We started with the CDT editors’ picks for favorite CDT posts and writing on China in 2021, CDT English top ten most-read posts of 2021, the Chinese internet’s top ten memes of 2021, and a look back at some of the civil society groups, bloggers, and media outlets that said goodbye in 2021. The following is a translation and contextualization of CDT Chinese’s Top 10 Censored Words of 2021.

1. Sprinkle Pepper 撒胡椒面

Related censored terms: indiscriminately + sprinkling pepper

February 25 was Xi Jinping’s big day to celebrate China’s triumph over poverty. But as he read out his florid victory speech, he flubbed one of his lines. Describing the government’s poverty alleviation work, he read that “we stress fact-based guidance and strict rules, not flowery fists and fancy footwork, red tape and excessive formality, and performative going-through-the-motions, and we resolutely oppose indiscriminately… sprinkling pepper.”

His long pause and the contrived earthiness of the phrase, which Xi uses to describe ineffectual work, offered rich fodder for those who suspect that Xi’s two Tsinghua University degrees (awarded under dubious circumstances) simply paper over his lack of formal education. He has stumbled over complex, and not so complex, phrases a number of times in the past.  In 2016, CDT published two leaked censorship directives on a case in which Xi misread “lenient to farmers” as “loosen clothing.”

Censors immediately aimed to mute discussion of the pepper-sprinkling verbal blunder. The word “pepper” was completely censored on Weibo for eight days after the speech, and searches for video of the speech returned no results. The word remains sensitive today: posting “sprinkle pepper” on Weibo can result in deletion of the offending account. Former U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle once incorrectly instructed an elementary school student to spell “potato” with an appended “e,” eliciting widespread mockery across the United States, but no censorship. 

2. Nomadland 无依之地

Related censored terms: Nomadland + release date/cancelled release, Nomadland / Chloe Zhao + humiliate China, Nomadland + block, cancel + Oscar , 93rd + Oscar Awards, Oscar + live stream + cancel, Chloe Zhao + Oscar, Nomadland + Oscar, Oscar for Best Director

When Chloé Zhao won Best Director at the 2021 Academy Awards for her film “Nomadland,” nobody in China, the country of her birth, was watching—at least not via officially sanctioned media. Coverage of her historic achievement was blacked out after nationalist commentators dug up a 2013 interview in which Zhao said China was a place “where there are lies everywhere.” Her name—along with the terms “Nomadland,” “Oscar,” and “Best Director”—were all censored. Millions still found a way to watch and discuss through the adoption of code words like “Settled Sky,” an inversion of the film’s Chinese title. 

Zhao’s other films also seem to be banned in China. A Marvel film she directed, “Eternals,” never aired in China, although other possible factors in that decision include state-approved homophobia—the film shows a kiss between a male superhero and his husband. Other Hollywood personages with family ties to China have been subject to similar political scrutiny. An encore of the Zhao controversy engulfed Canadian actor Simu Liu after nationalists posted screenshots of an interview in which he recalled that his parents’ memories of growing up in China included “stories of people dying from starvation.” 

3. Support Xinjiang People支持新疆人

Related censored terms: support + Xinjiang People, Support + Uyghurs, support + “Uy” people

In March, the Communist Youth League set Weibo afire when it accused Swedish fast-fashion brand H&M of lying about labor abuses in Xinjiang’s cotton industry, and actively encouraged Chinese citizens to boycott H&M products. Amidst the sound and fury of nationalist support for Xinjiang cotton, some Chinese citizens spoke out in support of the people of Xinjiang: “Don’t just support Xinjiang cotton, support Xinjiang people! Support allowing them to stay in hotels, support them traveling abroad, support them finding work, support them walking down the street without having their phones & IDs checked.” Those posts were quickly censored. But as the government fanned the flames of the boycotts, many netizens began to ask, “What is really going on in Xinjiang?”

A post in support of Xinjiang people is censored.

The censored Weibo posts are an indication that international condemnation of China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang may be capable of influencing Chinese public opinion, despite the Chinese government’s assertions to the contrary. In the meantime, nationalistic boycotts over Xinjiang continue. The latest targets are Intel and Walmart. 

4. Accelerationism 加速主义

Related censored terms: China + accelerationism, Accelerator-in-Chief (总加速师) 

From China Digital Space: 

The concept that Xi Jinping is hastening the demise of the Chinese Communist Party by doubling down on his authoritarian rule, often referenced by the mock-title Accelerator-in-Chief. In its original sense, accelerationism holds that strengthening the growth of the “techno-capitalist” state, not resistance to it, will bring sweeping social change. While [the term] jiasuzhuyi is used satirically, in the West this fringe political theory has become closely tied to white supremacist groups, which hold that violence and discord will topple the current political order and pave the way for their vision of the future. [Source]

There was a brief moment on Baidu when searches for “Accelerator-in-Chief” returned results for Xi Jinping, but that is no longer the case. Bot accounts, the famed “internet water army,” have flooded Twitter with Chinese-language posts connecting accelerationism to America. These patently inorganic posts seem designed to drown out criticism of Xi in Chinese-language spaces on the global internet:

Twitter posts tying accelerationism to America

5. Guonan 蝈蝻

Related censored terms: married ass, little dick, little dock

Guonan, a homophone for “national male” formed from characters that share a radical with maggot and cockroach, is a derogatory term for Chinese men. The term is used by some radical feminists to criticize what they see as pervasive chauvinism in Chinese society. A similar term exists for women in traditional heterosexual marriages: “married asses.” Censorship of guonan and related terms increased after Xinhua’s May 31 announcement, “The Three-Child Policy Is Here,” which raised fears of another round of invasive government involvement in women’s reproductive choices. The censorship of guonan seems mild in comparison to the mass shuttering of feminist groups and the arrest of #MeToo journalists. Even less overtly political expressions of feminism can be grounds for official censure. When the comic Yang Li posed the question, “How can he look so average and still have so much confidence?” she was accused of inciting “gender opposition”—which Weibo now uses as grounds for censorship. CDT was also accused of this by Global Times in December.

6. Liedownism 躺平学

Related censored terms: involution, Luo Huazhong

Lying down is “not acceptable,” according to state media. In an effort to escape the perceived “involution” of Chinese society, Chinese youth are “lying down”—much to the chagrin of the Chinese government. The Cyberspace Administration of China mandated that products branded with “lie down, liedownism, involution” and the like be removed from e-commerce sites. Yet the art of “liedownism” slouches on: an image of the actor Ge You reclining on a sofa has become a popular meme, even making the list of CDT Chinese’s Top Ten Memes of 2021.

7. Zhang Xianzhong 张献忠

Related censored terms: Zhang Xianzhong, Xianzhongology, Xianzhong gist, Xianzhong, Xianzhong incident, Xianzhong behavior, everywhere Xianzhong, no different from Xianzhong 

A 17th-century rebel famous for slaughter so indiscriminate that he left Sichuan depopulated centuries later is perhaps an unlikely candidate for a meme—nonetheless, Zhang Xianzhong has become one online. His name has become a stand-in for two unrelated topics: the mass deaths that followed Mao’s Great Leap Forward and other fanatical Communist policies; and those who “take revenge against society” by following Zhang’s (likely apocryphal) injunction to “Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill. Kill.” In a famous recent case, an impoverished man in rural Fujian murdered his wealthy neighbors, with whom he had a long-running property dispute, and then fled into the mountains. Despite his grisly crime, his plight garnered widespread sympathy, and a few even expressed admiration: “If the dead and injured were from the village tyrant’s family, then I’d admire this Ou guy for being a real man.” The now-suspended WeChat account @过桥土豆 sought to explain the attitude underpinning the Chinese internet’s adoption of Zhang Xianzhong as an anti-hero: “The bottom rung of society is like a stagnant pond that grows more suffocating by the day. People are on their last nerve, and they’re feeling desperate. That’s why they want someone—anyone, for whatever reason—to show up and destroy the social order, to smash everything, and to hell with the consequences, so that they can vent their outrage.”

8. Zhao Wei 赵薇

Related censored terms: evil-doing artist, Henry Huo, Kris Wu, Zheng Shuang, Fan Bingbing 

A “profound transformation” is underway in China’s entertainment industry. The government has cracked down on both celebrity behavior and fandoms. Zhao Wei was erased from the internet for reasons that remain unclear—perhaps due to her connection with former Alibaba CEO Jack Ma. CDT Chinese created a chart of the most sensitive celebrities and the extent to which they are censored across China’s largest video platforms: red=total censorship, yellow=targeted censorship, green=uncensored.

