai: From what you’re saying, it sounds like even though you try to tamp down your feelings or not succumb to emotional weakness, you do feel … guilty about harming others.

Macaron: I think I do. Even though we try to comfort ourselves, or deceive ourselves, by saying “Oh, this is just how war is,” at some point we have to face reality.

Chai: Over this past year or so of war and everything else you’ve experienced, was there ever a moment that made you feel particularly uncomfortable, or guilty?

Macaron: That sort of thing happens a lot. Especially here in Bakhmut, where we’re often going into empty houses, and there are still things like furniture and stuff inside. If we see something we can use at our command post, we’ll take it. And honestly, that doesn’t seem right to me, taking things that don’t belong to us. Even if no one is coming back for them, they belonged to ordinary people, ordinary Ukrainians. It doesn’t feel right for us to trash or loot or take their things. So sometimes I feel bad about that.

[A video of a soldier, seen from behind, sitting in a wooden chair and playing a piano in an empty house.]

Chai: In one of Macaron’s videos, he and his comrades find a dusty piano in the ruins of someone’s home.

Macaron (V.O.): If I’m honest, sometimes I get a bit emotional when I’m standing there in these wrecked houses, looking at the ruins around me. Sometimes in my mind, I silently apologize to the owners, to the people who used to live there. I feel like I should apologize for my behavior. [the piano video fades away and is replaced with Macaron speaking to Cai Jing again] Even though I wasn’t the one who did it, even if the place was trashed before I showed up, I’m still part of the system. I’m on the side that did this to them, so I’m complicit.

Chai: You said you don’t want to harm people anymore. You want to do something to help, instead. What kind of things?

Macaron: Well, there are a lot of kids in the Donbas region. [A photo shows a blasted-out school building with charred, twisted pieces of metal playground equipment outside.] I used to see kids begging at the train station in Donetsk. Someday if I get the chance, I’d like to do something to help them, even if it’s just making sure they have enough to eat or enough to wear.

Chai: Before this program aired, Macaron was injured. [A video shows only Macaron’s arms and legs. He is sitting in a wheelchair, his right arm encased in a white cast.] Unable to walk, he was evacuated from the front lines to a hospital. In two more months, his contract will be up. When he was in pain and couldn’t sleep at night, he wrote this poem and sent it to me:

[Chai Jing reads the poem, to the accompaniment of tinkling piano music and a video showing Macaron walking outdoors, on patrol with other soldiers amid empty roads and demolished buildings. Lastly, there is an aerial shot of a neighborhood in Bakhmut where all the buildings have been bombed or burned, with smoke still rising from the ruins.]

Chai Jing (V.O.):
I like the pain
because it reminds me
I’m still alive.
Trees have been blasted apart,
but young saplings will bud again.
Houses have been bombed to rubble,
but engineers will rebuild them.
It is only the dead,
their limbs torn asunder,
who won’t be coming back.
The dead watch the living die,
and the living wish the dead could revive.
I am in Bakhmut—
a city destroyed by war. [Chinese]

Chinese state-controlled media’s coverage on his death has been terse. The Chinese government extended its condolences nearly 24 hours after the Vatican’s announcement of the pope’s death – when asked about it at a regular news conference at its foreign ministry.

“In recent years, China and the Vatican have maintained constructive contact and engaged in beneficial exchanges. The Chinese side is willing to work together with the Vatican to promote the continued improvement of China-Vatican relations,” Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for the ministry, told reporters on Tuesday.

China’s minimalist response underscores the sensitivity of ties between the atheist ruling Communist Party and the Holy See. [Source]

After the death of Pope John Paul II in 2005, the Chinese government did not send a representative to his funeral and instead criticized then-Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s planned trip to the Vatican as a separatist move. The Vatican is one of 11 countries worldwide and the only country in Europe that officially recognizes Taiwan. This week, current Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te expressed his “sincerest condolences on behalf of the people of Taiwan to the Catholic community and everyone mourning the passing of His Holiness Pope Francis,” adding, “We will continue to draw inspiration from his lifelong commitment to peace, global solidarity, and caring for those in need.” Taiwan reportedly hopes to send President Lai to attend Pope Francis’ funeral, and is awaiting a response from the Vatican. Hong Kong’s Catholic Church and religious leaders also expressed their “deepest condolences.” The Dalai Lama stated, “His Holiness Pope Francis dedicated himself to the service of others, […] consistently revealing by his own actions how to live a simple, but meaningful life. The best tribute we can pay to him is to be a warm-hearted person, serving others wherever and in whatever way we can.”

Unlike many of his predecessors, Pope Francis never met with the Dalai Lama, as he tried to thread the needle of the Vatican’s sensitive relationship with China. The Chinese government’s restrictions on Catholicism have produced a decades-long split among the 10-12 million Catholics in China, between the state-controlled Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association churches and persecuted underground churches that profess loyalty to the pope. Pope Francis reached a landmark agreement with the government in 2018—which was renewed in 2020 and 2022, and renewed again last October for another four years—that ostensibly recognizes the pope as the religious authority of all Chinese Catholics, gives the pope the power to veto appointments of all new bishops nominated by Beijing, and legitimizes those that had been appointed by Beijing without prior papal approval.

Details of the agreement have remained secret. Critics lament that in reality the Chinese government has over the past few years made several high-profile, unilateral appointments that forced the pope to retrospectively ratify in order to maintain the Church’s formal position in China. The Vatican’s muted reaction to Hong Kong’s arrest of Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun in May 2022, just months before the agreement with China was renewed, added to the controversy. And despite these agreements, religious persecution and Sinicization campaigns have only grown under Xi Jinping.

Laura Zhou, Shi Jiangtao, and Lawrence Chung at the South China Morning Post reported how China’s ties with the Vatican might change under a new pope:

“It depends on who will succeed him,” said Yun Sun, director of the China programme at the Stimson Centre think tank in Washington.

“If it is a more conservative and orthodox pope, the Vatican will be likely to withdraw some of Pope Francis’ engagement, outreach and pragmatic approach to China, such as the authority to appoint bishops.”

[...] “This issue is not likely to be resolved, whoever will represent the Vatican in this relationship going forward,” [a] specialist on Sino-Christian studies said.

“Beijing will remain pragmatic, the question is to what extent pragmatism will serve the Holy See and China’s Catholic Church.”

[...] “Beijing is unlikely to pay too much attention to the China policy of the Vatican, because China’s position has been consistent and will not be changed because of a new pope,” said Deng Yuwen, former deputy editor of the Communist Party’s flagship newspaper Study Times.

“But of course Beijing would be keen to see a successor who is friendly to China, and who will not have a too close relationship with Taiwan.” [Source]

Pope Francis’ efforts to bridge the Vatican and China will likely not be the last. “The next pope may not be as gifted or confident with Chinese or Asian situations, but it’s going to remain a priority,” Dr. Michel Chambon, a Catholic theologian at the National University of Singapore, told The Sydney Morning Herald. “The next election [for pope] will be probably the first time that, when they select candidates, they will check his view on China. It will be a key criteria that he has a subtle, constructive view on how to engage China.” At Le Monde, Frédéric Lemaître described how, despite the limitations of Pope Francis’ approach, the Vatican is pursuing a realist and long-term strategy:

This key man in Vatican diplomacy[, Benoît Vermander, a Jesuit who teaches philosophy at Fudan University in Shanghai,] is in favor of the agreement, but noted that many Catholics feel that the price to be paid to move toward this greater unity of the Church is high. While Pope Francis was very discreet about human rights abuses in China – only once was he heard praying for "the poor Uyghurs" – Xi clearly has no intention of granting greater autonomy to the Churches. Quite the contrary, in fact. Since 2017, he has been insisting on the Sinicization of religions, a term which means that they must in effect accept the primacy of the Chinese Communist Party. In an interview with the American Catholic channel EWTN News in March 2023, Paul Richard Gallagher, the Vatican’s secretary for relations with states, acknowledged that this 2020 agreement is "certainly not the best deal possible."

