The subsidiary laws include designating premises linked to the Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS), Beijing’s national security office in Hong Kong, as “prohibited places” and drawing up related offences, as well as setting up a mechanism allowing mainland China to exercise jurisdiction over national security cases.

[…] According to the legislation gazetted on Tuesday, anyone who discloses any information related to the measures and investigation by the OSNS can face a fine of up to HK$500,000 and imprisonment for up to seven years.

Anyone who provides false or misleading information to the OSNS is also liable to conviction and can be punished with a maximum fine of HK$500,000 and a jail sentence of up to seven years.

[…] The subsidiary legislation stated that any government department or public servant must provide “necessary and reasonable assistance” to the OSNS. [Source]

Chinese jurisdiction over Hong Kong in certain national security cases is based in part on Article 55 of the National Security Law imposed by Beijing, but the new legislation calls for establishing “a mechanism at the local law level” to allow the OSNS to perform the Article 55 mandate “effectively” and further solidify Beijing’s authority. Under Article 55, the OSNS has jurisdiction in circumstances when a case is determined to be a “serious situation” which renders the city government unable to enforce the law effectively or counter a “major and imminent threat to national security,” or if the case is complex due to the involvement of a foreign country. The OSNS can also take over a case at the request of the Hong Kong government. Secretary for Justice Paul Lam claimed, “Human rights and freedom provisions will not be affected in any way by subsidiary legislation.” Six sites used by the OSNS have already been declared as “prohibited places.”

In addition to the Hong Kong government, some citizens are showing their own zeal for national security. A BBC investigation published over the weekend described the story of a 60-year-old Hong Kong pro-China informer named Innes Tang, a prominent self-described patriot who assists the police with surveillance work:

He and his volunteers have taken screen grabs from social media of any activities or comments they believe could be in breach of the [National Security Law].

He also established a hotline for tip-offs from the public and encouraged his online followers to share information on the people around them.

Nearly 100 individuals and organisations have been reported to the authorities by him and his followers, he says.

"Does reporting work? We wouldn’t do it if it didn’t," Mr Tang says. "Many had cases opened by the police… with some resulting in jail terms."

Mr Tang says he hasn’t investigated alleged law breakers himself, but simply reported incidents he thinks warrant scrutiny – describing it as "proper community-police co-operation".

[…] Hong Kong’s authorities have set up their own national security hotline, receiving 890,000 tip-offs from November 2020 to February this year – the city’s security bureau told the BBC. [Source]

The recent national security legislation is just the latest step in an ongoing entrenchment of authoritarian rule in Hong Kong. Last month, the Hong Kong Center for Human Rights published its annual human rights report for 2024, which documented patterns of repression across a variety of domains and the government’s efforts to restrict civil liberties. Here are two key insights from the report’s executive summary:

1. Expansion of the National Security Regime
The enactment of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO) in 2024 has significantly expanded Hong Kong’s national security apparatus. Building on the 2020 National Security Law (NSL), the SNSO empowers the executive to override judicial processes, curtail fair trial guarantees, and assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. The decisions made by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR are explicitly binding and beyond judicial review, and the Chief Executive may issue binding national security certificates at any time.

2. Erosion of Judicial Independence and Access to Justice
The judiciary has been sidelined in national security matters, with executive authorities exerting direct influence over legal outcomes. Restrictions on legal representation, declining approval rates for legal aid, scrutiny of crowdfunding, and the imposition of punitive cost orders have fostered a hostile environment for public interest litigation. High-profile legal reprisals against civil society actors have created a chilling effect on access to justice. [Source]

In other news related to national security in Hong Kong, earlier this month the city’s national security police arrested the father and brother of Anna Kwok, executive director of the U.S.-based Hong Kong Democracy Council and one of 19 overseas activists targeted with a HK$1 million ($127,656) bounty for her arrest. The police allege her family members dealt with her finances, and they could face up to seven years in prison. Elsewhere, four members of the “Hong Kong 47” group of pro-democracy activists jailed for national security offences were released last month. They include Claudia Mo, Kwok Ka-ki, Jeremy Tam, and Gary Fan, who had served sentences of over four years. Most of the rest of the group members are still in prison serving sentences of up to ten years.

Although physical attacks against journalists are the most visible violations of press freedom, economic pressure is also a major, more insidious problem. The economic indicator on the RSF World Press Freedom Index now stands at an unprecedented, critical low as its decline continued in 2025. As a result, the global state of press freedom is now classified as a “difficult situation” for the first time in the history of the Index.

[…] For over ten years, the Index’s results have warned of a worldwide decline in press freedom. In 2025, a new low point emerged: the average score of all assessed countries fell below 55 points, falling into the category of a “difficult situation.” More than six out of ten countries (112 in total) saw their overall scores decline in the Index.

For the first time in the history of the Index, the conditions for practising journalism are “difficult” or “very serious” in over half of the world’s countries and satisfactory in fewer than one in four.

[…] Out of the 32 countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific region, 20 have seen their economic score decline in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index. The systemic media control in authoritarian regimes is often inspired by China’s propaganda model. China (178th) remains the world’s largest jail for journalists and reentered the bottom trio of the Index, coming just ahead of North Korea (179th). Meanwhile, the concentration of media ownership in the hands of influential groups linked to those in power — as seen in India (151st) — combined with growing economic pressures even in established democracies, means that press freedom in the region faces mounting repression and increasing uncertainty. [Source]

For the first time, Hong Kong slipped into the “red zone,” or the lowest category of the index, alongside China. RSF also noted that Hong Kong is among the territories that now directs subsidies toward pro-government media. Tom Grundy from the Hong Kong Free Press reported on the city’s uniquely precipitous drop in the rankings:

“At RSF, we have never seen such a sharp and rapid deterioration in the press freedom record of any country or territory,” the watchdog’s Asia-Pacific Bureau Advocacy Officer Aleksandra Bielakowska⁩ told HKFP. “Today, Hong Kong increasingly resembles neighbouring China, the world’s largest prison for journalists.”

[…] Hong Kong saw sharp dips in all five of the watchdog’s indicators: political context, legal framework, economic context, socio-cultural context, and safety – adding up to a historic low score of 39.86.

The free expression NGO said: “The main factor behind this decline is the deterioration of the political indicator (-7.28 pts), notably due to the September 2024 conviction for ‘sedition’ of Chung Pui-kuen and Patrick Lam, former editors of Stand News. This is the first sedition case against the media since the UK handed over the territory in 1997.” [Source]

The 2025 RSF index of world press freedom is out.Hong Kong is ranked 140 out of 179, snuggly inbetween Sri Lanka and Kazakhstan. It is officially in the "red zone", together with China that is ranked 178. N-Korea is last. To put in context: HK was ranked 18, back in 2002.rsf.org/en/index

— lokman tsui (@lokman.org) 2025-05-02T06:57:31.409Z

HKFP is among the many media organizations facing the economic pressures highlighted by RSF:

HKFP has weathered threats, harassment, scrutiny from multiple government departments over the past year, but now facing a funding crunch. In full: buff.ly/ZxXDaLL

— Hong Kong Free Press HKFP (@hongkongfp.com) 2025-05-02T23:01:04.657Z

RSF’s Asia-Pacific advocacy manager Aleksandra Bielakowska highlighted how foreign media’s ability to operate in China has become severely limited, especially in borderland regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. She described it as “[n]ot just an authoritarian country, but a really totalitarian system where nobody can speak up, nobody can report on any issues.” “The difficulty is always safety as an exile media. Everybody is so afraid to talk with us and work with us,” said Shirley Leung Ka Lai, editor-in-chief of Photon Media from Hong Kong. She added that working anonymously creates obstacles for connecting with sources who are often reluctant to trust calls from unknown foreign numbers.