The top row lists artists (from left to right) and their reported offenses: Zhao Wei (offense unknown), Henry Hou (serial cheater), Kris Wu (rape), Zheng Shuang (surrogacy and tax evasion), Fan Bingbing (tax evasion). The left column list the various platforms (from top to bottom): iQIYI, Youku, Tencent Video, Mango TV, Migu Video, Bilibili, Douban

9. Fragile 玻璃心

Related censored terms: Wee Meng Chee, Kimberley Chen + Fragile, Fragile + humiliate China 

It is not difficult to understand why “Fragile,” by Namewee (Wee Meng Chee) and Kimberly Chen, was banned in China. The lyrics mock Xi Jinping, little pinks and their love of saying “your mom is dead (NMSL), the ban on Taiwanese pineapples, and all the rest. The song is so sensitive that even criticizing it brings on censorship: 

Even this Weibo post calling Namewee a bastard is censored

Even this Weibo post calling Namewee a bastard is censored

Namewee, meanwhile, has reportedly struck it rich by selling non-fungible tokens (NFTs) tied to the song.

10. Peng Shuai 彭帅

Related censored terms: Peng Shuai, ps, Eddie Peng + Shuai, Pu Shu, Vice Premier Peng, Peng Dehuai, Zhang Gaoli, Usury Zhang, Gaoli, zgl, Zhuge Liang, Kang Jie, State Council vice premier, melon, eat melon, big melon, jumbo melon, tennis, “The Prime Minister and I”, Diamond Cup, Yibin Guesthouse, Women’s Tennis Association, WTA, tennis association + leave/stop/suspend, Women’s Tableless Ping Pong Association, Steve Simon

On November 2, in a Weibo post on her personal account, Peng Shuai accused former Standing Politburo Committee member Zhang Gaoli of sexual assault. Before an hour had passed, her accusation was deleted. A scorched-earth campaign of censorship followed. Peng herself also disappeared from public view, sparking an international outcry that eventually led to her “forced reappearance.” The fallout inspired the Women’s Tennis Association (or the “Women’s Tableless Ping Pong Association,” as one censorship-dodging Weibo user dubbed the WTA) to suspend all future tournaments in China. The breadth and intensity of the censorship of Peng’s accusation is unmatched by any other event this year. 

Welcome back to CDT’s usually weekly updates, also available as an email newsletter via Substack. With these updates, we aim to provide an overview of new content across CDT’s English and Chinese sites, as well as the bilingual China Digital Space wiki, and related content elsewhere.

CDT is currently seeking two new editors. Applications for the senior position close tonight (Friday, June 18), but those for the other role will be open for another week (until Friday, June 25). Applications or help in sharing the postings with potential candidates are very welcome!

Today’s entry on CDT’s Sensitive Words calendar is 豬堅強, or Zhū Jiānqiáng, meaning “Strong-willed Pig.” The name was bestowed upon a porcine survivor of the deadly 2008 Sichuan earthquake, who became a “symbol of hope and resilience” after he was recovered from the rubble after 36 days. He had sustained himself by eating charcoal and drinking rainwater, but was reportedly so emaciated when rescued that he was initially mistaken for a goat. Zhu died on Wednesday, aged 14, at the museum where he had spent his later years. The BBC reported that “millions of people have taken to social media site Weibo to remember the pig and pay tribute to its long life.” CDT Chinese editors noted the deletion of one online tribute, likely for mocking the florid tone of official propaganda toward eminent Party figures. The obituary concluded:

Mr Zhu Jianqiang’s whole life was one of struggle, of glory, and of wholehearted service to humanity. His passing is a heavy loss to the Jianchuan museum and all mankind. We must turn grief into strength, and emulate his spirit of struggle, steadfast determination, outstanding work style, patriotism, and professionalism in striving for decisive overall victory in the construction of a moderately prosperous society.

May the deceased rest in peace, and the living strive for greatness! Zhu Jianqiang will live forever in our hearts!  

See CDT Chinese for more recent Sensitive Words.

The four weeks of this newsletter’s summer break have seen many other developments, some even more momentous. One major CDT project completed since our last installment was the expanded translation of a Fudan University study of the “Wailing Wall” constructed over the past year in the replies to whistleblower-doctor Li Wenliang’s final Weibo post. Fudan’s Zhou Baohua and Zhong Yuan examined the Wall as a novel expression of online collective mourning and community, and analyzed its participants, content, reactions to current events, and prevailing emotional currents. CDT added translations of posts drawn from our ongoing archive to illustrate the eight major activity spikes Zhou and Zhong identified, and highlighted aspects of the Wailing Wall phenomenon which the original paper could not address.

One of the spikes, for example, was only partly explained in the Fudan paper, as the response to a ceremony at which Xi Jinping honored heroes of the fight against the pandemic. In fact, the strength of the reaction owed much to the fact that Li was omitted from the list of honorees, despite other posthumous inclusions. The paper also did not note the impact of censorship, including the ominous removal of the Wall’s comments on June 19, 2019, and their incomplete subsequent restoration. Finally, we placed the Fudan study in the context of a broader analysis from Stanford of pandemic-related content from Weibo as a whole, focusing on the balance of critical and supportive sentiment. Although the Wailing Wall was not this paper’s main emphasis, its findings help convey the significance of Li’s death, which, they suggest, briefly overturned the central government’s usually ironclad possession of greater public trust than its local counterparts.

The situation in Hong Kong has continued to deteriorate, with a second raid against the Apple Daily newspaper this week, strict controls on traditional commemorations of June 4, accusations that the city’s universities have been “penetrated by foreign forces,”  and regulations against “fake news” and political censorship of films on the horizon. On June 3, Gwyneth Ho Kwai-lam—a former journalist and one of 47 opposition figures now facing subversion charges—published a letter from jail reflecting on the changing significance of the Tiananmen anniversary in a city whose political climate is drawing sharply closer to that of the mainland. CDT translated the letter, as well as her first one in April. In it, Ho outlines the generational divide in attitudes to the anniversary and the traditional Victoria Park vigil, and challenges common perceptions of younger Hong Kongers’ reasons for skepticism.

Allow me to share my perspective as someone born after June 4. I used to think that Victoria Park, and even the candlelight vigil, was not that important: not because I rejected mainland China, but rather because of my understanding of it. I’ve always paid attention to rights protection cases in mainland China. I am more moved by the faces of contemporary human rights defenders than by history books.

Before 2019, I only visited Victoria Park once. I stood on the football pitch, watching the ceremonies, the testimonies, and the songs (coincidentally, there were some singles by local people that year …), but so little attention was paid to current Chinese activists. I couldn’t help but wonder, of all the Hong Kong people who go to light a candle year after year, did any care about the people in China right now? I always felt uncomfortable with Victoria Park, and I didn’t plan to go again.

[…] I’ve been wondering, if all the people we respect—those who have been silenced by secret interrogations, [court-]appointed lawyers, and gag orders—had had the (relatively) immense platform of the Hong Kong courts, what would they have done with it?

The question might forever remain at the level of speculation. But I still hope that they might have the opportunity to know that in a Hong Kong prison across the river, under the same regime, there are also people accused of “subverting state power,” and who have persisted in mourning June 4, despite being warned that doing so would be illegal. I’ve read their (and their defense lawyers’) written statements over and over again, statements that they may not even have had the opportunity to read in court. I’m not emotional about it: like other cases, you read and focus while taking notes, jot down useful and inspiring portions. But I know that in this era and space, even just the act of reading holds a different meaning.

Several recent installments of this newsletter have focused on the fiercely nationalistic atmosphere now prevailing on China’s social media. Criticism of the government, advocacy of causes seen as at odds with its interests, and even passing expression of concern about domestic issues frequently faces aggressive backlash. As the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Bill Birtles also reported this week, some of those formerly considered radical nationalists, such as Global Times editor Hu Xijin, now face accusations of weakness or worse. 

Zhou Xiaoxuan, also known by her online alias Xianzi, discussed the effects of this nationalistic climate in an essay written on the eve of the second hearing for her sexual harassment court case against CCTV host Zhu Jun. CDT translated the essay in late May, after this hearing was postponed, adding to our earlier translations of writing by Xianzi and her supporters.