"Everything is done obviously in the context of Chinese domestic politics (…) And therefore, we can only achieve so much," Gallagher said. "But one of the things that the Chinese and the Catholic Church and the Holy See have in common is that we don’t think in months, or even in years. We’re thinking in terms of a much longer time. And we hope that, in time, the relations between the Catholic Church in China will be shall we say much more ‘normal,’ much more fluid, much more fruitful." While Francis may have been a visionary, it has to be said that he was up against a formidable tactician determined to do him no favors. [Source]

While the occupation of a three-million-square-mile island nearly two thousand miles from China might charitably be described as fanciful, China’s development of capabilities to project maritime power further across the region is more grounded in reality. A new report from Domingo I-Kwei Yang at the Prague-based Sinopsis also takes the recent naval exercises as a starting point, arguing that economic and commercial activities carried out under the Belt and Road Initiative lay foundations for potential future militarization. From the report’s introduction:

In February 2025, Australia, New Zealand, and regional actors were caught off guard when the PLA conducted live-fire exercises there with little notice, forcing dozens of flights to reroute. The incident served as a wake-up call, highlighting China’s expanding military reach beyond the Third Island Chain [[See background on the Pacific’s strategic island chains]. China’s military presence in the Pacific will continue to grow, driven by its expanding hegemonic ambitions in the region. China has been steadily building its military capabilities and extending its security sphere through infrastructure projects in the Pacific for many years.

China’s military reach is hidden, embedded in its foreign investments and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. While research on the BRI has expanded since 2013, most studies focus on economics and foreign aid, downplaying its security and military dimensions. Even as China’s overseas basing ambitions draw attention—especially after its first military base in Djibouti in 2017—the security risks of its Pacific infrastructure projects remain largely ignored.

[…] This policy paper explores whether China is preparing to weaponise its infrastructure in the Pacific to strengthen its hard power presence. It first analyses the strategic nature of the BRI in the region, arguing that China’s geopolitical ambitions outweigh its economic objectives. It then identifies four key categories of strategic infrastructure: ports and wharves, fishery facilities, aeronautical hubs, and ICT networks. The paper further explores how these assets could be militarised before assessing China’s long-term strategy for leveraging them in the Pacific.

This paper argues that China uses its development projects in the Pacific as covert infrastructures to advance the PLA’s force projection toward the Third Island Chain. Far from serving purely economic interests, these projects act as force multipliers—tangible and intangible assets that enhance military capability and strategic value. Through dualuse infrastructure, technology, software, and hardware, China expands its influence and strengthens its military reach. In a transition from peace to war, these assets could be weaponised to restrict regional actors’ freedom of action. [Source]

The paper concludes:

If China consolidates control over […] strategic nodes, it could manipulate trade flows, disrupt global markets, and exert political pressure on both regional and global actors. Countries that rely on open and secure sea lanes—such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific small island developing states—must recognise the long-term risks posed by China’s infrastructures located at geostrategic chokepoints.

Ultimately, China’s expansion in the Pacific is not only about territorial influence but about shaping the future balance of power. Chinese infrastructure projects have the potential to become military footholds and multiply power projection capability. A proactive response—through strengthened alliances, strategic investments, and regional cooperation—is essential to preserving peace and stability. For the U.S., its allies, and regional actors, this is not just about countering China; it is about defending a free, open, and rules-based international order in the Pacific. [Source]

The report ends with a set of recommendations emphasizing the importance of solidarity and collaboration with allies across the region.

China’s reliance on dual-use resources was also highlighted in a recent New York Times report on the development of new landing barges apparently intended for use in the event of an invasion of Taiwan:

The satellite images did not show any vehicles actually being unloaded. But ferries and cargo ships that took part were of a kind built or modified to handle heavy armed vehicles, like armored personnel vehicles or even tanks, said Jason Wang, the chief operating officer of ingeniSPACE, a company that analyzes satellite images and other data, including about the Chinese military.

Taiwan’s western coastline, facing the Chinese mainland, has relatively few beaches or ports where landing is easy, and those areas are relatively well guarded. The barges would theoretically enable China to pick other areas on Taiwan’s coast that might be more difficult to land on but are less defended, from which to come ashore, several experts said.

[…] “China still doesn’t have enough gray hull naval ships to assault Taiwan’s main island on their own,” Mr. Wang said, referring to the typical color of warships. But when you add specialized dual-use ferries and cargo ships, “then that becomes a different story,” he said.

“You’re then starting to have enough vessels to be able to deliver a battalion on shore quickly,” he said. [Source]

In the two weeks since Trump launched what he called his “Liberation Day” tariff blitz, Chinese diplomats have taken to X and Facebook — platforms that are banned within China — to post archival footage of President Ronald Reagan deploring trade wars and former Chinese leader Mao Zedong declaring China’s determination to defeat the United States in the Korean War.

Chinese state media have reposted a TikTok video made with AI that shows unhappy American workers sewing garments and assembling smartphones, with the caption: “Make America Great Again.” Several times a week, the state-run China Media Group has been sending personalized emails to reporters covering the trade war, offering them updates on China’s perspective.

[...] “It is not so much a change in China’s propaganda tactics, but that Trump himself messed up, allowing China’s propaganda to score points,” said Deng Yuwen, former deputy editor of the Communist Party-affiliated Study Times, who now lives in the U.S. “The huge controversy caused by the Trump administration has allowed the Chinese government’s methods to win points.”

[...] Now, Beijing is also delivering that message in catchy short videos and snarky memes aimed directly at Americans. A video posted on Facebook earlier this month by Guo Jiakun, a Foreign Ministry official, featured images of stock market indexes crashing and streets full of American protesters, while a narrator intoned in English: “The so-called global beacon now puts America first. … With China here, the sky won’t fall.” [Source]

Some of these efforts have backfired against domestic Chinese audiences. A CCTV account on Douyin published an AI-generated video that showed a factory assembly line of gloomy American government officials, including Trump and J.D. Vance, which evoked a satirical future of revitalized U.S. manufacturing that Trump seeks through his trade war. As CDT Chinese editors highlighted, many netizens criticized the video for its tone-deaf mockery of lower-income, labor-intensive jobs that many Chinese citizens are forced to endure in the present. In response to the avalanche of comments, the account closed the comment section and eventually deleted the video. A selection of critical comments have been translated below:

枫落秋末：The work you look down on is exactly what Chinese workers do every day.

¥金金：I don’t even know who this is trying to humiliate.

热拿铁：What’s the point of this? You’re mocking your own people.

BFSUNSET2887：What you hate is my life.

Xiaxia1357346：Officials know that factory work is grueling and poorly paid, yet they still claim that Chinese folks are poor because they don’t work hard enough.

sinji198183：You’re shooting yourself in the foot here.

WeileiFromSanqi：This is basically the consensus of the Chinese elite: the lives of the lower class are not worth living. If by some stroke of bad luck, they could no longer live an upper-class life, they would rather die.

