Chinese state-controlled media’s coverage on his death has been terse. The Chinese government extended its condolences nearly 24 hours after the Vatican’s announcement of the pope’s death – when asked about it at a regular news conference at its foreign ministry.

“In recent years, China and the Vatican have maintained constructive contact and engaged in beneficial exchanges. The Chinese side is willing to work together with the Vatican to promote the continued improvement of China-Vatican relations,” Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for the ministry, told reporters on Tuesday.

China’s minimalist response underscores the sensitivity of ties between the atheist ruling Communist Party and the Holy See. [Source]

After the death of Pope John Paul II in 2005, the Chinese government did not send a representative to his funeral and instead criticized then-Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s planned trip to the Vatican as a separatist move. The Vatican is one of 11 countries worldwide and the only country in Europe that officially recognizes Taiwan. This week, current Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te expressed his “sincerest condolences on behalf of the people of Taiwan to the Catholic community and everyone mourning the passing of His Holiness Pope Francis,” adding, “We will continue to draw inspiration from his lifelong commitment to peace, global solidarity, and caring for those in need.” Taiwan reportedly hopes to send President Lai to attend Pope Francis’ funeral, and is awaiting a response from the Vatican. Hong Kong’s Catholic Church and religious leaders also expressed their “deepest condolences.” The Dalai Lama stated, “His Holiness Pope Francis dedicated himself to the service of others, […] consistently revealing by his own actions how to live a simple, but meaningful life. The best tribute we can pay to him is to be a warm-hearted person, serving others wherever and in whatever way we can.”

Unlike many of his predecessors, Pope Francis never met with the Dalai Lama, as he tried to thread the needle of the Vatican’s sensitive relationship with China. The Chinese government’s restrictions on Catholicism have produced a decades-long split among the 10-12 million Catholics in China, between the state-controlled Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association churches and persecuted underground churches that profess loyalty to the pope. Pope Francis reached a landmark agreement with the government in 2018—which was renewed in 2020 and 2022, and renewed again last October for another four years—that ostensibly recognizes the pope as the religious authority of all Chinese Catholics, gives the pope the power to veto appointments of all new bishops nominated by Beijing, and legitimizes those that had been appointed by Beijing without prior papal approval.

Details of the agreement have remained secret. Critics lament that in reality the Chinese government has over the past few years made several high-profile, unilateral appointments that forced the pope to retrospectively ratify in order to maintain the Church’s formal position in China. The Vatican’s muted reaction to Hong Kong’s arrest of Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun in May 2022, just months before the agreement with China was renewed, added to the controversy. And despite these agreements, religious persecution and Sinicization campaigns have only grown under Xi Jinping.

Laura Zhou, Shi Jiangtao, and Lawrence Chung at the South China Morning Post reported how China’s ties with the Vatican might change under a new pope:

“It depends on who will succeed him,” said Yun Sun, director of the China programme at the Stimson Centre think tank in Washington.

“If it is a more conservative and orthodox pope, the Vatican will be likely to withdraw some of Pope Francis’ engagement, outreach and pragmatic approach to China, such as the authority to appoint bishops.”

[...] “This issue is not likely to be resolved, whoever will represent the Vatican in this relationship going forward,” [a] specialist on Sino-Christian studies said.

“Beijing will remain pragmatic, the question is to what extent pragmatism will serve the Holy See and China’s Catholic Church.”

[...] “Beijing is unlikely to pay too much attention to the China policy of the Vatican, because China’s position has been consistent and will not be changed because of a new pope,” said Deng Yuwen, former deputy editor of the Communist Party’s flagship newspaper Study Times.

“But of course Beijing would be keen to see a successor who is friendly to China, and who will not have a too close relationship with Taiwan.” [Source]

Pope Francis’ efforts to bridge the Vatican and China will likely not be the last. “The next pope may not be as gifted or confident with Chinese or Asian situations, but it’s going to remain a priority,” Dr. Michel Chambon, a Catholic theologian at the National University of Singapore, told The Sydney Morning Herald. “The next election [for pope] will be probably the first time that, when they select candidates, they will check his view on China. It will be a key criteria that he has a subtle, constructive view on how to engage China.” At Le Monde, Frédéric Lemaître described how, despite the limitations of Pope Francis’ approach, the Vatican is pursuing a realist and long-term strategy:

This key man in Vatican diplomacy[, Benoît Vermander, a Jesuit who teaches philosophy at Fudan University in Shanghai,] is in favor of the agreement, but noted that many Catholics feel that the price to be paid to move toward this greater unity of the Church is high. While Pope Francis was very discreet about human rights abuses in China – only once was he heard praying for "the poor Uyghurs" – Xi clearly has no intention of granting greater autonomy to the Churches. Quite the contrary, in fact. Since 2017, he has been insisting on the Sinicization of religions, a term which means that they must in effect accept the primacy of the Chinese Communist Party. In an interview with the American Catholic channel EWTN News in March 2023, Paul Richard Gallagher, the Vatican’s secretary for relations with states, acknowledged that this 2020 agreement is "certainly not the best deal possible."

"Everything is done obviously in the context of Chinese domestic politics (…) And therefore, we can only achieve so much," Gallagher said. "But one of the things that the Chinese and the Catholic Church and the Holy See have in common is that we don’t think in months, or even in years. We’re thinking in terms of a much longer time. And we hope that, in time, the relations between the Catholic Church in China will be shall we say much more ‘normal,’ much more fluid, much more fruitful." While Francis may have been a visionary, it has to be said that he was up against a formidable tactician determined to do him no favors. [Source]

Last month’s Chinese live-fire naval drills, while technically acceptable under international maritime law, took the Australian government and military by surprise, necessitated the rerouting of nearly 50 airline flights, and highlighted the weakness of Australian naval preparedness. Canberra’s new plan, reported last week, to arm Australian soldiers with anti-ship missiles and advanced-targeting radar systems seems likely to fuel even more online saber-rattling by expansionist-minded Chinese nationalists.

A recent question posted to the Q&A site Zhihu (“Why is everyone talking about ‘seizing’ Australia?”) elicited spirited debate on the topic, and inspired a number of articles and essays, at least one of which has since been censored. In a post titled "Why Was an Article Opposing a War of Aggression Deleted?," Wu Xingchuan from the WeChat public account “Dad Talks Science” (老爸讲科学, Lǎobà jiǎng kēxué) shared a notice from platform censors informing him that his article about the Zhihu question had been deleted. Wu reposted his censored article in full, prefaced by the following query: “I would like to ask the webmaster, by voicing opposition to war, which country’s laws did I break? Which company’s platform regulations did I violate? Or is the webmaster hoping to propagate values ​​that lead in another direction? I invite readers to give their opinions.”

CDT editors have also archived two articles, both of which are still available online, critical of those advocating a war of aggression against Australia. The first, from WeChat public account Zhang Beihai’s Natural Selection (章北海的自然选择, Zhāng Běihǎi de zìrán xuǎnzé) begins with the title "They’re Fantasizing Again, This Time About ‘Seizing’ Australia…" The author strongly criticizes online nationalists for recklessly advocating that Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops be put in harm’s way; likens those eager to get their hands on Australia’s iron ore to the Japanese Imperial Army’s resource-extraction policies in Manchuria; and features anti-imperialist, anti-expansionary quotes from former Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.

The second article, by current-events and science blogger Xiang Dongliang (of the WeChat public account “Constructive Suggestions”), takes a more satirical tone: “Well, This Seems Promising—We’re Actually Considering ‘Nabbing’ Australia!” In it, Xiang expresses utter shock that some of his compatriots could seriously advocate a military takeover of Australia, of all places. The article is translated in full, below:

Perhaps it’s due to a lack of boldness or imagination on my part, but for whatever reason, never in my life have I entertained a scenario in which China would dispatch troops to capture Australia.

Nor did I expect that some of my compatriots, brimming with confidence and grandiose ambition, would be imagining—and even mapping out—the geopolitical landscape that might follow our annexation of Australia.

A screenshot of one Zhihu user’s response to the question “Why is everyone talking about ‘seizing’ Australia?” received 11,000 likes and 1,295 comments. In comparing the pros and cons of invading Australia vs. invading Taiwan, the author notes that while Australia and Taiwan have similarly sized populations, Australia has a much larger land mass. Since both invasions would provoke harsh, across-the-board financial sanctions, reasons the author, it makes more sense to invade Australia, thus seizing more land and mineral resources, and eliminating one of the “enemy nations” that might impose economic sanctions on China. “If you don’t take what god offers you, you will suffer the consequences,” concludes the author. “If China doesn’t occupy [Australia], then Indonesia or some other country will, and China really will be ‘ambushed on all sides.’ Therefore, China must pour all of its efforts into building ships and then wait for the right opportunity!”