Since the first hearing in December, the accusations aimed at me have gone from “she’s a liar” to “she’s attacking the system.” My friends outside Haidian People’s Court, anti-sexual harassment activists there to support victims, have been falsely portrayed as so-called “foreign forces” […]

[…] To remove sexual assault victims’ voices from mainstream narratives actually reinforces the value judgement that women should be ashamed of sexual assault—it even binds women’s chastity to the nation, affirming that a woman’s defilement is the nation’s shame and is thus a reality that should not be spoken of.

[…] To treat victims’ histories as things that can be casually covered up removes victims of sexual assault from mainstream narratives. Similarly, it removes vulnerable groups’ rights from mainstream narratives. Because power always favors vested interests, as soon as vested interests bind themselves to public symbols, they occupy a place beyond criticism.

In other recent CDT translations, feminist activist Xiao Meili also examined the entanglement of sexual assault and power, while another, Zheng Churan, offered similar reflections on the nationalist backlash against equality advocates and assault survivors. More recently, we translated a Sohu News report on the 2018 suicide of a Gansu teenager after a court dropped the case against the teacher who had assaulted her. Her fall from the eighth floor of a department store building was accompanied by cheers from onlookers who had encouraged her to jump.

A recent Phoenix TV post, also translated by CDT, examined fallout from an earlier wave of state-sanctioned aggressive nationalism. The piece chronicles the deteriorating fortunes of two families, those of a man struck in the head with a U-lock for driving a Toyota amid anti-Japanese protests in 2011, and his assailant, who was subsequently sentenced to ten years in prison for the assault. At one point, the victim, still suffering from serious linguistic and physical impairments and undergoing daily rehabilitation therapy, struggles into his shoes, and declares “‘I wear Nike, Nike brand, made in China.’ After a pause, he adds: ‘Rational patriotism!’”

In a Wechat post translated by CDT this week, Shenzhen University journalism professor Gu Xiaojin highlighted the fake news industry feeding both off and into online nationalist indignation. One fake news mill, New Lingnan Observer, recently reported that “Italian Prime Minister Admits that the Coronavirus Was Spreading in Italy Six Months Before China!” The piece was silently withdrawn after Gu challenged it, and later prompted a denial from China’s embassy in Italy. The embassy’s statement, however, received barely a tenth as many views as the original article. “As long as it can draw eyeballs,” Gu laments, “fake news will always be ahead of the truth.”

Right now, there are some self media that engage with the hot topics of the day and meticulously fabricate lengthy international news stories involving China. They pretend to quote from mainstream Western media, including photos and foreign names, concocting what appear to be thorough, timely, truthful “authoritative reports” to dupe their readers. They are all variations on a theme: borrowing Western government officials or media personalities to speak for China and pander to a certain mood online. The kicker is that these “international rumors” exploit the public’s asymmetric access to domestic and international news to propagate themselves, easily gaining hundreds of thousands [of reactions]. The vast majority of readers remain in the dark, to the point that they actively share [this misinformation].

The music streaming platform, which has made headlines throughout the past year for its artist-centric model and in particular its excellent Bandcamp Fridays initiative, has become a popular outlet for Chinese indie bands in recent years. It’s no coincidence that RADII’s monthly round-ups of the best Chinese music have frequently been dominated by tracks sourced from the site.

Bandcamp’s disappearance behind the so-called “Great Firewall” — China’s system of controls on certain overseas websites and services — has been met with dismay by many in Chinese music circles, as the site had provided an important bridge between DIY labels and artists in the country and international audiences. In the short-term, many of those using the platform from within China will likely find a way around the block, but the longer-term impact should not be underestimated.

[…] Unfortunately, it seems the blocking of Bandcamp may throw up a barrier for artists hoping to reach international audiences who want to explore the extremely diverse, fascinating Chinese music scene. [Source]

At Vice News, Josh Terry wrote about Bandcamp’s relationship with Chinese rocker Li Zhi, who has had numerous songs, like “The Square,” banned in China. [Read more about Li Zhi, including translations of The Square and other songs, via CDT.]:

It’s unclear exactly why the Chinese government may have chosen to block Bandcamp at this point in time. While China recently blocked the rising social media app Clubhouse, which Chinese citizens used to freely discuss politics and debate contentious issues, Bandcamp is not a forum for political dissent or protest in the usual sense—at least of any overt kind. In fact, as [Josh] Feola points out in a 2020 newsletter, “to legally release an album in mainland China, all lyrics must be submitted beforehand to a Department of Culture bureau for official approval.”

There are acts who have pushed the boundaries, and the Chinese Culture bureau has cracked down especially hard on hip-hop. One notable case is influential Chinese folk musician Li Zhi, a musician who, according to Radii China, was known for being a fierce defender of artist copyright and for suing companies for infringement; in 2019, after Sichuan Provincial Department of Culture and Tourism canceled his tour due unspecified “misbehavior,” Radii China reports, his social media accounts were removed from platforms like Weibo and WeChat and his music was scrubbed from streaming services. (He is now living in exile from China).

[…] As Feola sees it, a ban on Bandcamp would probably be more a matter of the Chinese government wanting to make it harder for underground artists from mainland China to reach a global audience than worrying about Western media getting into the country. Big Chinese streaming services like QQ and other Tencent-owned platforms, after all, already have deals in place with companies like Sony, Warner Music, and Universal Music Group, which means that Chinese users have access to Western popular music. “If I had to wager a guess, I’d say [the ban] was more about protectionism than censorship,” Feola said. [Source]

Feola is a regular contributor to the Bandcamp Daily blog, where he has highlighted a wide range of music from China and elsewhere.

Almost all major fandoms in China – music, books, art, videogames and film – require VPN use now for any meaningful engagement with their mediums.

— Krish Raghav (@krishraghav) February 17, 2021

Our data confirms that the @Bandcamp website has been blocked in China. https://t.co/a2LxWDbale https://t.co/LIV0XneqS4 pic.twitter.com/Zqx6meziCV

— GreatFire.org (@GreatFireChina) February 17, 2021

Such a shame. The site is full of so much good Chinese music and has been so important in getting independent Chinese artists exposure in front of international audiences.

— Jake Newby (@JakeNewby) February 17, 2021

The earlier closure of Renren Yingshi was another recent blow to China’s independent cultural sphere. For nearly two decades, the subtitling group provided free, uncensored, translated Hollywood films and television shows to Chinese viewers. The likely end of the group sparked a large outcry on the Chinese internet. CDT Chinese’s Sensitive Word Series tracked censorship of netizen’s complaints about the raid on Renren. Censors on Weibo deleted screenshots of a 2011 People’s Daily article that praised the subtitling group as a model of the egalitarian knowledge-sharing ethos of the internet era. At The Wall Street Journal, Sha Hua reported on the end of Renren Yingshi and the future of uncensored television content in China:

The outsized reaction to the possible demise of Renren Yingshi, which roughly translates to “Everybody’s Film and TV,” illustrates the voracious appetite for uncensored foreign content that still exists in China, even as Mr. Xi feeds a nationalist fervor and inveighs against the influence of Western ideas. It has also provided a rare occasion for some Chinese citizens, mostly well-educated urbanites, to push back against censorship at a time of increasingly tightened media controls.

[…] “If Renren has committed a crime, then everybody has committed a crime,” several Chinese social-media users wrote in a play on the group’s name.

Pirated content has been a staple in China’s entertainment diet since the late 1990s, in part because of restrictions on the import of foreign films and censorship that many viewers blamed for rendering some shows unwatchable.

[…] “Taking down Renren, the biggest and most influential [fan subtitling] group, sends a signal to other groups like them,” said Yu Meng, a legal expert and co-founder of the journal China Justice Observer. [Source]

At The Economist, Sue-Lin Wong reflected on what the end of Renren Yingshi means for China’s Hollywood fans:

[…] Demand for Renren Yingshi’s offerings was fuelled by tight supply. China is one of four regions without Netflix: the others are North Korea, Syria and Crimea. Even though it is one of the fastest growing film markets, China approves only a few foreign films for screening in cinemas each year. It is possible to watch some foreign shows on officially approved streaming sites. But they are heavily censored—so much so in the case of “Game of Thrones” that the plot is hard to follow. Such restrictions helped to turn translation-group services into big operations. Police in Shanghai said Renren Yingshi had produced more than 20,000 television shows for its 8m registered users.