Nick22022420863：This isn’t America’s desired future; it’s the Chinese people’s present. [Chinese]

Le Monde reported that Chinese influencers have flooded American social media platforms and urged American users to bypass American tariffs by buying goods directly from Chinese factories, which allegedly procure the same goods for a cheaper price than retailers. Some of these videos have received millions of views, propelling Chinese cross-border e-commerce app DHgate, which allows users to buy directly from Chinese factories, to become the second-most popular app on Apple’s App Store in the U.S. on Wednesday. But this alleged workaround may not last long, since the Trump administration’s elimination of the de minimis rule—which exempted Chinese shippers from paying U.S. taxes on goods worth less than $800—will go into effect on May 2. Moreover, many Chinese workers are already suffering from the impacts of the trade war. Yaling Jiang and Rongrong Zhuge at the Following the Yuan Substack shared RedNote posts by Chinese exporters and factory workers, including one from an employee who had just been laid off from their job at a cross-border e-commerce company:

“Who understands? I’ve been working at this company for almost four years, thinking I’d be here until retirement… But then, I received the news — the company had to close down due to 🇺🇸 tariffs! Our boss was truly amazing. He treated all of us like friends. Not only did he pay us our full month’s salary, but he also prepared personal farewell gifts for everyone. I’m so moved 🥹

No fake marketing here, just sharing my personal dramatic experience. I didn’t expect so many others are in the same situation. Please, don’t misjudge based on this.”

Comments:

• So soon, shouldn’t your company wait and see? Maybe your boss has been wanting to quit for a while, that’s why they’re lying flat. // The payroll cost must be high, I assume most of their businesses are with the US. The policy isn’t stable and the uncertainty may last a while. [Source]

Recent procurement documents reveal that Meiya Pico, a Chinese state-owned digital forensics firm, will provide an offensive cyber operations training environment and digital forensic laboratory to the Tibet Police College in Lhasa. This development underscores the Chinese government’s strategic investment in advanced Public Security Bureau (PSB) training infrastructure in Tibet and highlights Meiya Pico’s integral role in meeting these specialized requirements.

[...] Over the past decade, Meiya Pico has become a cornerstone of China’s digital surveillance complex. From developing covert phone spyware apps and forensic hacking devices for police, to building big-data platforms that mine email communications, Meiya Pico’s technology has been deployed at the front lines of repression in Xinjiang and Tibet. The company was identified as presenting a significant risk to the national security of the U.S. in 2019 and placed on its Entity List alongside companies like iFlytek and SenseTime – citing involvement in human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

[...] Meiya Pico is typical of this ecosystem in that it serves a dual role: enabling police surveillance on the home front in the PRC’s frontier regions, and the export of China’s digital repression model abroad. Whether through equipping PRC police in Tibet’s historic and cultural capital, Lhasa, with remote intrusion techniques or training foreign police forces, Meiya Pico exemplifies the global ambitions of China’s surveillance and security industry. [Source]

The digital realm has long been a target and instrument of state surveillance in Tibet. In CDT’s 2023 Cloud Cover report, we found that local and provincial Tibetan governments have spent over 55 million yuan on Police Geographic Information Systems (PGIS) technology over the past two decades. Other reports have covered how the Chinese government has expanded digital surveillance and DNA collection in Tibet. On Sunday, Human Rights Watch published a report about the increasing number of arrests of Tibetans for their internet and phone use. It described how this phenomenon has grown in tandem with police offering cash rewards for informing on fellow citizens, expanding manual phone searches on a mass scale, forcing Tibetans to download a government “anti-fraud” app that allows for backdoor government surveillance, and imposing restrictions on religious practice:

The full scale of such arrests and prosecutions is unknown, as Chinese authorities do not disclose official data for political offenses. The more than 60 reported cases appear related to an increase in government surveillance during this period, including through mass phone searches and the use of mandatory phone apps with built-in government surveillance, as well as a tightened regulatory regime on data and religion.

“For Tibetans, simply using a cellphone has become dangerous, and everyday activities like posting a humorous video or contacting loved ones abroad can bring arrest, detention, and torture,” said Maya Wang, associate China director at Human Rights Watch. “Tibetans, particularly those living in remote areas, once celebrated the arrival of cellphones so they could stay in touch with friends and family, but their phones have effectively become government tracking devices.”

[...] In many cases, those arrested were accused of keeping “banned content” on their phones or sharing it online. Such “banned content” typically includes references to Tibetan religious figures, particularly the exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and expressions of pro-Tibetan sentiment. Chinese authorities have applied the ambiguous language of the law broadly: in one case, a man was arrested for setting up a WeChat group celebrating the birthdays of 80-year-old Buddhist monks. The police said it was “illegal” to form such a chat group “without permission.” [Source]

A prime example of this sort of government repression took place earlier this month following the death of influential Tibetan Buddhist leader Tulku Hungkar Dorje. After Chinese authorities announced his death on April 2, they interrogated and detained local Tibetans who posted photos and messages online mourning his death, placed his monastery in Golog prefecture of Qinghai Province under round-the-clock police surveillance, and conducted random inspections of locals’ phones. Tulku Hungkar Dorje went missing in August 2024 after being harassed by Chinese authorities for his work on the preservation of Tibetan language and culture, and for allegedly snubbing the Chinese government-installed 11th Panchen Lama during the latter’s visit to his monastery. He was detained in Vietnam last month and reportedly died the day he was handed over to a visiting Chinese police squad. Five Tibetan monks, accompanied by Chinese embassy officials, were shown his face for two minutes but not allowed to see other parts of his body.

The Chinese government’s efforts to suppress Tibetan language and culture, particularly via Chinese schooling, have attracted growing media attention. Harold Thibault from Le Monde recently traveled to Golog prefecture, the location of Tulku Hungkar Dorje’s monastery, and reported how state boarding schools “sever [the] roots” of Tibetan children. He described the story of a 14-year-old girl named Dolma, who at age seven was sent to one such boarding school located more than 12 hours from her home in Sichuan:

[E]verything suggests that the project is at least as political as it is educational. It aims to integrate these students into Chinese society to assimilate them further, to the detriment of their mother tongue and local culture. In these high schools, located in cities with a predominantly Han Chinese population, most classes are taught in Chinese, and patriotic education permeates everyday life.

[...] Given Dolma’s young age, her mother had asked an older girl sent to the same boarding school to look after her before her departure. But they were not placed in the same dormitory and rarely saw each other. Dolma felt very lonely. At such a distance, it was unthinkable to return home on weekends, so she spent eight months a year away from her family. She could only make the journey for the nearly two months of winter vacation (between the Gregorian New Year and the Tibetan New Year) and the two months of summer vacation. "When I returned, the first weeks, I no longer understood the dialect spoken by my family; I had to re-learn it in a way. A distance was created, and we lost our closeness," she recounted from another country where she now lived.

At school, Chinese was the main language. There was indeed a Tibetan class, but the teacher seemed to come from a region so far from hers that she could not understand him. Political education, however, was central. "We were taught to love China, that China protects the Tibetans, that China is the best country," the teenager recounted.

[...] The subject is a sensitive one for China. Upon leaving the regional airport, Le Monde’s reporter was followed by at least three cars and five individuals, plainclothes agents sharing the same hotel in the evening, the same breakfast, and then ensuring at the terminal that he took a return flight. [Source]

Hu Yaobang remained a taboo topic for many years after Tiananmen, albeit with some degree of rehabilitation under Xi Jinping. Hu Dehua was an outspoken advocate for his father’s cause of reform. He criticized Xi Jinping’s analysis of the fall of the U.S.S.R. and its causes in a speech in 2013; in an interview with South China Morning Post the following year, he lamented the stalling of reform in China and the lack of constitutionally guaranteed rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. In an earlier video, Hu Dehua contrasted his father with Deng Xiaoping, saying: “one cared about saving the people and the other cared about saving the Party … Hu Yaobang believed people should always have a place to speak, that the freedom and power to speak were necessary. But Old Deng only permitted people to say the Party was good.” Later, Hu Dehua was a senior figure at the liberal Party journal Yanhuang Chunqiu prior to its aggressive overhaul in 2016.