In a statement on Friday, The Foreign Correspondents’ Club (FCC) of Hong Kong reaffirmed its support to journalists and stated that the day serves as a reminder to the city’s officials to respect their stated commitments regarding press freedom. Last month, the FCC released its Press Freedom Survey for 2025, which revealed a significant deterioration of working conditions for journalists in Hong Kong.

Of the 69 respondents, 43 (62%) said that their working environment as a journalist in Hong Kong had changed for the worse since July 2023, the time of the last press freedom survey. The National Security Law, its related trials, and the perceived exodus of international news organisations were mentioned as reasons for the change.

Respondents also noted that their sources have become more concerned about sharing their own opinions, with 44 (64%) saying that their sources are less willing to be quoted or discuss sensitive subjects.

Journalists are cautious about their own writing as well, with 45 (65%) saying they had self-censored in the last 18 months, and 12 (18%) saying they had self-censored “considerably”.

Ten respondents (16%) reported facing minor interference in their reporting, and one noted significant interference.

The perception of the media environment is also noteworthy, with four people (6%) saying they are “very concerned,” and 36 people (52%) being “slightly concerned” about the possibility of arrest or prosecution over their reporting or opinion articles or work they have edited. [Source]

For more on this topic, see CDT’s past coverage of press freedom in China and Hong Kong, including last year’s annual report of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, which showed a similar picture of surveillance, obstruction, and intimidation of journalists.

Five senior members of the Democratic Party had earlier told Reuters that Chinese officials or middlemen had warned it in recent months to disband or face serious consequences, including possible arrests.

The party, founded three years before Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule from Britain in 1997, has been the Asian financial hub’s flagship opposition, uniting democratic forces to push Beijing on democratic reforms, and to uphold freedoms.

Party head Lo Kin-hei told reporters that 90 percent of 110 members had voted at Sunday’s meeting for a three-person committee to start making arrangements for disbandment, including resolving legal and accounting matters.

[…] If the party disbands, it would mark the end of nearly 30 years of opposition party politics in Hong Kong. [Source]

The party’s manifesto maintained that Hong Kong is an indivisible part of China, but its “relatively moderate position didn’t really effectively improve the relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing over the past decade,” said Ma Ngok, an associate professor of government at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. New measures in 2021 limiting legislative elections to only "patriots” effectively barred the Democratic Party from fielding candidates, and at least five Democratic Party members are currently behind bars, including two former chairpersons, Albert Ho and Wu Chi-wai. Nonetheless, the party continued to provide pro-bono legal services and voice criticism of some government policies. The Civic Party, the second-largest opposition group, officially disbanded in March 2020. Yeung Sum, co-founder of the Democratic Party, said, “I’m not very happy about it, but I can see if we refuse the call to disband, we may pay a very huge price for it.” While acknowledging that disbandment would be a “very huge setback” that would challenge the “one country, two systems” principle, Yeung also said, “But I think people’s hearts for democracy, they will not fade out. They still keep it, maybe in different form.”

Hong Kong opposition forces are re-organizing outside of the city. On Tuesday, Amnesty International announced the launch of its new Hong Kong office based overseas, following the closure of its local office in 2021. Officially registered in Switzerland, the new office will be led by diaspora activists operating in Australia, Canada, Taiwan, the U.K., and the U.S., and it will “focus on advocating for human rights of Hongkongers, within Hong Kong and abroad, amplifying their voices and fostering a strong diaspora community globally.” Among its board members are ex-lawmaker Fernando Cheung and former student activist Joey Siu, one of the 19 activists for which the Hong Kong government has placed a HK$1 million bounty. The press release from Amnesty International provided more details about the initiative, in the words of its leaders:

“The opening of Amnesty International Hong Kong Overseas [AIHKO] marks a new chapter in the organization’s strengthened commitment to human rights in Hong Kong and its support for the Hong Kong diaspora around the world,” said Chi-man Luk, the new AIHKO Executive Director.

“The gutting of Hong Kong’s civil society has been a tragedy for the city with more than 100 non-profits and media outlets shut down or forced to flee. But since the closing of Amnesty International Hong Kong three years ago, our dedication has only grown. We are now ready to intensify our efforts by building new communities of support driven by the Hong Kong diaspora.”

[…] AIHKO is Amnesty International’s first-ever section founded and operated entirely “in exile”, and follows the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Hongkongers who have gone abroad in search of safety and freedom.

“Being overseas provides us with a degree of protection, allowing us to speak more freely and engage in advocacy work. We have a responsibility to do more to support those who remain in Hong Kong and continue their vital efforts,” said Fernando Cheung, AIHKO board member and former Hong Kong legislator. [Source]

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong government held its 10th National Security Education Day on Tuesday, during which Education Secretary Christine Choi warned of the “dangerous aspect” of “soft resistance,” which could “easily penetrate the heart and mind.” In other news, the government attracted criticism last week by refusing entry to British lawmaker Wera Hobhouse. After landing at Hong Kong airport, she was questioned and put on a flight back to the U.K. hours later. Caroline Davies from The Guardian provided more detail on the ordeal and possible justifications, which may relate to Hobhouse’s criticism of Hong Kong:

The UK government is “greatly concerned” and wants an account of why the Liberal Democrat MP Wera Hobhouse was denied entry to Hong Kong on a family visit to meet her three-month-old grandson for the first time.

[…] Hobhouse told the Sunday Times her passport was confiscated, she was asked about her job and the purpose of her trip, her luggage was searched and swabbed, then she was escorted to the boarding gate by four immigration officers.

Her son, a university academic living in Hong Kong since 2019, was waiting in the arrivals hall. Her husband, William, a businessman, was allowed entry but chose also to return to the UK. She is believed to be the first MP refused entry since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong.

Hobhouse, who has never visited Hong Kong, said she was given no explanation but believes it was because she is an MP. She is a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (Ipac), an international group of politicians that scrutinises Beijing’s approach to human rights and has criticised the crackdown on free speech in Hong Kong. [Source]

1. Do not reprint or cite foreign media commentary on sensitive issues involving Xinjiang.
2. Do not republish or hype inaccurate reports on epidemic control in Russia.
3. Strengthen checks on maps and place name labels and markers involving the South China Sea. (March 3, 2020) [Chinese]

Reminders related to the novel coronavirus pneumonia epidemic:

1. Give low-key handling to our government’s coordination of commercial charter flights to repatriate Chinese citizens from Iran. Brief factual reports are permissible, but do not extrapolate, decipher, comment, republish foreign media reports, draw connections to Sino-Iranian relations and cooperation, or use the term "evacuate." If reporting on accommodations for Chinese citizens following their repatriation, do so in accordance with information published by the relevant provinces and authoritative departments, and do not quote unverified online information. Do not conduct interviews with repatriated people or their friends and relatives in the absence of unified arrangements.
2. In general, do not publish reports on online information such as "vegetables given to support Hubei by other regions left to go to waste."
3. If reporting on the number of fatalities from novel coronavirus pneumonia in welfare institutions, senior citizens’ homes, mental hospitals etc., proceed in accordance with information published by authoritative departments. Do not cite data published by social organizations or foreign organizations, or information circulating online.
4. In the next few days, the Hong Kong and Macao governments will repatriate groups of their citizens from Hubei. Do not create reports for domestic audiences; reports for foreign audiences may proceed on the basis of unified deployment. (March 3, 2020) [Chinese]

These directives’ instructions on the COVID-19 epidemic echo many themes from previous orders, including the tone of coverage of the epidemic in other countries, avoidance of potentially inflammatory terminology and topics such as evacuations of Hong Kong, U.S. and other citizens, and standardization of sourcing with heavy emphasis on official releases. Other recent orders had also similarly called for rectification of names involving the South China Sea.