Renren Yingshi’s popularity is evident in the debate that still surrounds it on Weibo, a Twitter-like platform. Posts with hashtags relating to the clampdown have garnered more than a billion views. In one of them, Yan Feng of Fudan University in Shanghai said the subtitling effort had been one of Chinese history’s great translation projects, on a par with a drive to render Western literature into Chinese in the 19th century. Uncensored foreign films and shows will remain accessible to Chinese viewers with foreign-language skills and software that can scale the great firewall. But most people are unlikely to try, not least because the government disapproves. Netizens have been sharing the poetic Chinese term, lindong jiangzhi. It is one that subtitling enthusiasts have used to translate a phrase made famous by “Game of Thrones”: winter is coming. [Source]

Other teams translated shows from Korean, Japanese, French, Spanish, Thai & Hindi to Chinese. Or focused on specific celebrities – Benedict Cumberbatch had his own subtitling group that translated his shows, interviews, plays, poetry readings, speeches into Chinese 3/3

— Sue-Lin Wong 黄淑琳 (@suelinwong) February 19, 2021

Anti-coup demonstrators have massed outside the Chinese embassy in Yangon over the past week, holding placards attacking Beijing or showing President Xi Jinping dangling senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the junta chief, by marionette strings.

[…] “China! Don’t make firewall to block internet in Myanmar,” one of the signs held up by protesters at a recent embassy protest said.

A junta spokesman on Tuesday denied China was building a firewall, adding that Myanmar had enough experts to do so itself.

Chinese officials have sent ambiguous and at times conflicting signals about Beijing’s stance since the coup. However, the youth taking to Myanmar’s streets and social media in hopes of reversing the coup have made up their minds that China is involved. [Source]

Rumors of internet censorship have been particularly inflammatory. The term “Myanmar Great Fire Wall” is even censored in China, according to CDT Chinese’s weekly Sensitive Words Series. The term doesn’t return search results on Zhihu, a popular social media network, and searches on Weibo and Weixin lead to results displaying Chinese embassy denials. In an interview with local media, republished by Global Times, China’s ambassador to Myanmar called the accusations “nonsense and even ridiculous,” warning that the rumors “only [prove] to have manipulation and instigation by forces with ulterior motives behind the scenes.”

The youth counter-coup protesters’ suspicion is, according to James Palmer at Foreign Policy, a reflection of China’s new preeminence in the region: “China is blamed even when it hasn’t actually done much. As with anti-U.S. feelings, resentment follows hegemony.” Myanmar youth have seemingly been paying close attention to similar democracy movements across Southeast Asia, including that of Hong Kong in 2019. At The Wall Street Journal, Feliz Solomon wrote about Myanmar protesters’ adoption of the three-finger salute inspired by “The Hunger Games” and popularized by protesters in Thailand in 2014:

Asia’s pro-democracy activists have adapted, often by developing flexible strategies. Thai activists embraced a motto popularized during Hong Kong’s 2019 protests, borrowed from kung-fu legend Bruce Lee: “be water.” The phrase came to signify fluid protests that were hard for authorities to get ahead of. In recent weeks, activists in Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan and elsewhere have also shown support for the demonstrations in Myanmar online and in smaller protests abroad.

[…] Two Thai campaigners who helped popularize the three-finger salute, Mr. Rittipong and Sombat Boonngamanong, say that to them, the gesture represented the French Revolution values of liberty, equality and fraternity. It quickly took on new meaning, adopted by counterparts in Hong Kong during the 2014 “Umbrella Protests” demanding universal suffrage, and now in Myanmar’s anticoup demonstrations.

“It’s universal,” Mr. Sombat said. “It’s not about one country, it’s a symbol for all people who want freedom.” [Source]

The Chinese government has been comparatively reticent on the coup, most likely because it has thrown the two countries’ relationship into flux. According to experts interviewed by The New York Times’ Steven Lee Myers and Hannah Beech, China will have difficulties engaging with the generals behind the coup, and might lament the overthrow of Aung San Suu Kyi, with whom they had cultivated close ties:

The coup poses challenges of its own for China. The country’s leader, Xi Jinping, had cultivated closer political ties with Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy. As Myanmar’s civilian leader, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi visited China more than any other foreign country.

[…] “They spent considerable energy, time cultivating Aung San Suu Kyi — with some success,” [Bilahari Kausikan, a former Singapore diplomat] said. “Now they have to start again with a new bunch of generals, and these generals are not just difficult for the West. They’re difficult for everyone.”

[…] “China’s relationship with Myanmar is not dependent on who is in power,” said [Yun Sun, the director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington]. “Whoever in power will always need to work with China. The difference is with the quality of the partnership, and the costs that China has to carry for it.” [Source]

China is Myanmar's friendly neighbor.Both the NLD&the military have friendly ties with China. We hope that parties in Myanmar will put their people's wishes&interests first, address differences through talks within constitutional&legal framework&ensure political&social stability.

— CHINA MFA Spokesperson 中国外交部发言人 (@MFA_China) February 19, 2021

At Nikkei Asia, Toru Takahashi traced the tumultuous relationship between the two countries through a history of the relationship between Aung San Suu Kyi and China:

In 1988, a pro-democracy protest broke out in Myanmar, and Aung San Suu Kyi, who had returned from the U.K. to take care of her sick mother, appeared on the political stage. When the Ne Win administration cracked down on the protests and thousands were killed, the army carried out an “internal coup” to overthrow the regime and continued military rule.

China was the first country in the world to approve Myanmar’s military junta, but China itself also came under heavy criticism from the West for crushing the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. For China, closer relations with Myanmar, which was in a similar position to its own, had strategic significance.

[…] However, in 2003, the junta drew up a road map and prepared for a democratic transition because it understood the danger of excessive dependence on China and the importance of improving relations with the West. The junta maneuvered to ease dependence on China.

[…] It was instead the government led by Suu Kyi, which took office in 2016, that brought the two countries closer together. When Suu Kyi herself came under fire from foreign governments for her persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority, she turned to China. [Source]

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is a highlight of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Economist reported that China’s leaders are likely eager to accommodate the new regime in order to preserve the showpiece economic project:

Part of Mr Campbell’s strategy in the 2010s was to play on the Tatmadaw’s worries about China’s power over their isolated country. Those fears, like the other drivers behind that opening-up, are still apparent today. The army is wary of Chinese support for insurgencies along their shared border. Chinese interests are deeply embedded in the country’s dysfunctional economy, easily discerned in arms sales, infrastructure projects, an army of small traders and border enclaves that are havens for gambling, smuggling and money-laundering.

The fact that Chinese state media described the coup as no more than a “major cabinet reshuffle” suggests that the Chinese government, which had been wooing Ms Suu Kyi, is keen to be on good terms with the new regime. Myanmar offers it a strategically crucial direct route to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean beyond—a way for China’s imports of oil and gas to bypass the potential chokehold of the Malacca Straits and for exports to be shipped out of its inner provinces. In time it could be a military foothold, too.

The physical manifestation of these strategic desires is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, over $21bn-worth of country-spanning projects including a railway, oil and gas pipelines and a deepwater port at Kyaukphyu. These projects were troubled even before the uncertainty injected by the coup. It is far from clear how Myanmar can pay for them all. And the links run through the territories of various ethnic minorities, including, in Rakhine, the territory where the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas took place. Chinese-backed construction is more likely to inflame existing ethnic conflicts in such places than to bring peace and development. [Source]

Just finished a very good conversation with President Xi of China. Discussed in great detail the CoronaVirus that is ravaging large parts of our Planet. China has been through much & has developed a strong understanding of the Virus. We are working closely together. Much respect!

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) March 27, 2020

The call took place as the U.S.’ official infection count surpassed China’s, and just after Xi delivered a speech to a video meeting of G-20 leaders, in which he called for international cooperation: “The virus knows no boundaries, and the pandemic is our common enemy. All countries must join hands and put up the strictest network for joint prevention and joint control.” China’s foreign ministry’s account of the conversation says Xi “stressed that since the COVID-19 outbreak began, the Chinese side has acted in an open, transparent and responsible manner,” and expressed Beijing’s willingness to support the U.S. in its fight against the virus. “It is the sincere hope of the Chinese people that the US will contain the spread of COVID-19 at an early date and reduce its impact on the American people.”