One deleted post marking Hu Dehua’s death was the following reflection from the WeChat public account 闻道不分朝夕—an earlier tribute to the late General Secretary republished on April 1 with a brief foreword noting that "we know that commemoration of Hu Dehua is actually rooted in gratitude to Hu Yaobang."

I’ll often kill time by chatting with friends.

There are many topics of conversation, of course—we cover everything under the sun. But they always seem to involve anecdotes about notable people. I once asked a friend: Do you still remember Yaobang? To my surprise, he replied, “Who’s Yaobang?”

I was struck speechless, unsure how to respond. But on reflection, it’s not so strange—there can’t be many youngsters born in the 90s and after who remember him.

History marches on.

But there are some people, and some things, that will always be remembered by someone or other. Hu Yaobang made two groundbreaking contributions to China’s reform: discussion of standards of truth, and rehabilitation of the falsely accused. What later generations remember him for is liberating minds, on one hand, and liberating people, on the other. And it was those whose bodies and minds that were liberated that went on to become the driving force of reform.

Of course, he didn’t accomplish this on his own, but it’s undeniable that he fought the hardest, risked the most, and showed the most courage, insight, and resolve.

[…] By an incomplete count, more than three million wrongfully convicted cadres were rehabilitated across the country between 1978 and 1982; more than 470,000 people had their Party membership restored; and tens of millions of cadres and others who had been baselessly implicated were exonerated.

Restoring order and justice on this scale, and bringing about historical reconciliation across the whole breadth of society, allowed for the almost complete reconstruction of the nation’s social foundation. This momentum, this atmosphere, was the spring thaw that melted the snow and ice that had been piling up since 1949.

Given these astonishing figures, there were some who wondered whether Hu Yaobang had rehabilitated too many. Hu’s immediate retort was: Why did no one ask if there were too many when people were seized in the first place?

The late Dai Huang, a former senior correspondent at Xinhua, wrote:

In 1994, Du Daozheng, head of the publisher of the journal Yanhuang Chunqiu, asked me to write about Hu Yaobang. He already had a title in mind: "Hu Yaobang and the Righting of Wrongful Cases." I agreed at once.

In November of the following year, to mark what would have been Hu Yaobang’s 80th birthday, Yanhuang Chunqiu published an excerpt from what I had written, which was then republished by dozens of newspapers including Southern Weekend.

But getting the book published proved to be difficult. The initial publishing contract was with the People’s Press. They had nearly finished editing the manuscript when they decided to unilaterally break off the contract. Later I was approached by the head of the Central Party School Press and one of his editors, so I gave them the manuscript. They edited the whole manuscript of several hundred thousand characters in just three days, but then the head of the press told me they couldn’t publish it right away, and that I should leave the manuscript in their hands while we waited it out. Worried that it might be a very long wait, I went back to the Central Party School Press and managed to get the manuscript back, although they were reluctant to part with it. [Chinese]

Another deleted post was the following one posted on April 4 by Wang Mingyuan on his WeChat public account Fuchengmen No. 6 Courtyard. This focuses more on Hu Dehua himself, and on the author’s personal relationship with him:

On the whole, Mr. Hu Dehua finally began to take some time for himself in the last few years, concentrating his energies on examining the evolution of his father’s thinking, and reflecting on a number of historical issues. He had two main focal points: first, how Hu Yaobang gradually diverged from revolutionary orthodoxy, and secondly, why he drifted apart from Deng Xiaoping on questions of reform. Much of Hu’s analysis is informed by his unique perspective.

Mr. Hu Dehua would often say: "When Deng Xiaoping visited the United States in 1979, he said that those who aligned with the U.S. became richer, but I actually think the flipside of that is also very important: that is, that those who aligned with the U.S.S.R. all became poorer. Why they become poorer is a question well worth asking, but this sort of introspection is rare.”

[…] Mr. Hu Dehua described his father as very upright and inimicably opposed to wrongdoing, never the bearer of grudges, and always inclined to treat others well. He was kind to his personal staff and his subordinates on the Communist Youth League Central Committee, concerning himself not only with their work but also their lives outside it, even though they had denounced him during the Cultural Revolution. Many of his close comrades-in-arms had also turned on him, but afterwards, Hu Yaobang chose to forgive them. At times, his children would anxiously warn him: "Father, don’t you know he’s one of the bad ones? He did so much to hurt you behind your back—how can you be so good to him?" Hu Yaobang would say, with a little smile: "How could I not remember that? But if everyone keeps seeking revenge, when will it end?" [Hu] Deping [Hu Yaobang’s eldest son] and Dehua both said that their father was extremely well versed in political machinations and trickery, but never used them himself. When he became General Secretary, he had said: "If you play Liu Bang [Emperor Han Gaozu], and I play Cao Cao [a key figure in the later dissolution of the Han Dynasty into the Three Kingdoms period], then our China will never move forward. We must practice what we preach, and drive forward rules for civilized politics."

Mr. Hu Dehua inherited his father’s sincerity, candor, and decency. Tao Siliang once said, "Uncle Yaobang’s forthright character made countless people like and feel close to him. His magnanimity and sincerity were his two most outstanding traits." The same could be said of Dehua. He never discriminated by class, and was invariably respectful toward people like waiters, drivers, and guards. He’d never refuse a request for his phone number or WeChat contact.

[…] Mr. Hu Dehua lived very modestly—previously with his mother in a courtyard house on Beichang Street. He’d usually only eat out with friends at places like Zeyuan restaurant—a restaurant for ordinary people set up by Mao Zedong’s chef Cheng Ruming after he retired—ordering simple dishes like corn porridge, scallion pancakes, or soy-braised pork. Whenever I went to see him after he moved to Tianshui Yuan, we’d usually go to Qingfeng Steamed Buns [where Xi Jinping famously acquired his "Steamed Bun" nickname] or McDonalds. He’d enthusiastically put away a 15-yuan plate of six steamed buns dipped in vinegar—which of the other diners would have guessed that his father once led the Chinese Communist Party?! As far as I can recall, the best meal we ever had together was a "luxury banquet" at Huishang Guli for about a thousand yuan [$135]. [Chinese]

Wang also writes of Hu Dehua that: “In business, he kept his hands clean, never colluding with officials or profiting from the national interest, and always relying on his own abilities to get by. As a result, he never made a great fortune.“ The modesty of Hu’s later life may be somewhat overstated in this account: he complained in 2013 that his luxury Beijing villa complex and real estate development company had been targeted by a small army of thugs hired by a rival; and he was named in the 2016 Panama Papers as a shareholder, director, and beneficial owner of an investment vehicle in the British Virgin Islands. Hu subsequently told South China Morning Post that the offshore company was the dormant remnant of an unsuccessful stock exchange listing in Hong Kong. His public comment was itself unusual: asked why other prominent Chinese figures named in the leaks had declined to comment, he said: “This is my style of doing things – a habit I’ve formed over all these the years. But I can’t demand everyone to be like me.”

A third apparent target of censorship is a lengthy account by Hu Dehua himself, recounting his father’s ordeals during the Cultural Revolution, the grace with which he bore them, and the developing relationship between father and son who had been estranged for many years. The piece remains online elsewhere, but reposts following Hu Dehua’s death have reportedly been removed from WeChat. The text both begins and ends with Hu Yaobang’s admonition to his son after the young Hu Dehua suggested that his father endorse false accusations against others in exchange for softer treatment:

“Every word I say must stand up to history’s judgment. In the end, one can only stand up to historical scrutiny by seeking truth from facts. I cannot talk rubbish in exchange for a lighter beating or lesser hardship, and have future generations point at me and say I was spineless. I can’t do it, and I don’t believe our Party will be that way either. I don’t know who wrote those big-character posters [accusing others], but I absolutely believe that in the end, our Party will not be like that, that in the end it will seek truth from facts ….” [Chinese]

Five senior members of the Democratic Party had earlier told Reuters that Chinese officials or middlemen had warned it in recent months to disband or face serious consequences, including possible arrests.