The order about "foreign media commentary on sensitive issues involving Xinjiang" came two weeks after The New York Times’ release of reporting on a major trove of leaked documents on China’s mass detention campaign in the region. It also coincided with a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on various Western firms’ suspected use of forced labor in the region, and with criticism of the detention campaign by NGOs at the United Nations. March 3 saw the opening of an exhibition at the the Palais Des Nations in Geneva intended to rebut such condemnation during the 43rd regular session of the U.N. Human Rights Council. The display included "more than 100 pictures and videos presenting a beautiful, open, and richly-endowed Xinjiang" in which "people of different ethnic groups, thanks to social stability, are able to share the fruits of development and enjoy their life and work."

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Reminders related to the novel coronavirus epidemic:

1. Keep a firm grasp when reporting on the coronavirus situation and control measures in foreign countries. Do not overly criticize or ridicule their "loopholes" or "mistakes." Do not make simple comparisons to China’s prevention and control measures. In order to avoid backlash from foreign countries, do not use terms like “copying homework.”

2. Concerning the adoption of necessary entry prevention, control, and quarantine measures taken towards South Korea, Japan, and other countries, report in strict accordance with statements from the Foreign Ministry and other authoritative departments. Do not report control measures taken by relevant locations without unified arrangement to avoid inflaming public opinion. Do not use extreme wording or triggering descriptions such as "uniformly prohibit," "strictly prevent," or "completely close." "Clickbait" behavior must be eliminated.

3. Regarding work resuming in tourist areas, restaurants, malls, etc., this must be handled in accordance with the principles of moderation. Do not highlight or aggregate reports. Guide the public to avoid large gatherings and to exercise sound judgment about going outside.

4. Concerning research and development into a vaccine for the novel coronavirus, further standardization of the publication and information control process is needed. Use only authoritative information issued by the State Council Joint Prevention mechanism, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the National Health Commission. Don’t hastily publish unconfirmed information, and do not exaggerate the efficacy of vaccines developed by social organizations. Do not speculate about the vaccine prospects, and prevent inaccurate reports and confusing information. (February 26, 2020) [Chinese]

On the matter of the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Regional government’s announcement of arrangements for retrieving Hong Kong residents stranded in the mainland, do not push news segments in pop-ups, do not post on front pages, do not start hot topics in interactive sections, do not show in trends, and promptly manage extreme comments. (February 26, 2020) [Chinese]

Earlier entries in the stream of coronavirus-related directives throughout February had included similar guidance on the issues of foreign opinion, border closures and other restrictions, and medical research.

Hong Kong’s government had announced on February 24 that it would begin to evacuate some 2,700 citizens from Hubei after a month of lockdown. Such moves had reportedly been blocked by central authorities aggrieved at similar moves by foreign countries; one earlier directive contained detailed restrictions on coverage of the American withdrawal of consular staff from Wuhan soon after the lockdown began.

•••

All departments and terminals publishing video pieces must persist in using higher authorities’ source information. Do not arbitrarily use source content from other media outlets. (February 26, 2020) [Chinese]

On the basis of this sample, please clean up and delete the articles, photos, etc. [listed]. Report relevant data on the clean-up to the editor on duty. Take note, this sample should not be circulated. (February 26, 2020) [Chinese]

Please search for and delete videos and articles related to this video sample. If any information is cleaned up please report to the editor on duty. (February 26, 2020) [Chinese]

CDT has not confirmed what specific content was targeted in the last three directives above.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Regarding reports on the epidemic, do not take the initiative in covering controversial topics, and do not look back or repost on controversial topics from the past. (February 9, 2020) [Chinese]

This broad, pre-emptive directive aimed to help “control the temperature” and contain potentially emerging sources of discontent amid the COVID-19 outbreak. The ban on highlighting "controversial topics from the past" reflects a common tactic meant to obscure parallels and patterns that could help fuel public anger. Another example is a January directive on coverage of a hospital doctor’s murder by the disgruntled son of a patient, which included an order not to "link to or relate to other incidents of injured doctors."

•••

Please cover donations of materials for fighting the epidemic to the mainland from all parts of Hong Kong society. (February 10, 2020) [Chinese]

Highlighting Hong Kongers’ support for the mainland was likely intended to bolster Beijing’s consistent domestic narrative on the territory’s mass protests in 2019 and 2020: that, despite the scale and breadth of participation, they were the work of a narrow separatist minority in league with foreign adversaries. The authorities had been pushing similar messages of unity within Hong Kong. A Spring Festival address by new Liaison Office head Luo Huining, for example, which was the subject of an earlier leaked directive, quoted Xi Jinping’s adage that "harmony in a family makes everything successful."

Other directives sought to guide coverage of other channels of support to Hubei, from other parts of China, celebrities, the People’s Liberation Army, and from foreign countries.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Please take care to block this video, which violates regulations: Korean drama "Psychopath Diary." (January 15, 2020) [Source]

"Ssaikopaeseu Daieori" is [POSSIBLE SPOILERS] the story of a serial killer who loses the diary in which he has recorded his murders, and of his father’s timid employee who finds the diary, loses his memory, and comes to believe that the diary is his own and that he is therefore the killer. K-drama ensues.

•••

Reminder! On the signing of the Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement between China and the United States:

1. Do not report live or livestream the signing ceremony, and do not carry livestreams from CCTV’s higher-level news channels or from CGTN.
2. For wire copy on the signing, strictly follow Xinhua copy as the standard. Do not modify headlines, take any independent actions, or cite information from other sources, especially information from outside of China. Strictly adhere to authoritative information when reporting on the press conference held in the U.S. by the Chinese delegation. It is strictly forbidden to republish or report old news about Sino-U.S. trade relations.
3. Strengthen supervision of online public opinion. Promptly find and deal with harmful information suggesting that we submitted or surrendered; playing up one-sided benefit; suggesting that the agreement violates WTO rules; starting or spreading rumors; inciting boycotts of the agreement, fear or adulation of the U.S., or pessimistic views of our economic prospects; or attacking the system or process. (January 15, 2020) [Source]

Issued on the day of the agreement’s signing, this is part of a series of instructions on handling of the Sino-U.S. trade agreement and preceding negotiations.

•••

1. Reports related to Iran’s mistaken attack on the Ukrainian passenger plane must hold reliably to our officially stated position. Cite foreign media with caution, do not lend endorsement to American or other Western sensationalism, and do not play up negative information about Iran.