While we wait to see if the call helped to thaw the diplomatic relationship or aid the global fight against the pandemic, CDT Chinese editors noticed that Weibo users attempting to post the cheer “Let’s go, America” (美国加油) met with the disclaimer “sorry, this content contains information that violates relevant laws or the ‘Weibo Community Convention. The action cannot be implemented.”

Screenshot source: @成涛漫画

“美国加油”四个字已违反法律法规……

我微博账号已被封杀干净，哪位推友测试下？ pic.twitter.com/WuoQGYSwXm

— 成涛漫画 cartoon & comic (@taocomic) March 27, 2020

@ChengTaoManHua: “Let’s go, America,” this phrase violates rules and regulations…. My Weibo account has already been wiped clean. Any other Twitterers that can test [the phrase]?

CDT Chinese editors have found other web-user tests confirming that as of March 27, 16:47 Beijing time, the posting restrictions were still in effect. Last June, days after a mass protest in Hong Kong against a proposed extradition bill broke out, the term “Let’s go, Hong Kong” (香港加油) became a sensitive search term on Weibo.

While both the Trump and Xi administrations are dealing with considerable public critique domestically for their responses to the novel coronavirus outbreak, Washington and Beijing have been trading shots aimed at highlighting how the the other’s actions are worthy of blame. In China, early cases in Wuhan were downplayed or ignored, information that turned out to be the warning bell for a global pandemic was labeled “rumor” and the doctors who shared it were punished, and when one of them died from the virus on February 7, censors worked hard to control relevant online news and discussion. Continued censorship of information about the early days of the outbreak has continued to be censored, inspiring netizens to invent new ways to preserve it. Chinese foreign ministry officials have promoted conspiracy theories blaming the U.S. for military for manufacturing the virus as China’s external propaganda apparatus has cast Beijing as a global leader in the fight against the pandemic and a beneficial donor of humanitarian foreign aid.

Meanwhile in the U.S., President Trump has earned criticism for dangerously downplaying and misinforming about an illness that has now infected over 80,000 in the U.S., surpassing China’s official but widely doubted tally. CNN reports that he has coordinated his administration to “highlight China’s alleged ‘coverup’ and subsequent disinformation campaign.” The President’s insistence on calling the novel coronavirus responsible for COVID-19 a “Chinese virus” has been widely viewed as a xenophobic dog whistle to distract from both his administration’s mismanagement of the crisis and progress towards its economic nationalist agenda.

Anger has been high in recent weeks over the Chinese government’s response to the novel coronavirus outbreak, which has now killed over 1,000 and infected nearly 43,000 in China. Initial ire over the Wuhan government’s failure to quickly and transparently label and educate about the emerging illness spiked after a “rumormonger” who was punished for spreading illegal information turned out to be frontline doctor Li Wenliang. When Li came down with the virus, news on the topic was censored. Anger again spiked after Dr. Li passed away (another news topic that censorship authorities controlled), culminating in a mass online call for the freedom of speech guaranteed by the PRC Constitution.

In late January, Beijing established a central task force to deal with the outbreak, officially headed by Premier Li Keqiang. Xi Jinping himself has been largely absent from public view (which some experts see as strategic), which has led netizens to question why the “core” of the CCP leadership doesn’t appear proactive in the fight against the disease. On Weibo on January 25, one user asked “where is that person?” (那个人在哪里?), and quickly saw the post deleted. Others on Weibo, noticing that the term Xi Jinping (习近平) was also sensitive, began replacing his name with that of his U.S. contemporary, Trump (特朗普). The term “Scolding Trump” (怒斥特朗普) began trending on Weibo, and posts asking “why hasn’t Trump yet appeared?” (特朗普为什么还不出现) or saying “Trump stepped down” (特朗普下台) were blocked. Perhaps in response to the critique, Xi Jinping stressed his personal direction of prevention and control efforts in his meeting with WHO head Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesusm on January 28. On February 10, Xi reemerged in state media visiting medical locations in Beijing. 

Xi has still not been to Wuhan, the epicenter and by far the hardest hit region in the epidemic–which some public health experts say may be an attempt to shield the top leadership from the viral fallout–and has remained largely out of the state media spotlight on relief efforts. With posts criticizing Xi sure to be deleted, netizens creatively invented an alternative meaning for the character for “green jade” (cuì 翠) that suggests wishes for Xi’s bad health.

By dismantling the components in the character, “翠” becomes two “习”s (Xí, Xi Jinping’s family name) on top of a “卒” (zú, meaning “to die”). This can be interpreted in several ways: 

• 习卒 (xí zú): “Xi death” 
• 习二卒 (xí èr zú): “Xi two deaths.” In addition to doubling the wish, in Beijing dialect, the character “二” (èr meaning “two”) can mean “stupid’, adding to this interpretation an element of insult to the chairman’s intelligence.
• 习卒习 (xí zú xí): “Xi death Xi.” Others have explained the significance of the “two” differently, saying that “xí zú xí” is pronounced similarly to the Chinese for “Chairman Xi”  (xí zhǔxí 习主席). 

The phrase “everyday I pray for green jade [Xi’s death]” (每日祈翠) briefly became a “super topic” (超话) on Weibo, though many who used it saw their accounts blocked. “Green jade” (cuì 翠) is not currently a forbidden search term on Weibo, but search results for the character suggest they have been heavily refined and that many posts containing it have been deleted.

Regarding the death of Doctor Li Wenliang of Wuhan Central Hospital, rigidly adhere to standard sources. It is strictly forbidden for reports to use contributions from self-media, and sites may not use pop-up alerts, comment, or sensationalize. Safely control the temperature of interactive sections, do not set up special topic sections, gradually withdraw the topic from Hot Search lists, and strictly manage harmful information. (February 6, 2020) [Chinese]

Li Wenliang was one of eight people punished by Wuhan authorities in early January for spreading rumors about the then-nascent coronavirus outbreak. News of his death from the virus on Thursday triggered a huge public response, and was followed by reports that he was still undergoing treatment. His death has now been confirmed.

We deeply mourn the death of #Wuhan doctor Li wenliang, who unfortunately got infected with novel #Coronavirus while battling with the epidemic. After all-effort rescue, Li passed away on 2:58 am, Feb. 7. pic.twitter.com/mbYA3wB4pn

— People's Daily, China (@PDChina) February 6, 2020

Local officials initially trumpeted these cases as a deterrent to others, but the later revelation that all eight were medical personnel who had been attempting to sound the alarm fueled public anger over the initial response to the disease. By then, Li himself had been infected by a patient he was treating for glaucoma, and was being treated in an isolation ward, but was still able to conduct several media interviews by phone and text message. One, with the Beijing Youth Daily, was targeted for deletion by a directive published by CDT last Thursday. In another interview, with Caixin, Li expressed relief at criticism of his earlier punishment from top central judicial authorities, commenting that “I think there should be more than one voice in a healthy society, and I don’t approve of using public power for excessive interference.” He told The New York Times by text that “if the officials had disclosed information about the epidemic earlier, I think it would have been a lot better. There should be more openness and transparency.”

Earlier anger of the treatment of Li and the others exploded on Thursday, after two acquaintances reported his death, with one adding that “the Wuhan government owes Dr. Li Wenliang an apology.” The BBC reported on the news’ spread through official media, and their subsequent reversal:

Dr Li was declared dead at 21:30 local time (13:30 GMT) on Thursday, and the news was reported by Chinese state media outlets, triggering a huge wave of popular reaction on Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter.

Journalists and doctors at the scene, who do not want their names used, told the BBC and other media that government officials then intervened.

Official media outlets were told to change their reports to say the doctor was still being treated.

Reports said the doctor was given a treatment known as ECMO (extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation) which keeps a person’s heart pumping and keeps their blood oxygenated without it going through their lungs. [Source]

Numerous observers remarked on the breadth and intensity of the public response to reports of Li’s death. (Examples of these reactions are being compiled at CDT Chinese, and selections will be translated as soon as possible.)

https://twitter.com/BeimengFu/status/1225446291682910208
https://twitter.com/niubi/status/1225454973414187008
https://twitter.com/S_Rabinovitch/status/1225463138021072897

Seems like the entire Chinese Internet is waiting on the very slim chance that Dr Li Wenliang, one of the first coronavirus whistleblowers, may be saved by ECMO treatment after his heart stopped beating earlier this evening.