The party, founded three years before Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule from Britain in 1997, has been the Asian financial hub’s flagship opposition, uniting democratic forces to push Beijing on democratic reforms, and to uphold freedoms.

Party head Lo Kin-hei told reporters that 90 percent of 110 members had voted at Sunday’s meeting for a three-person committee to start making arrangements for disbandment, including resolving legal and accounting matters.

[…] If the party disbands, it would mark the end of nearly 30 years of opposition party politics in Hong Kong. [Source]

The party’s manifesto maintained that Hong Kong is an indivisible part of China, but its “relatively moderate position didn’t really effectively improve the relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing over the past decade,” said Ma Ngok, an associate professor of government at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. New measures in 2021 limiting legislative elections to only "patriots” effectively barred the Democratic Party from fielding candidates, and at least five Democratic Party members are currently behind bars, including two former chairpersons, Albert Ho and Wu Chi-wai. Nonetheless, the party continued to provide pro-bono legal services and voice criticism of some government policies. The Civic Party, the second-largest opposition group, officially disbanded in March 2020. Yeung Sum, co-founder of the Democratic Party, said, “I’m not very happy about it, but I can see if we refuse the call to disband, we may pay a very huge price for it.” While acknowledging that disbandment would be a “very huge setback” that would challenge the “one country, two systems” principle, Yeung also said, “But I think people’s hearts for democracy, they will not fade out. They still keep it, maybe in different form.”

Hong Kong opposition forces are re-organizing outside of the city. On Tuesday, Amnesty International announced the launch of its new Hong Kong office based overseas, following the closure of its local office in 2021. Officially registered in Switzerland, the new office will be led by diaspora activists operating in Australia, Canada, Taiwan, the U.K., and the U.S., and it will “focus on advocating for human rights of Hongkongers, within Hong Kong and abroad, amplifying their voices and fostering a strong diaspora community globally.” Among its board members are ex-lawmaker Fernando Cheung and former student activist Joey Siu, one of the 19 activists for which the Hong Kong government has placed a HK$1 million bounty. The press release from Amnesty International provided more details about the initiative, in the words of its leaders:

“The opening of Amnesty International Hong Kong Overseas [AIHKO] marks a new chapter in the organization’s strengthened commitment to human rights in Hong Kong and its support for the Hong Kong diaspora around the world,” said Chi-man Luk, the new AIHKO Executive Director.

“The gutting of Hong Kong’s civil society has been a tragedy for the city with more than 100 non-profits and media outlets shut down or forced to flee. But since the closing of Amnesty International Hong Kong three years ago, our dedication has only grown. We are now ready to intensify our efforts by building new communities of support driven by the Hong Kong diaspora.”

[…] AIHKO is Amnesty International’s first-ever section founded and operated entirely “in exile”, and follows the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Hongkongers who have gone abroad in search of safety and freedom.

“Being overseas provides us with a degree of protection, allowing us to speak more freely and engage in advocacy work. We have a responsibility to do more to support those who remain in Hong Kong and continue their vital efforts,” said Fernando Cheung, AIHKO board member and former Hong Kong legislator. [Source]

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong government held its 10th National Security Education Day on Tuesday, during which Education Secretary Christine Choi warned of the “dangerous aspect” of “soft resistance,” which could “easily penetrate the heart and mind.” In other news, the government attracted criticism last week by refusing entry to British lawmaker Wera Hobhouse. After landing at Hong Kong airport, she was questioned and put on a flight back to the U.K. hours later. Caroline Davies from The Guardian provided more detail on the ordeal and possible justifications, which may relate to Hobhouse’s criticism of Hong Kong:

The UK government is “greatly concerned” and wants an account of why the Liberal Democrat MP Wera Hobhouse was denied entry to Hong Kong on a family visit to meet her three-month-old grandson for the first time.

[…] Hobhouse told the Sunday Times her passport was confiscated, she was asked about her job and the purpose of her trip, her luggage was searched and swabbed, then she was escorted to the boarding gate by four immigration officers.

Her son, a university academic living in Hong Kong since 2019, was waiting in the arrivals hall. Her husband, William, a businessman, was allowed entry but chose also to return to the UK. She is believed to be the first MP refused entry since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong.

Hobhouse, who has never visited Hong Kong, said she was given no explanation but believes it was because she is an MP. She is a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (Ipac), an international group of politicians that scrutinises Beijing’s approach to human rights and has criticised the crackdown on free speech in Hong Kong. [Source]

The first two captured Chinese citizens. Today, investigators from the Security Service of Ukraine spoke with them. We are working to establish all the facts regarding the involvement of these and other Chinese citizens being part of the Russian occupation army. Ukrainian… pic.twitter.com/PkBpBjI2Qm

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) April 9, 2025

At the Financial Times, Christopher Miller reported that the two Chinese fighters, aged 33 and 31, had been captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting with Russian soldiers in the eastern Donetsk region. This prompted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to instruct his foreign minister Andriy Sybiha to summon the Chinese chargé d’affaires in Kyiv for an explanation:

It is unclear whether the Chinese fighters were soldiers in the country’s army or mercenaries who joined Russia’s military on their own. There have been reports of Chinese nationals joining the Russian army independently and western officials said they had not seen any evidence of state sponsorship.

Zelenskyy said Kyiv has “information that there are significantly more Chinese citizens” fighting in Russia’s army and he had tasked his intelligence agencies with clarifying the facts.

[Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy] Sybiha said the participation of Chinese citizens in the Russian army “calls into question China’s declared position on peace and undermines trust in Beijing as a responsible permanent member of the UN Security Council”.

Moscow has also recruited mercenaries from countries across the world to fight with its forces in Ukraine. Many have come from Cuba, India, Yemen and several African nations.

The only regular soldiers known to have officially entered the war have come from North Korea. Pyongyang sent more than 11,000 troops to help Russia last autumn, according to Ukrainian and western officials. [Source]

Posts on Chinese social media show that there are, indeed, a number of Chinese citizens currently fighting for Russia, either as mercenaries or regular army recruits. Some of these fighters post videos set to music, or use their social media presence to gain more followers or sell products online. Le Monde’s Harold Thibault recently profiled “Fen,” a Chinese man who fought for Russia in Ukraine, spent much of his time there in hospital, and has since returned to China. On social media platforms, particularly Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, Le Monde “identified around 40 social media accounts belonging to Chinese individuals who, backed by photo evidence, claim to have signed up with the Russian forces. Fen only met seven of his compatriots on the front lines, but estimated that a few hundred may have joined the fighting.”

CDT Chinese has republished an interview between investigative journalist and documentary filmmaker Chai Jing and a Chinese citizen nicknamed “Macaron,” who has been fighting with the Russian army in Ukraine. The wide-ranging interview, conducted via video and interspersed with copious posts from Chinese soldiers involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, details Macaron’s demoralizing experiences with perilous battlefield conditions; inadequate rations and equipment; racism against Black, Asian, and other foreign fighters; the motives of Chinese fighters, who according to Macaron can also be found on the Ukrainian side, though in smaller numbers; and desperate attempts to escape the fighting and return home to China. (For more CDT coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war, see “Four Censored Essays on the Ukraine Crisis,” “Netizen Voices on Ukraine,” and a censorship directive with instructions to “keep Weibo posts on Ukraine favorable to Russia.”)