2. Regarding protest activities within Iran, cite foreign media reports with caution, do not blindly pile on, do not hype, and do not lend endorsement to American or other Western smearing of Iran’s image or incitement of conflict within the country. Exercise moderation in reporting on the brief detention of the U.K. ambassador to Iran, and appropriately expose and criticize Western double standards and underhand practices of inciting color revolution and interfering in other countries’ internal affairs.

3. Regarding issues with unilateral American sanctions on Iran that involve China, handle reports on Sino-Iranian cooperation cautiously. Particularly avoid the appearance of specific details on financial institutions, businesses, ports, transactions, etc. involved in our cooperation with Iran. Do not associate conflicts between the U.S. and Iran with Sino-Iranian or Sino-U.S. relations. (January 15, 2020) [Source]

Iran acknowledged on January 11 that it accidentally shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 near Tehran on January 8. Also on January 11, British ambassador Rob Macaire was detained for three hours in Tehran after attending a vigil for the 176 mostly Iranian or Iranian-Canadian victims. Macaire claimed that "I left after 5 mins, when some started chanting," but was accused by the Revolutionary Guard-affiliated Tasnim news agency of having tried to "organise, instigate and direct some of the radical and destructive actions" in the subsequent protest. Similar accusations have arisen in China with the endorsement of bodies such as the Communist Youth League and Global Times, particularly focusing on Western consular observers at rights lawyers’ trials after the 2015 "709" or "Black Friday" crackdown, and U.S. ambassador Jon Huntsman over his presence on Wangfujing at the time of a planned "Jasmine Revolution" protest in 2011.

•••

Reminder: Regarding the article "Cherishing Hong Kong as Our Common Home—An Address at the Central Government’s Hong Kong Liaison Office’s 2020 Spring Festival Reception," on Comrade Luo Huining’s speech at the Spring Festival Reception, news sections must not send pop-ups or give placement on site-wide or news front pages. Weibo, WeChat, Tieba, and other forums, and interactive platforms such as Zhihu and Douban, must not set up special topics or hot searches. Thoroughly clean up harmful information. (January 15, 2020) [Source]

Luo was installed as Beijing’s "enforcer" in Hong Kong at the start of January, after his predecessor Wang Zhimin’s removal amid the fallout from 2019’s anti-extradition, pro-democracy protests. An earlier order directed coverage of the personnel change. China Daily’s Willa Wu reported on Luo’s address:

The central government’s new liaison chief in Hong Kong said on Wednesday that ending violence and chaos remains the most pressing task for the city, and appealed to the community to cherish Hong Kong and uphold the “one country, two systems” principle.

[…] In his 18-minute welcoming speech, Luo noted that Hong Kong had not completely emerged from the prolonged social unrest, which has dragged Hong Kong’s economy into a recession and severely affected the residents’ lives.

Luo then called on the whole community to cherish their home by making best use of “one country, two systems”, upholding the core values of the rule of law and a civilized society, and realizing the aspiration of prosperity and development.

“Harmony in a family makes everything successful,” Luo said, quoting President Xi Jinping, who made the remarks during his inspection tour in Macao late last month. [Source]

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Concerning Comrade [Vice Premier] Liu He’s January 13-15 trip to the United States to sign Phase One of an economic trade agreement, with no exception: do not organize reports without prior arrangement, do not send push notifications, do not reprint unfavorable foreign reports without authorization. In interactive sections, do not set up special topics, recommendations, or other collections. Promotion without authorization is strictly forbidden. (January 9, 2020) [Chinese]

In January, Liu He traveled to Washington to sign a Phase One trade deal with President Trump. In the run-up to the signing, propaganda officials issued several directives limiting coverage of the event.

•••

The two elections for regional leadership and public representatives in Taiwan will take place on January 11. You are hereby notified of the following relevant arrangements and work requirements:

1. After results are announced, refer to Xinhua News reports. Election results are not to be forecast in advance.
2. Voting and ballot information on the election may be briefly reported, but the quantity of reports must be strictly controlled; do not push pop-ups, do not open special topics or columns, and live reports are not allowed in any form of text, broadcast, television, online video, or mobile broadcast. Live broadcast is also prohibited on work unit or individuals’ social media including Weibo, WeChat public accounts, or other new media platforms. Do not interview relevant candidates, members of campaigns, or other politically sensitive figures on the island;
3. Taiwan-related emergency situations that occurred during, before, or after the elections may be briefly and objectively reported in accordance with Xinhua copy. Do not independently conduct interviews or reporting without authorization. (January 9, 2020) [Chinese]

On January 11, Taiwan held an election, which saw a resounding victory for incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen. In the run-up to the election, Beijing had launched an influence and disinformation campaign promoting her challenger Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu. A previous censorship directive on January 6 also limited coverage of the Taiwan election.

•••

Regarding Comrade Wang Zhimin’s appointment as deputy head of the Central Institute for Party History and Literature Research, there are to be no pop-ups, no placement on dual homepages [site-wide and news], no special topics; do not open topics on interactive sections, do not list as a hot search. Promptly clean up outrageous and absurd commentary, distorted interpretations, and other inappropriate information. (January 9, 2020) [Chinese]

In the midst of long-running pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, Wang Zhimin was abruptly replaced as the head of the Chinese liaison office in Hong Kong. The liaison office reports directly to the State Council and is Beijing’s primary representative office in the city. Wang was replaced by former Shanxi CCP chief Luo Huining.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Do not report on the epidemic situation in Hong Kong, the special administrative region’s handling of the situation, etc. (January 8, 2020) [Chinese]

On January 8, The New York Times published its first report on a "new virus causing pneumonialike illness" identified in China, noting Chinese authorities’ claim that there was "no evidence that the new virus is readily spread by humans"—a line that the WHO would soon echo. According to the Times’ January 8 report on the emerging illness, eight people in Hong Kong had shown flulike symptoms after recent visits to Wuhan, and additional symptom screening had been installed at the Hong Kong airport. The first known Chinese censorship directive issued to control the narrative over the coronavirus outbreak came on January 2.

In early January, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement was entering its seventh consecutive month of protest. Beijing had just replaced its top official in the region, and 400 were arrested after tens of thousands at a New Year’s Day demonstration  In the following months, the Hong Kong government would enact and extend viral control restrictions, including a ban on public gatherings. While these moves were supported by public health experts, some defended the right to protest during the pandemic (in the context of Black Lives Matter demonstrations in the United States) amid concerns that the restrictions also served to further erode the political autonomy of the Hong Kong people at a crucial moment.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Regarding the pneumonia of unknown origin that emerged in Wuhan, Hubei, use information released by authoritative departments as the standard, do not write baseless conjecture. Strictly prohibit publishing foreign reports, do not hype or link to the 2003 SARS epidemic, prevent fake news from triggering mass panic. (January 4, 2020) [Chinese]

This order echoes another from January 2, the earliest known directive on the coronavirus outbreak. This one adds the prohibition on publishing foreign reports and on drawing parallels with the 2003 SARS outbreak. Similar instructions are commonly seen in directives: the former shore up the primacy of approved information from "authoritative departments," while the latter aim to avert panic and avoid the highlighting of trends or patterns that may embarrass authorities.