“Tonight we don’t need sleep, but Li must wake up!” pic.twitter.com/N6TlT86gKp

— Laurie Chen (@lauriechenwords) February 6, 2020

https://twitter.com/Liz_in_Shanghai/status/1225467627373355010

Here’s a timeline of the topic “Dr. Li Wenliang passed away” slipping from top place to 7th on weibo’s trending topic list. (notice the number of mentions magically goes down) now this topic is completely gone, replaced by “Dr. Li undergoing emergency treatment”. pic.twitter.com/JbbdBTjSMv

— Cecilia Wang (@ceciliaxywang) February 6, 2020

Dr. Li Wenliang passed away tonight from the same coronavirus he tried to warn others about, and now state media are calling him a "whistleblower".

A month ago, they said he was "spreading rumors". https://t.co/SjdTFbdCSs

— Dake Kang (@dakekang) February 6, 2020

This Weibo post by Li Wenliang from 2012 is now flooded with tributes

"Dear friends, from today, you may not be able to reach me anymore, because I'm going to save the Earth. If the sun still rises tomorrow, it means I made it. You don't need to thank me, it‘s what I should do!" pic.twitter.com/4C527HjBRs

— Nectar Gan (@Nectar_Gan) February 6, 2020

The two trending topics censored by Weibo tonight:

# Wuhan government owes Dr. Li Wenliang an apology #

# We want freedom of speech #

Both had tens of thousands of views before disappearing into this dark night. pic.twitter.com/LHEMsbn02I

— Nectar Gan (@Nectar_Gan) February 6, 2020

I’ve never felt so angry in my entire life with the passing away of Dr #liwenliang but I know the next morning Weibo wil be cleansed. For the regime it will be business as usual. It never learns from its mistakes. pic.twitter.com/QGnBEgQy03

— Xibai Xu (@xuxibai) February 6, 2020

https://twitter.com/BeimengFu/status/1225508374260932609
https://twitter.com/muyixiao/status/1225512484594950144
https://twitter.com/xinyanyu/status/1225517901542764565

Top Weibo comments under hospital announcement of Li Wenliang's "official death" after hours of "rescue":

– I've learned two words: political rescue & performative rescue
– I knew you would post this in the middle of the night
– You think we've all gone to sleep? No. We haven't. pic.twitter.com/W3FvbZ7wvN

— Nectar Gan (@Nectar_Gan) February 6, 2020

In another example of censorship around the case, Weibo has begun blocking posts quoting a transcript of Li’s encounter with Wuhan authorities, in which he was threatened with further punishment if he persisted: “Do you understand?” “I understand.”

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

On June 10th, a Weibo user broke the news that searches for the term “Let’s go Hong Kong” (香港加油) are now censored on the popular microblogging site, with queries yielding the statement “search results are not displayed according to relevant laws, regulations, and policies.” CDT Chinese editors conducted a search test on June 11 Beijing time confirming that the term has indeed been blocked on Sina Weibo. The following is a screenshot of the censorship notice:

The Weibo censorship comes days after Sunday’s mass protest in Hong Kong, where an estimated one million people rallied against proposed legal amendments that would allow the extradition of suspects to mainland China for the first time. Many in Hong Kong fear that the planned extradition law will be used by authorities to target political dissidents and further erode the region’s shrinking liberties. More protesters are expected to take to the streets in planned mass demonstrations and strikes on Wednesday, when the extradition bill is scheduled to be introduced to Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The Guardian’s Verna Yu reports that hundreds of people have already gathered outside government headquarters as of Tuesday night:

Hong Kong faces a citywide shutdown on Wednesday after hundreds of businesses, parents and teachers called for a boycott of work and classes to show their opposition to the proposed bill, which would allow mainland China to pursue fugitives in the former British colony.

The law is due for a second round of debate in the 70-seat legislative council. Critics said the legislation would give Beijing the ability to pursue government critics and other political opponents in Hong Kong.

An online petition had called for 50,000 people to surround the legislature at 10pm (2pm GMT) on Tuesday night to stay until Wednesday morning. Protesters planned to stage an overnight demonstration just outside the legislative council in Admiralty district but authorities closed the designated protest area and cordoned off a nearby lawn at Tamar Park, outside the legislative council. Police in riot gear were deployed to the protests.

Protesters, blocked from the demonstration zone, filled the streets outside the legislature and the government headquarters. Police searched cars and bicycles and surrounded protesters but the situation remained calm. Sounds of the hymn Sing Alleluia to the Lord wafted through the air, sung by a group in the crowd. [Source]

The bill is expected to go up for a vote on June 2o and to become law despite the protests, Guy Davies and Karson Yiu at ABC News report:

Hong Kong’s leader, Carrie Lam, has said she plans to sign the legislation despite the protests, according to The Associated Press.

The Hong Kong government has been “very savvy” to use the case of Taiwan as the basis for the extradition law, according to King, and the “results from within the legislature will be exactly as the government want.”

“While the protests are the largest and most significant in decades, the impact on the resulting legislation will be limited,” King said. “This being said, they are being very effective in ensuring that Hong Kong’s experience under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model is not forgotten. With real implications for Taiwan, the international community would (and should) be very interested to see where this leads.”

However, introduction of the extradition laws is “ill-advised and unnecessary,” according to Tsang, who said it reflects the top down approach of policy making by Chinese Premier Xi Jinping. But neither officials in Hong Kong nor China are likely to change their mind, meaning the crisis could escalate further. [Source]

Note on translation: “加油” (jiayou) is a commonly used Chinese cheer that literally means to “add fuel.” There isn’t a set translation for the term since its English equivalent varies depending on the context in which the term is used.

Late last week, a Weibo user broke the news that searches for the term Soviet joke (苏联笑话) are now censored on the microblogging site, with queries yielding the statement “search results are not displayed according to relevant laws, regulations, and policies.” CDT Chinese editors conducted a search test on May 16th confirming that the term has indeed been blocked on Sina Weibo.

The term is likely censored due to the historical context surrounding the rise of political humor in the former Soviet Union and its association with current political conditions in China. In the USSR, political humor allowed individuals to express their dissatisfaction clandestinely in an environment where speech was strictly controlled. This trend that can also be seen in the covert, humorous, and highly creative lexicon that Chinese netizens have developed to comment on and mock politics.

Because humor can be understood as a form of quiet protest, these jokes were officially forbidden and told at some risk to the individuals doing the telling–in the former Soviet Union, the telling of a political joke could in the worst case scenario yield a ten year prison sentence for “anti-Soviet agitation” under Article 58 of the criminal code. In modern China, we have seen netizens placed in criminal detention for publicly spreading political jokes online. In 2017, for example, a netizen was jailed for 22 months for “picking quarrels and provoking troubles” after mocking President Xi Jinping with the widely-used nickname “Steamed Bun Xi.”

One of the easter eggs in Devotion is a poster containing the words “Xi Jinping” next to “Winnie the Pooh”, in an ancient style of writing. Winnie the Pooh has been censored on Chinese search engines and social media since 2017, after bloggers began comparing Mr Xi to the children’s story book and film character.

Gamers have also spotted an old newspaper in Devotion that refers to an individual who has received a prison sentence, nicknamed “baozi” or “steamed bun”.

[…] Taiwanese Vice Premier Chen Chi-mai has praised the game, saying: “Only in countries with democracy and freedom can creation be free from restrictions.” [Source]

At Polygon, Owen S. Good reports that the Xi mockery in the game prompted some Chinese gamers to review bomb the Steam site, eliciting an official apology from Red Candle:

Count some Chinese players as not big fans, though. Germany’s Spiel Times noted that the interior decorating of Devotion’s apartment includes a poster that says “Xi Jinping Winnie-the-Pooh moron.” This is a big no-no. Xi is notoriously self-conscious about comparisons to Pooh Bear, to the point that China’s super-chill censors sometimes crack down on just the image of Pooh, whether or not it accompanies POTPROC. It was enough to worry folks about the Chinese launch of Kingdom Hearts 3, which features the character.

Devotion’s jab is a lot more overt. It probably does not help that the game is set in Taiwan, either. In 570 reviews in English, the game has a mostly positive reception. There are 18,380 reviews overall, however, a majority of them bad (9,015 thumbs down, versus 5,841 up). That gives it a super-accurate mixed reputation on the Steam storefront page.