Below is Part One of CDT’s full translation of the interview, published with Chai Jing’s permission. Some explanatory links and descriptions of audio-visual content have been added for clarity.

Chai Jing: Three years into the Russia-Ukraine war, the conflict has reached a critical juncture. The situation is highly volatile, and its outcome will have a significant impact on the future global order. Upon this battlefield, there are also Chinese citizens—some fighting for Russia, and others fighting for Ukraine. In upcoming programs, I will be interviewing participants from both sides in order to understand their differing viewpoints and beliefs, and through their eyes, to glimpse the inner workings of a war that is often inaccessible to journalists.

In today’s program, I will be interviewing "Macaron," a Chinese mercenary in the Russian army. He spoke via video, from an underground bunker on the front lines.

Interview transcript:

Macaron: Actually, there are a lot of people who … [hearing a noise and turning his head to look] Did you hear that gunfire?

Chai: That was gunfire? Are you on the front lines?

Macaron: Yeah, yeah. They’ve got these unmanned drones flying over, and sometimes we shoot them down.

Chai: I realize that your current location is quite sensitive, but to the extent that you’re able, can you tell us roughly where you are?

Macaron: Oh sure, it’s fine, I can tell you straight up—it’s Bakhmut. The Russian army started the assault on Bakhmut in October of 2022 … uh, no, it started in August. By May of 2023, we’d taken control of the city, but there’s always been intense fighting on the outskirts.

Chai: And what’s your role in this?

Macaron: I’m part of an advance team, an assault unit.

Chai: And what’s your team’s mission?

Macaron: To continue the forward advance by attacking and infiltrating the enemy lines. We’re actually quite close to the combat zone, just a few kilometers away—five or six kilometers at most.

Chai: You talk about "we" and "the enemy." As you can imagine, this program will provoke a lot of discussion, including criticism of you. Are you prepared for that?

Macaron: Oh, that’s no big deal, seeing as this is the path I chose. Since I realize that one of these days, I might die here on the battlefield, I’ve decided to share some real-life experiences. China, and the Chinese people, haven’t experienced war in a long time, so I want to tell them what war is like for an ordinary soldier, especially a foreign soldier.

Chai: What do you want to tell the Chinese people?

Macaron: I hope China can maintain a sensible stance and avoid rashly starting or getting drawn into a war. A lot of people watch these exaggerated patriotic dramas that glorify war—like “Wolf Warrior” and “Drawing Sword”—and they get all fired up. But the reality of battle is incredibly brutal. It’s literally hell on earth.

Chai (V.O.): Macaron himself was once a fan of “Wolf Warrior” and “Drawing Sword.” He was born in 1995 in Shandong and previously served in the [Chinese] military. When the Russia-Ukraine war broke out, he was working for the military as a team-building instructor.

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Putin announced a "special military operation" against Ukraine.

[Video of Putin speaking]

Putin: “I decided to conduct a special military operation.”

Chai (V.O.): Ukrainian President Zelenskyy responded.

[Video of Zelenskyy speaking]

Zelenskyy: "But if we are attacked by the [enemy] troops, if they try to take our country away from us, our freedom, our lives, the lives of our children, we will defend ourselves."

Chai (V.O.): On March 2, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with 141 countries voting in favor, 5 against, and China abstaining. In November 2023, Macaron arrived in Moscow on a tourist visa and joined the [Russian] military.

Chai: [speaking to Macaron] Since no one asked you to join this war, no one forced you into it, and it isn’t even your war, why did you decide to join up?

Macaron: There were a lot of reasons. Money was part of it, but not the main reason. Honestly, the salary isn’t even that high. Also, I used to be a soldier when I was in China, but I never experienced war, so I had no idea what it was really like. I originally wanted to join the French Foreign Legion—that’s where I wanted to go—but getting a visa for Europe was a huge hassle. It’s really hard to get a visa for Europe.

Chai: If getting a visa for Ukraine had been just as easy [as getting a visa for Russia], would you have gone to fight for Ukraine instead?

Macaron: Hmm, speaking hypothetically … yeah, it’s possible. It’s definitely possible. I think there are at least a few hundred Chinese fighting for the Russian army, and some fighting for the Ukrainian side, but not very many. I’m sure the visa issue plays a role in that. Also, there are a lot of people who think that helping Russia means helping China.

Chai (V.O.): According to Phoenix TV journalist Lu Yuguang, the first Chinese mercenary killed fighting for Russia in this war was named Zhao Rui. (His fellow mercenary Zhou Zhiqiang said) Zhao joined the war because he’d heard he could fight the Japanese and [other members of] the “Eight-Nation Alliance.” It is unclear whether Zhao Rui was aware that Russia itself had once been part of the Eight-Nation Alliance.

Many Chinese mercenaries justify their involvement by invoking a more common bit of nationalist rhetoric. They say, “China and Russia are in the same boat,” and "We both oppose NATO expansion." They firmly believe they’re on the winning side.

[A TikTok video of Sun Ruiqi, a Chinese citizen fighting for Russia, with a group of other soldiers]

Sun: Attention! Stand by for orders!
Crowd of soldiers: Standing by, sir!
Sun: Greetings, comrades!
Crowd: Greetings, comrades!
Sun: You’ve served well, comrades!
Crowd: We serve with honor, sir!
Sun: Send me into battle first …
Crowd: Send me into battle, sir …
Sun: And victory is assured!
Crowd: And victory is assured!
Sun: Okay!
Crowd: Okay!

Chai (V.O.): However, Chinese nationalists have always had mixed feelings about Russia. After the war [in Ukraine] started, a list of Russia’s past territorial invasions of China circulated on social media, with some people comparing Russia’s incursions to Japan’s establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. This pressure forced some Chinese mercenaries fighting for Russia to justify their choices.

[A Bilibili video from a Chinese soldier fighting for Russia who goes by the name of “Warden”]

Warden: Some people tell me I’m “selling out to the enemy.” First of all, you’ve got to understand who’s paying my salary, who’s keeping me fed. If I go back [to China], are you going to put food on my table? No, right? So let’s be real, let’s tell it like it is: I’m loyal to whoever pays me. It’s that simple. When I can’t even afford to feed myself, you’re going to lecture me about ideals? [Warden’s defense strongly echoes justifications offered by Chinese censorship workers in recent interviews.]

Chai (V.O.): To gain followers on social media, Chinese mercenaries often post soundtracked videos of themselves marching or doing training exercises. Many of those fighting also hawk products online.

[A Chinese social-media video set to music shows soldiers on the march.]

Macaron: A lot of people were deep in debt back home, so they rolled the dice and came here. I guess they figured it was worth the risk of dying. A lot of guys also have these fantasies about being in battle. I got so many DMs that I stopped replying. I used to try to talk them out of it, but now I don’t bother—there are just too many of them, complaining about how bad the Chinese job market is, or how much debt they’re in.

Chai: Are they [Russia] paying you a decent salary?

Macaron: It’s typical, pretty typical. About 15,000 yuan per month [$2,500 U.S. dollars], more or less. But the purchasing power here is terrible. What 10,000 yuan buys you here might only cost 2,500 yuan back in China. Also, the pay isn’t commensurate with the danger and difficulty of the job. I work 365 days a year with no vacation, no time off—I’m constantly on duty. It’s a highly dangerous job, plus you don’t have any freedom.