•••

If reporting on the January 5 funeral ceremony for Doctor Yang Wen of Babaoshan Civil Aviation Hospital, authoritative departments’ information shall serve as the norm. Do not make special topics, do not link to or relate to other incidents of injured doctors. Promptly clean up harmful information. (January 4, 2020) [Chinese]

This order also follows an earlier one, from January 3, on the stabbing of an emergency room doctor by the disgruntled son of a patient. Again, the directive attempts to isolate the incident from the long-running trend of similar attacks on medical personnel.

•••

Concerning the change of the head of the Hong Kong Central Liaison Office, please republish and report in strict accordance with authoritative sources such as Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China National Radio. Do not independently gather or aggregate, or spread analysis without prior arrangement. Weibo, WeChat, Q&A sites, etc., strengthen content review in interactive sections, do not spread hype, don’t set up special topics or hot searches, strictly manage all types of attacks on the dismissal/appointment decision, and reject all harmful information about our Hong Kong policy. (January 4, 2020) [Chinese]

Former Shanxi Party Secretary Luo Huining replaced Wang Zhiming as the central government’s most senior official in Hong Kong. Reuters had previously reported that Wang’s superiors were dissatisfied with the office’s handling of last year’s massive anti-extradition, pro-democracy protests. His replacement was part of a broader response that culminated with the imposition of a draconian National Security Law on the territory on July 1.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

[Tony Chung, t]he 23-year-old independence activist [and ex-convener of now-disbanded pro-independence group Studentlocalism] finished his jail term last June over a national security offence but was subject to a post-prison supervision order which the Correctional Services Department said he had “openly breached”.

[…] Carmen Lau, 29, a former district councillor and now an activist with the US-based NGO Hong Kong Democracy Council, was charged with incitement to secession and collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security.

[…] At 19 years old, Chloe Cheung is the youngest of the activists who have had arrest warrants issued against them.

Cheung is charged with incitement to secession by publishing articles as a member of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation (CFHK). She is also accused of colluding with foreign forces for asking foreign countries to issue warnings about the growing risks of conducting business in the city.

[…] Chung Kim-wah, 64, was formerly a pollster at the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI). Then-deputy chief executive officer, Chung in April 2022 left Hong Kong for the UK, and said that the city had become a place where one could “no longer live normally and without intimidation.”

[…] Ex-TVB actor Joseph Tay, 62, co-founded the Canada-based NGO HongKonger Station. He is accused of using to publish content inciting secession and to urge foreign governments to impose sanctions on Beijing and Hong Kong authorities.

[…] Canadian citizen and journalist Victor Ho, 69, is accused of subversion under the national security law for establishing the “Hong Kong Parliament” in exile, “with a view to achieving “self-determination” and subverting state power. [Source]

Chloe Cheung noted on X that the photo of her used in the Hong Kong police’s bounty announcement was from when she was 11 years old. Cheung asked, “How fragile, incompetent, and cowardly does a regime have to be to believe that I, a 19-year-old, ordinary Hongkonger, can ‘endanger’ and ‘divide’ the country? How panicked are they that they have to put a million-dollar bounty on me?” Hongkongers made similar points about the government’s fragility last Friday, when over 20 police officers disrupted an independent book fair by stopping and searching almost everyone who left a bookstore, one staffer reported.

Last week, the Hong Kong government also canceled the passports of seven activists who had bounties issued against them in 2023: Ted Hui, Anna Kwok, Elmer Yuen, Dennis Kwok, Kevin Yam, Frances Hui, and Joey Siu. The government did the same in June for six other activists targeted with bounties in 2023: Nathan Law, Christopher Mung, Finn Lau, Simon Cheng, Johnny Fok, and Tony Choi. There are now a total of 19 exiled Hong Kongers with arrest warrants and bounties against them.

Rights defenders blasted the Hong Kong police. “The Hong Kong government’s latest round of arrest warrants and bounties against six Hong Kong activists is a cowardly act of intimidation that aims to silence Hong Kong people,” said Maya Wang, associate China director at Human Rights Watch. “This is an outrageous escalation in transnational repression against overseas Hong Kongers. […] These absurd, arbitrary charges only serve to further drive home the farce of Hong Kong authorities claiming to follow the rule of law,” said Michael Caster, Head of Global China Programme for Article 19. Hong Kong Watch condemned the government’s measures and highlighted responses from other targeted activists:

Carmen Lau, Senior Advocacy Associate for the Hong Kong Democracy Council who was issued a bounty today, said:

“I have always considered serving Hong Kongers and fighting for our freedom and democracy my lifelong obligation since the day I was elected as a district councillor. Since I fled, I have often regretted not being able to serve my people until the end. Therefore, as a member of the diaspora and as a Hong Konger, I swear to put our fight for Hong Kong before anything else, even before myself.”

Joey Siu, an independent Hong Kong activist who had her passport cancelled today, said:

“On Christmas Eve, Hong Kong authorities announced the cancellation of my HKSAR passport and those of six other exiles, citing the Article 23… I separately hold a U.S. passport, so the impact of this cancellation on me is minimal. However, it is detrimental to many of my fellow exiled advocates from Hong Kong who are not as privileged.

As an American who is continuously targeted by Hong Kong authorities, first under the National Security Law, then ongoing transnational repression, and now with Article 23, I believe that the federal government’s response has been insufficient. Unnamed visa restrictions are not enough. Targeted sanctions under the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 should be imposed immediately.”

[…] Megan Khoo, Policy Director of Hong Kong Watch, said:

“Hong Kong Watch unequivocally condemns the issuance of bounties and cancellation of passports targeting our friends and colleagues in exile. These acts are clear attempts of transnational repression, designed to silence dissent and extend the reach of authoritarian control beyond Hong Kong’s borders. We must not allow them to succeed.” [Source]

Separately, on December 22, the Chinese government sanctioned the Canada-based Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project and the Canada-Tibet Committee, along with 15 members of the former and five members of the latter. The sanctions include asset freezes and entry bans. The move follows sanctions by the Canadian government against eight former and current senior Chinese officials for their roles in human rights violations in Xinjiang and Tibet. Among these officials are Chen Quanguo, the former CCP chief of Xinjiang, and Wu Yingjie, former party head of Tibet. Alan Lu from RFA shared reactions from some of the sanctioned activists who stated that the measures only further motivate them and highlight the impact of their work:

Sherap Therchin, executive director of the Canada Tibet Committee, a Montreal-based advocacy group that promotes human rights and democratic freedoms of the Tibetan people, said that the sanctioning of the group and five of its members was an acknowledgment of their work for Tibet.

“This move actually strengthens our resolve to keep on this path and continue to advocate for policies that bring about a just and equitable solution to the harsh occupation and repression now ongoing in Tibet,” he told Radio Free Asia.

[…] Shane Yi, a researcher with the nongovernmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders, said China’s sanctions against the Canadian groups suggested they were having some impact.

“This not only underscores China’s intent to escalate its suppression efforts but also demonstrates the growing impact of these organizations’ work,” Yi said. [Source]

CDT Chinese publishes a column called CDT Reports, which collects external reports from think tanks, academic journals, NGOs, the media, and other sources on topics related to various human rights issues in China. This year, CDT Chinese published 150 of these report columns, covering freedom of speech, freedom of the press, public opinion polls, transnational repression, Uyghur human rights, Tibetan human rights, religious freedom, digital authoritarianism, labor rights, China’s economy, the rights of women and LGBTQ+ groups, and U.S.-China relations. The list below is a sample of the most notable reports of 2024, as chosen by CDT Chinese editors.