Red Candle Games posted an apology which said the inclusion of the poster was a “purely an accident.” Apparently it had been some kind of a placeholder asset and a “version synchronizing problem” left it in by mistake. “As a game company, Red Candle Games has immense room for improvement,” the studio said. “We are deeply sorry for the trouble it caused to everyone, and that we sincerely ask for the forgiveness of our players. [Source]

“习包子” (Steamed Bun Xi) and “小熊维尼” (Winnie the Pooh) remain blocked from search results on Weibo. An attempt to post the former term on the social media platform on February 27 yielded a disclaimer indicating its current prohibition; the latter term was post-able. CDT Chinese editors found several new relevant search terms that appear to be censored on various platforms in China this week.  “还愿” (Devotion) and “赤烛” (Red Candle) were absent from Weibo search results, and blocked from searches on games and animation video-sharing site Bilibili this week. Attempts to post “Steam游戏” (Steam game) yielded a disclaimer that the term was in violation of relevant laws and regulations. The Steam video game platform is not officially approved in China, but, according to tests by GreatFire.org, is sometimes accessible from China. The above quoted BBC article notes that this recent episode “has raised questions as to whether Steam will be the latest overseas online platform to be blocked in mainland China.”

The game’s release comes as cross-strait tensions are at a relative high. Following Beijing’s sustained exertion of economic, diplomatic, and military pressure on the island, last week Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen warned the entire Asia Pacific to be wary of Chinese aggression: “If it’s Taiwan today, people should ask who’s next? Any country in the region — if it no longer wants to submit to the will of China, they would face similar military threats.” Ahead of elections in Taiwan late this year, the chairman of the Beijing-friendly opposition Kuomintang party mentioned the possibility of a peace deal with China if his party wins. Beijing quickly clarified that any talks leading to that deal would have to promote “reunification.”

On Wednesday morning, Inkstone’s attempts to post messages about the comedian or the show were blocked by the Chinese social media site, citing a violation of regulations.

This kind of censorship is unlikely to surprise anyone: not least Oliver, who poked fun in his latest show at censors’ efforts to suppress references to President Xi Jinping’s resemblance to Winnie the Pooh. [See prior CDT coverage.]

It’s unclear what Chinese censors found inappropriate. But in the Sunday episode, the host highlighted a selection of political discussions that had previously been censored:

• China’s removal in March of presidential term limits and how it cleared the way for Xi to stay in power indefinitely.
• The government’s crackdown on political dissent and organized worship.
• The house arrest of Liu Xia, the widow of Chinese dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. [Source]

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with China’s Xi Jinping in Beijing this week in his first public overseas trip and meeting with a foreign head of state since he inherited power in 2011, ahead of anticipated talks with his South Korean and American counterparts. Xi reportedly accepted Kim’s invitation to visit Pyongyang in the future. News of the meeting broke only after Kim’s departure, following days of rumors sparked by the appearance in Beijing of a distinctive train resembling those used for international travel by his predecessors. The political sensitivity of relations with North Korea has made the topic a frequent focus of Chinese censors: CDT has previously published a string of leaked censorship directives related to North Korean leaders, nuclear tests, and more, and has noted intermittent social media blocks for the irreverent nickname "Kim Fatty III" (or “Kim Three Fat” 金三胖) since 2013.

CDT Chinese editors noted that this and other related terms were blocked from both posting and searching on Weibo this week:

Some variations including 金三月巴 and 金三月半, which divide characters from the above terms into their separate components, are also blocked. "Kim Fatty III" and "Fatty III," together with the more mundane "Kim Jong-un," "Xi Jinping," and "North Korea," all appeared in FreeWeibo‘s top ten Hot Searches on Wednesday. The site’s archive includes deleted posts on the subject including "reform and opening is North Korea’s only way out" and "someone said: however you feel about this trade war, Fatty III is the biggest winner! ?"

At What’s On Weibo, Manya Koetse described handling of the news on the social media platform:

On social media platform Sina Weibo, the meeting received ample attention today and became a number one searched topic. The hashtag “Xi Jinping Meets Kim Jong-un” (#习近平会见金正恩#) was viewed nearly 38 million times by Wednesday afternoon; the hashtag ‘Kim Jong-un Visit’ (#金正恩访华#) received more than 32 million views.

[…] But online censorship was also at its height when news of the meeting was released by Chinese state media. Although the news articles received thousands of comments on social media, most of them were no longer able to view on Wednesday late afternoon (Beijing time), while other comment sections only showed the “carefully selected comments” (“以下为博主精选评论”). Individual posts about the event were hard to find.

One video, posted by the Chinese Wall Street Journal on Weibo, focused on a supposed meeting between Trump and Kim Jong-un – saying it would be a “big breakthrough” – and was soon taken offline after it was already viewed 30,000 times. [Source]

Noting the fat-shaming tendency evident in references to Kim, the Inkstone’s Xinyan Yu described "Kim Fatty III" as "a nickname born of a little bit of malice, and strangely, a bit of fondness, as well":

Malice because he’s a dictator of a hereditary Communist dynasty ruling over people who probably weigh half what he does; and fondness because it’s the kind of nickname you’d give a mischievous family member.

[…] In 2016, it was reported by international media that the term “fatty Kim the third” had been banned on China’s social media and search engines.

“The Chinese government is committed to building a healthy and civilized environment to express opinions,” spokesperson Geng Shuang said. “We do not agree with the use of derogatory terms to describe leaders of any nations.”

[…] Some have called the term “the barometer” for China-North Korea relations – it disappears when the two nations are friendly and returns when they are not. [Source]

The meeting and its effusive coverage in North Korean and Chinese official media suggests renewed warmth in this relationship after several chilly years. The New York Times’ Steven Lee Myers and Jane Perlez note that Kim had "rebuffed overtures from China, and purged officials who had previously served as the main channels to Beijing, including his uncle, who was executed." At the BBC, Ankit Panda noted that "like Kim, Xi – following a recent change to China’s constitution – will almost certainly lead his country for life, so their personal relationship matters." Panda is also an early participant in an ongoing China File conversation on the visit.

Elsewhere, the NYT’s Perlez examined the visit’s wider international implications, describing it as a demonstration of China’s decisive role in anticipated nuclear negotiations and "a reminder […] of what a strong hand [Kim] has going into talks, first with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea next month and later with President Trump." Reuters’ Josh Smith and Soyoung Kim focused on the domestic implications of Kim’s professed openness to denuclearization, citing former South Korean vice unification minister Kim Hyung-suk: "Kim Jong Un would seek to propagate the idea that he induced the U.S. and international community’s ‘surrender’ by having mastered nuclear weapons." Their report also noted former senior U.S. diplomat Evans Revere’s skeptical view that "those of us who have negotiated with the North Koreans know what they mean (by denuclearisation)": not just one-sided disarmament, but a withdrawal of American troops and deterrent "nuclear umbrella." Chinese North Korea expert Yang Xiyu expressed similar doubt, telling the NYT that Kim "is starting a new game where he could make concessions on denuclearization. […] At most, he will cut the grass, but he will not pull out the roots."

The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos sums up:

The North Korean crisis has morphed faster and more surprisingly in the first three months of 2018 than at any time since the death of Kim Jong Il, in 2011. Having spent much of the past two years taunting and defying the outside world, Kim, since New Year’s Day, has dispatched a delegation (including his sister) to the Winter Olympics in South Korea; pursued talks with President Moon Jae-in; received envoys in Pyongyang; proposed a summit with Donald Trump and a pause in his weapons-testing; and, most recently, agreed to Xi’s invitation to patch up tattered ties with China.

[…] “They’ve probably reached a point in their weapons program where they feel a pause is fine. They don’t need to test, and they could still advance and progress without these big demonstrations,” Victor Cha, a former director for Asian affairs in the National Security Council who is now a professor at Georgetown University, told me. “But the other piece of it is, I think, they’re feeling a lot of pressure from the sanctions. The last U.N. Security Council resolution basically sanctioned a hundred per cent of North Korea’s external trade. So this is unprecedented. And then the other thing is, I think, they are worried that the U.S. might do something crazy. I think they are genuinely worried about that.”