Chai (V.O.): On June 4, 2023, Ukrainian forces launched a counteroffensive against Russian-occupied territories in the southeast. This marked a critical point in the war. In the year prior, Russian conscription efforts had met with significant backlash at home. In response, they shifted their recruitment efforts, offering bonuses to new recruits and trying to appeal to their masculinity.

[A Russian recruitment ad features stirring rock music and heroic-looking soldiers emerging from the smoke of a battlefield. Russian captions read “You’re a real man. Be one,” and offer enlistment contracts with monthly salaries equivalent to nearly $2,500.]

Chai (V.O.): Macaron doesn’t speak Russian. He first joined the pro-Russian militia in the Donbas [region of Ukraine]. In May of 2024, he signed a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry to enlist in the regular Russian army.

During the Battle of Bakhmut, the Russian army, under the command of the Defense Ministry, focused on launching artillery strikes from the periphery of the city, while Wagner Group mercenaries, particularly those recruited from prisons, led the deadly ground assaults. Before arriving at a military training camp in Rostov, Macaron was unaware of these details.

Chai: Hearing these things, some might say you’re just being used as cannon fodder.

Macaron: Hm, as awful as it sounds, they’re right.

Macaron: [in a previous video posted to social media] Why should I be cannon fodder in someone else’s war? Before I came, I didn’t know that’s how they’d treat me. Once I arrived at the training camp in Rostov, I saw there was serious racism—against Black people, and against Chinese people. Why risk your life for people who treat you like that?

Macaron: The Russian commanding officers would openly insult Black soldiers. They’d say these really horrible, racist things—about Black, Arab, and Chinese soldiers. One officer even said, "Right now, it’s wartime, the war is still going on. But once the war’s over, how about we kill the lot of you? You won’t be going home alive …"

Chai: Hang on—

Macaron: It’s true, that’s what he said.

Chai: Wait, hang on—who did he say they would kill?

Macaron: He meant us (the foreign mercenaries). I don’t know if he was joking, or if it was coming from some deep-seated racism, I just don’t know. But our translator at the time quit right on the spot. He was an Arab from Egypt, and he told me he was so disgusted by the commander that he was quitting. After I heard that, I said I wanted to leave, too. I wanted out, but they told me I couldn’t break my contract.

Chai (V.O.): Before signing the contract, Macaron had used translation software to check that he understood it. One section stipulated that enlistees had three months in which to revoke the contract, if they so wished. But when Macaron broached the subject, he was told it was out of the question. Macaron was left with no choice, no way out. He was issued a weapon: a gun that was nearly 80 years old.

Macaron: [in a previous social-media video] Yesterday, the commander gave me a gun—a machine gun, I think, but I don’t really know what kind. I wanted to see how old it was, so I checked the manufacturing date on the gun, and it said 1948, a year before the PRC was founded. Looking at this antique, my heart sank, and I wondered if it even worked anymore. Take a look at this gun. I forgot to tell you the story behind it. See those four notches on the lower part? You know what they mean? They represent “four souls." They told me that when they gave me the gun. I said it was too old, and I didn’t want it, but they kept insisting I take it. I said I didn’t want to use a broken gun, but he (the commander) told me that I had to take it. He said this gun had belonged to four other people, four people who died in battle, and that’s what those four horizontal notches meant. But how they died, I have no idea.

Chai (V.O.): Macaron used his own salary to purchase a helmet, body armor, and other combat gear, but when he went to the hospital for an illness, he was whisked off directly to the front instead—and his equipment never arrived.

Macaron: They didn’t give me the things I needed to survive on the battlefield. Instead, they gave me some dilapidated old gear from soldiers who’d died in battle. It was in really bad shape—the helmet they gave me actually had holes in it. They just handed me this junk and sent me into battle.

Chai: Why didn’t they give you the equipment you’d purchased for yourself?

Macaron: I think it’s because they don’t care. They just don’t care about these things. In a wartime situation, everything moves fast. They’re shipping in groups of soldiers, then shipping them off to the front. No one has time to think about equipment, or care about stuff like that.

Chai: So, in that sense, would it be fair to say that they don’t really care whether you live or die?

Macaron: Yes, you could say that. Because in battle, we’re the assault team, the commandos. Casualties are high, and not many come back alive.

Chai: What’s the survival rate, roughly?

Macaron: From my experience, for every three or four of our soldiers killed, or maybe every five or six, only one Ukrainian soldier dies. That’s the ratio.

Chai (V.O.): Sun Ruiqi, the soldier who shouted, "Send me into battle first, and victory is certain!" eventually made it to the battlefield. I checked his social media and saw a video he’d posted about an older soldier in his unit whose only equipment was a plastic bag. Inside the bag was a single change of clothes. When Sun asked the other soldiers about it, they told him that everyone, including the old soldier himself, believed it wouldn’t be long before he died on the battlefield. Two weeks later, the old soldier had disappeared, and no one ever asked what had become of him.

This is some of the video footage Macaron recorded, showing the material privations on the front lines. He often used candles or gas to cook small portions of noodles. Rice was extremely scarce, and rats had gnawed through the bags used to store bread.

These privations led to internal strife, with Russian soldiers sometimes exchanging “friendly fire” when competing for supplies. The chocolates, sausages, tea, and coffee distributed to soldiers during holidays were used for photo ops: Macaron would be given these items, but as soon as the photo was taken, he would have to hand them back.

Macaron: I told them, "Either don’t give that stuff to me, or don’t take photos. If you’re just going to take it all back, what’s the point? Better not to give it to me in the first place." That sort of thing happened all the time.

Chai: From what you say, it sounds like there’s a certain amount of corruption.

Macaron: Probably. When it comes to stuff like that … [laughs] In the army, especially during wartime, commanders have immense power, but the lives of rank-and-file soldiers are seen as kind of … trivial.

Chai (V.O.): On November 11, 2023 in the Russian Southern Military District, Zhou Zhiqiang and Zhao Rui recorded their first experience as soldiers on the front lines.

[Video recorded by Zhou Zhiqiang, in darkness]

Zhou: The Russians don’t see us as human beings, but as suicide squads. We were ordered to seize some trenches, so we did, but because they didn’t send any reinforcements, we suffered heavy casualties. Out of a few dozen, only six or seven of us made it out unscathed.

Chai (V.O.): On November 18, Zhao Rui’s unit found themselves surrounded by Ukrainian forces. These are videos that Zhao Rui took during the siege.

[The first video shows about a dozen uniformed soldiers sitting or sleeping on the floor of a room. The curtains are drawn, one window is blocked with sandbags, and the soldiers’ weapons are propped up against the walls. An injured man lies on a bed.]

Zhao: It’s our third day under siege. This guy is injured, and we’ve got to evacuate him or he’ll die.

[The second video shows the same room, slightly darkened. A few of the men are standing and talking in the background.]

Zhao: Day four. All last night, we tried to evacuate our wounded, but we couldn’t get him out. We tried to make a break for it, but it was hopeless.

[The third video shows the same room, the ground now strewn with garbage and some unopened water bottles. There are fewer soldiers than before, only five or six sprawled on the floor.]

Zhao: It’s our fifth day under siege. Last night, the Ukrainian troops launched a raid against us. There are only a few of us left now … just us few. We can’t hold out much longer.

[The fourth video pans around the room, where several soldiers are sitting and talking.]

Zhao: It’s been six days now.

[Another video just shows the floor, even more littered now, and the feet and legs of several soldiers standing around.]

Zhao: Last night, some Ukrainian APCs and tanks appeared near our position. I don’t think they noticed us because it was so dark, but they hit another building nearby. It was close, really close.

Chai (V.O.): On October 24, after being besieged for six days, they finally managed to retreat.