1. V-Dem, “Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot”

This flagship report by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden measured the receding ground of democracies around the world. It noted that autocratization is ongoing in 42 countries, home to 35 percent of the world’s population, and that “[a]lmost all components of democracy are getting worse in more countries than they are getting better, compared to ten years ago.” China is ranked 171 out of 179 countries on the report’s Liberal Democracy Index, and it falls similarly close to the bottom in the four related categories. The report also labels the BRICS+, which is largely led by China, a “Club of Autocracies.” (CDT Reports column)

2. Human Rights Watch, “‘Educate the Masses to Change Their Minds’: China’s Forced Relocation of Rural Tibetans”

This report shows that Chinese media coverage in many cases contradicts official claims that rural Tibetans gave their consent to relocate to urban areas. Drawing on over one thousand official Chinese media articles as well as government publications and academic field studies, the report indicates that participation in “whole-village relocation” programs in Tibet is compulsory and enforced by coercion. Between 2000 and 2025, the Chinese authorities will have relocated over 930,000 rural Tibetans, according to official statistics. (CDT Reports column; CDT English coverage.)

3. Amnesty International, “‘On my campus, I am afraid’: China’s targeting of overseas students stifles rights”

Using in-depth interviews with 32 Chinese students, including 12 from Hong Kong, studying at universities in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S., the report highlights the climate of fear on university campuses, along with responses from university administrations. Among the various findings, the report details how the Chinese government’s transnational repression has frightened some Chinese students to such an extent that it causes isolation and severe health problems. (CDT Reports column; CDT English coverage)

4. Exovera’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Censorship Practices of the People’s Republic of China”

This report outlines the nature and reach of China’s censorship apparatus, the methods and technologies that underpin it, the international activities it conducts, and the implications for the U.S. It states that under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Party-state has streamlined control over online content, improved censors’ technical skills, and made legal reforms to broaden state supervision over media. The outcome is what the Commission calls “the world’s most elaborate and pervasive censorship apparatus.” (CDT Reports column; CDT English coverage)

5. Amnesty International and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “‘I yearn to see you’ – Valentine’s letters to activists detained in mainland China and Hong Kong”

Ahead of Valentine’s Day, the partners of three detained Chinese human rights activists wrote letters to express their love and highlight the severe treatment of their partners. The group included Geng He and her husband Gao Zhisheng, a human rights lawyer who was forcibly disappeared; activist Ye Du under police surveillance in Guangzhou and her partner Chow Hang-tung, a lawyer detained for organizing a vigil for the Tiananmen crackdown; and Luo Shengchun, the wife of human rights lawyer Ding Jiaxi, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison for subversion of state power. (CDT Reports column)

6. Google Threat Intelligence Group, “Seeing Through a GLASSBRIDGE: Understanding the Digital Marketing Ecosystem Spreading Pro-PRC Influence Operations”

Google researchers documented an umbrella group of four different private companies operating hundreds of fake websites that posed as news sites and newswire services from dozens of countries. These sites demonstrated an ability to tailor their content to specific regional audiences and to appear as legitimate news. The examples in this report suggest that the companies took instructions from a shared customer that was organizing a coordinated influence campaign aligned with PRC political agendas.
(CDT Reports column)

7. The China Quarterly, “Do Chinese Citizens Conceal Opposition to the CCP in Surveys? Evidence from Two Experiments”

Erin Baggott Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Stephen Schick at the University of Southern California published findings from two public opinion surveys that challenged common understandings of how Chinese people feel about the CCP. In addition to asking directly for Chinese citizens’ views of the CCP, which elicits extremely high degrees of support, the researchers also asked in the form of list experiments that provide a greater sense of anonymity. The result of this second method was the CCP receiving support among only 50 to 70 percent of respondents. The Chinese leadership may therefore not be as popular as previously thought. (CDT Reports column)

Although Lai has admitted urging American officials to speak out in support of the protests and to sanction Hong Kong officials, some pro-PRC commenters on both sides of the Great Firewall have leveled a more dramatic accusation: that Lai encouraged the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against China. When evidence is supplied, it typically takes the form of a brief video clip of Lai onstage in Washington, with the key phrase repeated and slowed down for emphasis: "You have the nuclear weapon. You can finish them in a minute."

The fundamental implausibility of the suggestion and its omission from formal charges aside, even the truncated clip includes hints that Lai was speaking figuratively. The full context, from a 2019 event for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, makes it very clear that Lai was referring to American "moral authority" as a potent "weapon" in a "war of values":

SCHANZER: […] What are these conversations? I mean, what happens in these conversations? Are you getting a sense that America is ready to commit to supporting Hong Kong? Is this a work in progress?

LAI: Well, I think they all agree that Hong Kong is fighting a war of the same values as you. It means that we’re fighting your war in your enemy camp. We need your support. Without the support, we won’t have the wherewithal morally and materially to really persist this resistance. You know, your support is very important. That’s why I asked Mr. Pompeo and Vice President. I said, “Look, say something to encourage the Hong Kong people, especially young people.”

It’s like when Kennedy went to Berlin, he said that “I’m a Berliner”. How much confidence and hope he gave to the Berliner to face the threat of Soviet Union at the time. We need the same thing. We need the support. We need the confidence. We need the hope. We need to know that America is behind us. By backing us, the America also sowing to the will of their moral authority because we are the only place in China, a tiny island in China, which is sharing your values, which is fighting the same war you have with China.

If we think that we’re starting a cold war with China today, a cold war that’s a war of competing values, and we’re on your side sacrificing our life, our freedom, everything we have, fighting this war in the frontier for you, should you support us? This is something that America has to know, not only supporting us, but use your moral authority in this cold war to win this war in the beginning because they have nothing. It’s like they are going to the battle without any weapon, and you have the nuclear weapon. You can finish them in a minute. [Source]

In itself, the misrepresentation of Lai’s remarks is an unremarkable piece of viral political misinformation. It bears a marked resemblance, though, to the campaign to discredit the late Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, based on a comment from an interview with Emancipation Monthly editor Jin Zhong on November 27, 1988. Liu is often said to have "advocated" or "prescribed" three centuries under foreign colonization to transform China along the same lines as Hong Kong. In both cases, a punchy quote is taken out of context and used to paint the target as a national traitor willing to see his countrymen enslaved or vaporized by the hostile West.