Whatever the precise parameters of Kim’s motivation, his China play has made it more difficult for Trump, who would have preferred that Beijing remain at odds with Pyongyang. Kim and Xi have re-scrambled the perceived loyalties and suspicions that will shape any potential encounter between North Korea and the United States—at the negotiating table or on the battlefield. This game is in the early stage. There may yet be more handshakes to come.[Source]

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On Twitter, University of British Columbia law student Shawn Zhang noted that Xi Jinping had misread a portion of text while delivering his closing address to the First Meeting of the 13th National People’s Congress in Beijing on March 20. In a nationalistic-tinged closing address that warned against division, Xi called on members of all of China’s 55 officially recognized ethnicities to support his “great rejuvenation of Chinese dream.” In a section of the speech, Xi recalled the long ideological, artistic, and creative history of China. While doing so, he misread the name of King Gesar from the Tibetan epic that bears his name, flipping the first two characters of the Mandarin rendering of the name (格萨尔王) to “King Sager” (萨格尔王):

Xi Jinping mispronounced the name of Tibetan Epic King Gesar as "King Sager" 习近平把“格萨尔王”说成”萨格尔王”。 pic.twitter.com/okiAEgraRP

— Shawn Zhang 章闻韶 (@shawnwzhang) March 20, 2018

Following the gaffe, Xinhua edited the video to unscramble the misspoken name of the mythological Tibetan king into something that more resembled the correct pronunciation (the edited portion can be seen at 6:36 on the video embedded here). Shawn Zhang notes on Twitter, and Victor Mair confirms at Language Log:

So after people found out Xi made a mistake, China reedited Xi's speech video and the mistake disappeared. https://t.co/OsszmJYrDF (pay close attention to 6:38 when Xi says King Gesar) https://t.co/vOds7vhqYo

— Shawn Zhang 章闻韶 (@shawnwzhang) March 21, 2018

On Sina Weibo, discussion of Xi’s misreading is being controlled. While searches for both “King Gesar” (格萨尔王) and “King Sager” (萨格尔王) are allowed, attempting to post the latter currently prompts the message “content is illegal.”

If the ongoing official campaign to portray Xi as well-read and erudite is any indication, he should have remembered the correct order of the characters in the epic king’s name. CDT Chinese editors note that official media last month listed the Epic of King Gesar as one of Xi’s recent reads.

Xi’s misreading recalls a 2016 gaffe that prompted fast action by censors. In a speech at the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, Xi misread the phrase for “be lenient to farmers” to the suggestive phrase for “loosen clothing,” and censors sprung to action. At Language Log, Victor Mair described this as a “horrendous gaffe” that “even someone with a middle school education should not have made.”  Following that embarrassing episode, at the 90th anniversary celebrations for the founding of the People’s Liberation Army last October, the unusual first character in the phrase kuīrán bù dòng (岿然不动, to “steadfastly stand one’s ground,”) was annotated on Xi’s teleprompter with tone-marked pinyin. This was accidentally captured in TV footage of the audience.

At a time when people across the world are increasingly concerned about the spread of misinformation online, about cyber-security, and about promoting a healthy and informed online civic discourse, Xi presents “cyber sovereignty” as a reasonable and thoughtful solution, as well as a government’s right. But it is a poison pill, proposing a cure that is far worse than the disease. As Forbidden Feeds will demonstrate, China’s system of online censorship is a broad-scale and daily a ack on free expression. As an Appendix to this report, PEN presents a list of 86 cases of internet users who have been targeted or punished by the government for their online expression.

China’s cyber sovereignty project has brought grave consequences to many, especially writers, activists, and dissidents. Those who dare to test the limits of China’s online censorship can face intimidation, job loss, years-long prison sentences, or find themselves forced into exile. […]

[…] Forbidden Feeds also considers the trade-offs facing foreign social media and technology companies as they consider entry into the Chinese market. PEN America argues that they should choose not to do so, because there is no way for them to operate in China at present without becoming a willing accomplice in widespread human rights violations. [p4] [Source]

Parts of the report focus on two long-running CDT series: the leaked censorship orders published as "Directives from the Ministry of Truth," and the blocked search and post terms from Weibo filed under "Sensitive Words." It also includes a case study on CDT cartoonist Badiucao [p45], who designed its cover.

One of the main ways that regulators provide specific marching orders on censorship to social media companies is with censorship directives, specific memorandums laying out instructions to internet companies and media organization on subjects such as how to handle coverage of certain events or which new words to ban.

[…] From 2002-2015, China Digital Times has published over 2,600 censorship directives from the government and the Communist Party. The actual number of directives, they have concluded, is likely far higher. “We know we only get a tiny fraction of the directives,” Samuel Wade, Deputy Editor of the site, told PEN America. “In September 2015, we got one that was an image and it was labeled directive number 320. Most of the times, the directives are passed on verbally to editors, in part so there’s less of a paper trail.” Wade went on to note that the number “320” only referred to the number of directives from that one censorship agency—the Central Propaganda Department. [p30]

[…] Perhaps the best-analyzed list of forbidden keywords comes from Sina Weibo, the microblogging platform with almost 400 million monthly users that functions much like Twitter. Because Sina Weibo posts are public, it is easier to analyze which words are blocked from the platform. Jason Q. Ng, an internet researcher, developed a censorship testing program in 2011 to evaluate the search engine offered by Sina Weibo, which allows people to search for posts from Weibo users. Ng found that, among the 700,000 words and phrases that he initially tested, over 1,000 words were blocked.

The results of the tracking system are hosted on China Digital Times. Due to technological changes in the way Weibo search functions, the automatic tracking mechanism has not worked since 2015, and CDT editors have manually updated the list since then. The list now contains almost 3500 words that have been added to the blacklist. Many of the words are not ‘blocked’ forever; instead, they are just blocked temporarily during breaking news events and later made accessible again once censors apparently judge that the ‘subversive’ connotations of the words have been forgotten. [p35]

For examples of the two series, see an extensive list of Sensitive Words related to the recent abolition of presidential term limits and an ongoing series of directives guiding coverage of the Two Sessions political meetings currently underway in Beijing. For more on the Directives series, see a recap of last year’s leaks, analysis of those by Freedom House’s Sarah Cook, and a 2013 essay by Perry Link.

Bāozi lòu Xiàn 包子露”宪”

A meme showing a steamed bun leaking an imperial Winnie-the-Pooh, a reference to Xi Jinping (Source: CDT)

Netizen allusion to Xi Jinping’s apparent and expected attempt to extend his rule as state president past the constitutional two-term limit; a hybrid of a homophonous play on a Chinese saying indicating that someone’s secrets are being exposed (bāozi lòu xiàn’er 包子露馅儿, “the steamed bun is leaking its filling”) and a longstanding sensitive nickname for Xi Jinping.

On February 25, 2018, state media announced a list of proposed amendments to China’s constitution, which were expected to be adopted at the upcoming National People’s Congress session in Beijing. Among the proposed changes, an edit to the language in section three of article 79 would eradicate the two-term limits to the posts of PRC president and vice-president, and would potentially allow Xi Jinping to rule over the state for the rest of his life. Immediately following the news, social media flooded with expressions of what commentator Mo Zhixu described as “universal shock and lamentation.” Netizens subsequently saw a long list of terms banned from being posted and searched for on social media and critical opinions of the plan censored online. Meanwhile, legal professionals in parts of the country were reportedly threatened with disbarment should they post “harmful information or comments” about the amendment.

An attempt to post the phrase yielded “Sorry, this content contains information that violates the law or the ‘Weibo Community Convention,’ and we are unable to advance operation.” (Source: Weibo)

Many of the terms banned on social media dealt with the topic as an apparent attempt by Xi Jinping to install himself as a virtual emperor. The phrase “Steamed Bun betrays the Constitution,” which as of March 2, 2018 was blocked from being posted on Weibo, fused a longstanding sensitive nickname of Xi’s with the Chinese saying bāozi lòu xiàn’er (包子露馅儿), “the steamed bun is leaking its filling.” In 2014, after the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ revelation that several family members of top Chinese leaders were using offshore tax havens—among them, the brother-in-law of Xi Jinping—netizens turned to the saying to mock the revealed ties. Xi had earlier earned the mocking nickname “Steamed Bun Xi” following a staged lunch at a popular dumpling restaurant in Beijing, and the moniker along with several related netizen terms was blocked from search results on Weibo.

See also Steamed Bun Xi and Cutlassfish bun.

Can’t get enough of subversive Chinese netspeak? Check out our latest ebook, “Decoding the Chinese Internet: A Glossary of Political Slang.” Includes dozens of new terms and classic catchphrases, presented in a new, image-rich format. Available for pay-what-you-want (including nothing). All proceeds support CDT.