[A video shows soldiers sitting in the back of a moving military truck with their duffel bags, weapons, and a spare plastic tank of petrol.]

Zhao: When we came, we had a truck full of soldiers. Look how few of us are left. You can count for yourself. Just a few of us. You still want to come here?

Chai (V.O.): In a text message, Macaron told me that, in his experience, the average survival time of a soldier in a combat zone is about three days.

[A video of Macaron, looking exhausted and upset, speaking slowly and directly to the camera.]

Macaron: The night before last, we launched a surprise attack. I was armed with 10 magazines, 10 bullet clips, and five grenades. It was the middle of the night, and we were right in the line of fire. Artillery from both sides kept shelling our position, and we were getting hit by mortar fire, even from our own side, so a lot of us were injured. I don’t know how to describe it, but it was bad, a real bloodbath.

Chai (V.O.): But the only bulletproof equipment he could find were two rusty iron plates.

[A video of Macaron, just his hands and feet visible, lifting two rusty iron plates from the rubble-strewn ground. Each plate is about the size and shape of the head of a small shovel, only much thicker and heavier.]

Macaron: These are great. Two bulletproof plates, pure iron. I just stripped them off someone (a fallen soldier). Heavy as hell, but not bad.

Chai (V.O.): Hoping to reclaim his helmet and body armor, essential for his survival, Macaron filed a complaint with the Russian military police against his commanding officer. His complaint was met with a swift reprisal.

[A video of Macaron in what appears to be a small underground pit with metal bars overhead. The bars are so low that he is unable to stand without ducking his head.]

Macaron: [peering through the metal bars] Hi everyone, I’m Red Macaron. These fucking Russians locked me up in here. I can’t even stand up straight. Just checking in to let you know I’m still alive. It’s been 11 days, but I’m fine, and I’ve got a lot of people trying to help me.

Chai (V.O.): As a result of his complaint, Macaron was thrown into a sort of dungeon—a deep pit in the ground, reinforced with iron bars. It was only three or four square meters [32-43 square feet] in size, and so low he could not stand upright in it. He was allowed to leave it only once a day to use the toilet.

The independent Russian media outlet Important Stories, through eyewitness accounts and satellite imagery, was able to confirm the existence of such “punishment pits” and their use by the Russian army. Two Russian soldiers were also imprisoned in the pit, alongside Macaron.

Chai: Why are soldiers punished in this way?

Macaron: The other two (the Russian soldiers) refused to fight. The thing is, as you know, the Russian army is always pushing forward, always advancing, whereas the Ukrainians are mostly defending. These two didn’t want to fight. They just wanted to hold the line, stay on defense. They didn’t want to kill anyone.

Chai: What happened to them afterward?

Macaron: Well, one of them … actually, there are some things I just can’t tell you. You know, because this kind of thing … If I were to tell you something too bleak, you know, the consequences would be unbearable.

Chai (V.O.): For Macaron’s safety, we have decided to omit the details of what happened. But one thing that we can confirm is that the two Russian soldiers, in the end, did not alter their principles.

Chai (V.O.): After being imprisoned for 21 days, a terrified Macaron made his escape while going to the toilet. He jumped from the third floor of an abandoned house and ran to another Russian military unit, where he demanded to be transferred away from his original commanding officer.

Chai: What if he’d retaliated against you, or done something else?

Macaron: Well, yeah, he did retaliate. He beat me up. [laughs nervously, then falls silent] Not just once, but twice. Not that I couldn’t fight back, but he had a gun.

Chai: Doesn’t that sort of thing strip away a soldier’s sense of pride?

Macaron: Sure it does. After the first time I was released from the pit, my will to fight was gone. Why would I want to fight for someone who throws me in a dungeon, someone who treats me like that? I felt like they had no respect for me at all.

Chai: Did you ever consider leaving the battlefield? Leaving for good, and going home?

Macaron: There was no way I could, and I don’t think the Chinese embassy would have helped me.

Chai (V.O.): Sun Ruiqi, the soldier who had shouted about certain victory on the battlefield, posted another video as he headed for the front.

[Video shows Sun Ruiqi and a large group of soldiers preparing to depart for the front. The uniformed soldiers all have blue duffel bags with them, and a troop transport truck is visible in the background.]

Sun: [speaking to the camera] We’re heading out. The whole unit is getting ready to move out.

Chai (V.O.): Not long afterward, Sun became a trending topic once more.

[Video of Sun Ruiqi, bundled in a heavy camouflage coat with a hood, buffeted by wind and snow.]

Sun: [breathing heavily] I trekked for almost 40 minutes through heavy snow just to get a signal so I could send this message. I contacted the Chinese Embassy in Russia [Moscow] and told them it was urgent, but they said it was a personal matter and couldn’t help me. So now I’m asking for help from the public, asking my fellow Chinese to contact the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I need to terminate my contract so I can go home for medical treatment. Around here, there are no medical facilities or medical equipment of any kind. I’m going to die here.

Chai: [speaking to Macaron again] Maybe the embassy considered it a personal matter, since you volunteered to come here and fight. You came on your own, without the support or approval of the Chinese government, so maybe they felt they weren’t in a position to intervene.

Macaron: Yeah, but I think some stuff, like what they show in those “Wolf Warrior” movies [which depict the Chinese military efficiently evacuating Chinese civilians abroad] is just totally fake.

[A promotional poster for the nationalistic military blockbuster “Wolf Warrior 2” shows lead actor Wu Jing holding a Chinese flag. This is followed by a video of Wu Jing—the writer, director, and star of the “Wolf Warrior” films—waxing patriotic.]

Wu: A Chinese passport is a ticket to safe passage. [pretending to hold up a Chinese passport] What does this say? It says Chinese people are the bomb.

Macaron: But when your actual citizens are in trouble … Sure, we volunteered to fight this war, but still … Take India, you know? There were a lot of Indians getting killed here, but then their Prime Minister Modi came and talked to Putin, and all the Indian mercenaries got sent home. Their contracts were terminated, and they were able to go home.

Chai (V.O.): A BBC report confirmed Macaron’s account. In July 2024, following reports of heavy Indian casualties and viral videos of Indian mercenaries begging for help, Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Moscow and discussed the matter with Putin. Two months later, over 90 Indian mercenaries were released from military service and sent home. Conversely, the Chinese mercenary known as Warden, who once said “I’m loyal to whoever pays me,” found that even after his contract expired, he wasn’t allowed to leave.

[Video of Warden speaking directly to the camera]

Warden: The boss called me in for a chat. He said my contract only ends once the war is won. They’re also planning to transfer me to head up the scariest of all the Storm Trooper units—the Black Mamba unit [a military unit made up of ex-convicts]. What’s he thinking? I don’t even know what to say about it. [pauses] But what the hell, I’ll go. I guess I’ll keep fighting until it’s over. I’m not the type to chicken out. I can’t afford to lose face. Two of my men deserted, and we’re hunting them down. If we catch them, they’re as good as dead. As for me? I’ll keep going. Cause I’m brave. No fear.

Chai (V.O.): Not long afterward, an announcement of Warden’s death was posted to his Douyin account, asking his followers to commemorate the passing of this “great international Communist warrior.” The video’s IP location was Henan province, where an assistant allegedly posted it. But his fans scarcely had time to mourn before a livestream surfaced, claiming that Warden had “come back to life,” used his martial wisdom to outwit the enemy, and beat a tactical retreat to Moscow. Sun Ruiqi also claimed to have made it back to China on his own. The details of how they returned remain unclear. Foreign media reports suggest that some mercenaries have shot themselves to escape from the front lines, while others have bribed their way out, but outright escape is nearly impossible. [Chinese]

The second half of the translation will be published soon.