In their 2023 biography "I Have No Enemies: The Life and Legacy of Liu Xiaobo," Wu Dazhi and Perry Link (who discussed the book with CDT earlier this year) noted the effectiveness of the quote’s use to discredit Liu: "The Chinese government has repeatedly taken that ‘three hundred years of colonization’ line out of context and used it to stoke Chinese nationalism and to tag Xiaobo as a traitor. Many people in mainland China have known nothing about Liu Xiaobo except for that one sentence. The Deng regime had come to realize in the 1980s that patriotism was the only ideological card left to it to play." The authors devote several pages to the quote and its context, including a transcript of the conversation from which it was taken. In that context, Liu explicitly states that the "300 years" scenario is hypothetical, not a practical suggestion:

Jz: Can China today remold itself fundamentally?
Xb: No. Even if one or two rulers were to resolve sincerely to do this, it wouldn’t work. The conditions aren’t ripe yet.
Jz: Then what conditions would allow a true historic transformation in China?
Xb: Three hundred years of colonization. Hong Kong took a hundred years of colonizing to get where it is today, so the mainland, huge as it is, would need three hundred to reach Hong Kong’s level. I don’t even know if three hundred would be enough.
Jz: That’s pretty thick "treason," isn’t it?
Xb: Let me quote Karl Marx, in The Communist Manifesto: "The workers have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got." I’m not thinking in terms of "loving" or "betraying" any particular country. If you want to call me a traitor, go ahead! I’m digging up the tombs of the ancestors? Fine! I’m proud of it!
Jz: You’re saying China should follow Hong Kong’s example?
Xb: History can’t give China that option. The colonial age is gone. There’s no one now ready to take up the burden of transforming China. [Source]

Picking up Liu’s own thread, Wu and Link compare Marx’s writing on colonialism with Liu’s own. They conclude: "In short, Marx on India and Xiaobo on China are not very far apart … the similarity creates a stark dilemma for the Chinese Communist Party’s Propaganda Department: Is Marx also wrong? Or Xiaobo not wrong after all?"

Liu later, in 2007, referred to the quote as "an ill-considered line that I tossed out in an interview in order to get people to think." Nevertheless, he refused to retract what he described as "nothing but an extreme version of a view that I continue to hold today: China’s modernization will require an extended process of Westernization before it can be realized."

Liu’s Westernization is not simply the total, slavish imitation and cultural erasure of which he is often accused. Wu and Link note that on that same first visit to Hong Kong during which he gave the fateful interview, Liu was overwhelmed with excitement at finding "that Hong Kong was a Chinese place but with a very different way to be Chinese," and "enchanted" by its popular culture. He was frequently scathing in his comments on Chinese society and culture (and on much else, including himself), but his then recently completed PhD dissertation was described by an examiner as "respectful and sincere" in its treatment of Chinese tradition. His book "Contemporary Chinese Politics and Chinese Intellectuals," published the following March, expressed his thoughts on how China needed to learn from the West, but was released with a hastily appended afterword explaining how he had changed his mind about this. The afterword is included in "No Enemies, No Hatred," a 2013 collection of Liu’s essays and poems in translation edited by Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao, and Liu Xia. In its opening paragraph, Liu Xiaobo summarizes the book’s original premise:

Western culture can serve as a comparison that helps to illuminate the contours, including the many flaws, of Chinese culture, as a critical tool with which to attack China’s obsolescence, and as a source of wisdom that can bring new lifeblood to China. [Source]

In the very next paragraph, however, he dismisses his own book as "cultural detritus." He continues, pointedly quoting one of China’s own great philosophers:

My tendency to idealize Western civilization arises from my nationalistic desire to use the West in order to reform China. But this has led me to overlook the flaws in Western culture-or, even if I see them, to set them aside intentionally. I have not, therefore, been able to stand apart from Western culture, take a critical view of it, and perhaps get a better view of human frailty more generally. I have been obsequious toward Western civilization, exaggerating its merits, and at the same time exaggerating my own merits. I have viewed the West as if it were not only the salvation of China but also the natural and ultimate destination of all humanity. Moreover I have used this delusional idealism to assign myself the role of savior. In the past I have always despised "saviors" —at least when they were other people. But wittingly or unwittingly, I myself could not help slipping into this role, with all its attendant complacency and grandiosity. I now realize that Western civilization, while it can be useful in reforming China in its present stage, cannot save humanity in an overall sense. If we stand back from Western civilization for a moment, we can see that it possesses all the flaws of humanity in general. I am reminded of what Zhuangzi (369-286 BCE) said in "The Floods of Autumn":

> However great the river, it is nothing compared to the ocean; however vast the ocean, it still is not the cosmos.

[…] No matter how strongly modern Western intellectuals may critique Western rationalism, and no matter how harshly they may denounce the West’s colonial expansion and the premise of white superiority, they still maintain deep-rooted feelings of superiority toward non-Western peoples. They feel proud of the courage and sincerity with which they do self-criticisms. They easily offer criticisms that they make of themselves, but have trouble listening to criticisms that originate from outside the West.

If I, as a person who has lived under China’s autocratic system for more than thirty years, want to reflect on the fate of humanity or on how to be an authentic person, I have no choice but to carry out two critiques simultaneously. I must:

1. Use Western civilization as a tool to critique China.
2. Use my own creativity to critique the West.

Neither of these kinds of critique can substitute for the other. […] [Source]

Over 300 members of the public braved the rain to support the defendants outside the court, but only five seats were reserved for supporters in the courtroom. On the steps of the courthouse, the mother of Hendrick Lui, who received a sentence of four years and three months, brandished a sign that read, “The righteous will live & the wicked will perish,” before she was hustled into a police van. Inside the courtroom, activist Joshua Wong shouted “I love Hong Kong!” as he was escorted away from the dock after receiving a sentence of four years and eight months in prison. Tiffany May from The New York Times reported on the solemn scene inside the courtroom and the trial’s significance for Hong Kong:

The sentences were the final step in a crackdown that cut the heart out of the city’s democracy movement, turning its leaders into a generation of political prisoners. Among them were veteran politicians, former journalists and younger activists who had called for self-determination for Hong Kong.

In a courtroom that had to be created just to accommodate them, the 45 defendants sat shoulder to shoulder on Tuesday on long benches, behind a glass partition and flanked by police officers. A judge read their sentences aloud, referring to them not by their names but by their numbers on a list. The hearing was over in half an hour.

It was the most forceful demonstration of the power of a national security law Beijing imposed on Hong Kong in response to months of large protests against Chinese rule in 2019. [Source]

Hong Kong Secretary for Security Chris Tang said that the government may consider “whether to file an appeal to seek longer jail terms” for certain individuals. The Hong Kong Free Press compiled a list of all of the defendants and the length of their sentences:

After receiving a seven-year sentence, Gwyneth Ho, who pleaded not guilty and did not submit a mitigation plea, published a statement on Facebook describing her prosecution as emblematic of Hong Kong’s broader struggle for democracy. She also explained how her courage to fight was motivated by the resolve of countless political prisoners from around the world whose governments have tried in vain to silence them:

17. The narrative put forward by the prosecution is not just a distortion of facts or a threat to the larger public. It goes much deeper—they are forcing the accused into self-denial of their lived experiences. That genuine solidarity was just a delusion. That the bonds, the togetherness, the honest conversations among people so different yet so connected, cannot be real after all. That the difficult co-building of a collective united in difference with a shared vision for a better future was just a utopian dream. 

18. But no. They are not just idealistic dreams but realities that I have lived through. I choose to fight to prove that such connections are not only possible but have actually been lived out and continue to live on. The only delusion here is the belief that brutal oppression can ever deny their existence.

19. It is not a responsibility nor moral obligation. It is the strong urge within me to do justice to what I witnessed and experienced, for they constitute part of me and define who I was. And I am now going to define who I am.

[…] 27. It’s that feeling again. Like looking through a cloudy gas mask into the determined eyes of a complete stranger, or walking alongside another in thick, irritating smog toward the light. I have come so far in search of it. The human connection that would only come through shared acts of courage, between individuals who dare to follow their true selves. For to dare is to lose one’s ground momentarily, yes, but not to dare, is to lose oneself. [Source]

Widespread condemnation followed the sentencing. The League of Social Democrats chairperson Chan Po-ying told reporters outside the courtroom, “My only thought is that it’s a miscarriage of justice and that they [the democrats] should not have been detained for even one day.” Maya Wang, associate China director at Human Rights Watch, stated, “Running in an election and trying to win it is now a crime that can lead to a decade in prison in Hong Kong. Today’s harsh sentences against dozens of prominent democracy activists reflect just how fast Hong Kong’s civil liberties and judicial independence have nosedived in the past four years since the Chinese government imposed the draconian National Security Law on the city.”

Sarah Brooks from Amnesty International stated, “These harsh sentences underline the dire state of Hong Kong’s justice system. None of the 45 people sentenced have committed an internationally recognized crime; they have been jailed only for exercising their human rights.” Eric Lai, a research fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, stated, “The courts now are rarely departing from the government’s narrative. Judges have been working to further the government’s line, using their definition of pro-democracy protests, on the strategies of the [opposition] democrats, rather than putting weight on safeguarding rights and freedoms.” Over 50 members of parliaments from around the world condemned the sentencing. Kanis Leung from Reuters compiled criticism of the sentencing from numerous foreign governments:

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said her government was “gravely concerned” by the sentences for Australian citizen Gordon Ng and the other activists. Wong said Australia has expressed strong objections to the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities over the continuing broad application of national security legislation.

[…The European Union] said in a statement that it is deeply concerned about the politically motivated prosecution of the defendants for peaceful political activity. It said such activities should be legitimate in any political system that respects basic democratic principles.

[…] The sentencing “not only breaks the promises of ‘50 years unchanged’ and ‘high degree of autonomy,’ but further proves that ‘one country, two systems’ is unfeasible,” [Taiwan presidential office spokesperson Karen Kuo] said in a statement.

[…] The U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong said the U.S. strongly condemned the sentences, saying the defendants were aggressively prosecuted and jailed for participating in normal political activity protected under the city’s mini-constitution. [Source]

On Wednesday, the national security trial of Hong Kong publisher and politician Jimmy Lai is scheduled to resume after being adjourned for four months. Lai has so far spent four years in solitary confinement and faces life imprisonment. These cases this week embody the government’s weaponization of the justice system to silence opposition. Emphasizing this point on Tuesday, Hong Kong Watch published a report titled, “In the Name of National Security: How Hong Kong’s National Security Laws Dismantle the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective,” comparing the city’s national security laws to similar legislation in China, Russia, and Malaysia.

“The road ahead will not be smooth, there will definitely be difficulties and obstacles, and we may encounter major tests such as high winds and rough seas, or even stormy waves,” said Xi, who has tightened control over the CCP and Chinese people during his rule.

[…] “Taiwan is China’s sacred territory, and the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are connected by blood, and blood is thicker than water,” Xi said during the speech, according to China’s state media. “No one can stop the wheel of history.”

[…] The banquet where Xi spoke was one of few events marking the 75th anniversary. Tuesday was a surprisingly muted affair marked in Beijing only by a flag raising ceremony in Tiananmen Square. Past milestone years have seen opulent ceremonies and big military parades. [Source]

The holiday was decidedly less muted in Hong Kong—now governed by “patriots” and under the control of Beijing after the passage of Article 23. Public dissent about Chinese rule in Hong Kong has been criminalized. In September, a man was sentenced to 14 months in prison for wearing a “seditious t-shirt.” Despite the risk of imprisonment, there were still subtle signs of dissent. One 51-year-old man was arrested for vandalizing light fixtures placed near subway stations to celebrate the holiday.

 Chinese state media also highlighted National Day celebrations in the United States, Japan, and the U.K. Senior officials and leaders from across the world congratulated China on the anniversary—with the notable exception of the United States State Department, which has traditionally done so. [Editor’s note: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken released a terse statement of well wishes on October 2, the day after National Day.] Senior U.S. officials did attend a reception hosted by the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., where they offered congratulations. 

On the mainland, national week is also a major consumer holiday. State media headlines tout record travel and box office receipts. Patriotic blockbusters are the standard holiday fare, but audience enthusiasm for them may be waning. The expected splurging comes amidst deep economic woes, slightly tempered by a resurgent stock market, courtesy of historic stimulus measures taken last week in Beijing. At Reuters, Sophie Yu and Casey Hall reported that there will be a surge in travel but that tourists will be more cost-conscious than in years past: 

“It would be a good result if tourism spending remains flat with last year,” said Liu Simin, an official with the tourism arm of Beijing-based research institute China Society for Futures Studies. “People are more willing to travel when the economy is good, but when there is no economic growth, there is no tourism growth.”

[…] “There is no toll fee during holiday so we’ll drive instead of taking the train,” [Wang Xin, a 45-year-old office worker in Beijing] said. “Better not to spend unnecessary money when the economy is like this. Many people are losing jobs and at my age if it happened to me, I wouldn’t be able to find another one.”

[…] Data from travel platform Flight Master shows domestic air ticket prices are expected to be 21% cheaper than the same period last year, while international economy class airfares will be 25% lower than 2023 and 7% lower than 2019.

It predicts international destinations of choice for outbound travelers will continue to be short-haul Asian hubs, such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore. [Source]

Unmentioned in the hoopla was the demise of the former Soviet Union, a long-time preoccupation of Chinese leaders and scholars. The P.R.C.’s former benefactor, later rival, and finally ally, the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, 74 years after its founding. The P.R.C. has now outlasted it. Chinese scholars and politicians have closely studied the lessons of the U.S.S.R.’s collapse, seeking to stave off a similar fate. The Economist argued that Xi attributes the failure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to a lack of ideological and organizational discipline, a conclusion which has shaped his leadership of the Chinese Communist Party: 

Mr Xi has also kept on using the special-challenges term. It was the subject of a classified speech he gave in January 2023 to the party’s Central Committee. Part of it was published in March this year. “As the party grows larger, some may form small cliques or factions or engage in behavior that undermines party unity and fighting strength,” he said. “A fortress is most easily breached from within. The only ones who can defeat us are ourselves.” Most analysts agree that there are no obvious splits in the party today, but their possible re-emergence clearly worries him.

In August Mr Xi mentioned Soviet history again. The occasion was the 120th anniversary of the birth of Deng Xiaoping, who launched China’s “reform and opening” policy in the late 1970s. He praised Deng for “resolutely opposing the turmoil” in China in 1989 “against the background of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and dramatic changes in Eastern Europe”. He quoted Deng as saying: “No one can crush us.”

[…] Mr Xi appears more fixated on the Soviet party’s loss of ideological and organizational discipline. This is evident in the huge effort he has made to rebuild the party at the grassroots, to beef up its presence in private firms and to enforce total obedience to his commands among party members. After the Soviet collapse Deng and his immediate successors abandoned talk of political reform but still tolerated limited experiments, such as allowing small ngos to help victims of injustices. Mr Xi has crushed civil society. Chinese academics make clear why, arguing that Western-backed NGOs played a role in pushing the Soviet party over the edge. [Source]

Updated: An earlier version of this article stated that the United States did not send China well wishes on its 75th anniversary. After the original publication of this article, Secretary of State Blinken issued a short statement. The article has been updated to reflect this.