The thing that has most shaken my worldview in recent years is the appearance of that specific phrase "seize Australia," and the fact that these posts are still being widely disseminated on the internet.

Some critical threshold has been crossed.

Prior to this, some claimed that China’s economy had overtaken the U.S. economy, and that a monthly wage of 3,000 yuan provided a higher standard of living than a monthly wage of $2,000 U.S. dollars.

Prior to this, some claimed that the rabbit’s [China’s] fighter jets were far superior to the eagle’s [the U.S.’s] fighter jets, and that this would deter [the Americans] from “behaving rashly” in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.

Prior to this, some advocated “crushing” Japan and “making vassal states” of Vietnam and the Philippines.

Pretty arrogant stuff, but still, it stayed within certain limits.

On the one hand, these arrogant pronouncements were essentially limited to trash-talking, and were targeted at traditional "nemeses” such as the U.S., Japan, Britain, and France—countries against whom China holds historical grudges or with whom it is currently embroiled in disputes.

On the other hand, the claims being advocated were confined to the realm of "taking back territory and/or status that was once ours."

But Australia is a different case entirely.

Although it is considered a member of the “Five Eyes” and has experienced periodic frictions with China, Australia is nowhere near the top of the "nemeses” list. Moreover, Australia and China have no current territorial disputes, nor any history of competing or overlapping territorial claims—and they’re not even neighboring countries.

As illustrated by the screenshot above, some people’s support for seizing Australia is predicated entirely on dreams of territorial expansion, and the shockingly arrogant assumption that "taking Australia would be as easy as taking candy from a baby."

Here are two key takeaways about this assault on my worldview:

First, years of accumulated “ahead of the curve” propaganda and education appear to have coalesced into an alarming level of nationalist sentiment. It’s truly something fierce.

Second, the Russian-Ukrainian war has had such a profound impact on the Chinese mindset that many Chinese no longer feel the need to conceal expansionist aims, and unabashedly advocate putting them into practice. This is truly something I never expected.

I have nothing positive to say on this topic, nor any constructive suggestions. I simply wanted to share with all of you the immense shock I felt.

Popular sentiment really has shifted.

My heartfelt prayer, as a humble science blogger: May Buddha bless and protect us. [Chinese]

While Xiang highlights Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an emboldening precedent, there are other recent developments from which Chinese nationalists might also have drawn inspiration.

All departments please strictly review web page layout and content recommendations to ensure that content involving actors with unsavory track records doesn’t appear. When producing original programs that touch on internet celebrities or characters, you must conduct a comprehensive investigation to prevent sensitive, negative content. (January 19, 2020) [Chinese]

CDT editors were unable to confidently identify any particular story, event, or piece of content likely to have inspired this directive. In the two days before this directive, a controversial documentary about China’s national volleyball team was the subject of several censorship directives. Subjects in the film had claimed that they were unfairly maligned.

•••

Regarding the matter of the recent Japanese legislator visiting Taiwan to deliver so-called congratulations to Tsai Ing-wen, uniformly do not report or republish foreign news media. (January 19, 2020) [Chinese]

On January 17, Japanese lawmaker Keiji Furuya, chair of the Japan-ROC parliamentary friendship association, visited Taiwan, where he delivered congratulations to recently re-elected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on behalf of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Several earlier detailed directives focused on limiting coverage of Taiwan’s election and results.

•••

On January 20, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission will release the latest official update on the novel coronavirus pneumonia. When republishing, strictly use content from official government bulletins, do not tamper with the headline, do not individually gather or compose news, do not hype or relate old text. Conjecture is strictly prohibited. (January 19, 2020) [Chinese]

Reminder: Relevant departments and regions will publish new information on the novel coronavirus epidemic situation. When republishing, strictly use content from official government bulletins, do not tamper with the headline, do not individually gather or compose news, do not hype or relate old text. Conjecture is strictly prohibited. (January 19, 2020) [Chinese]

As the novel coronavirus appeared in Wuhan late the previous year, Chinese authorities acted immediately to restrict information about the emerging crisis, disciplining eight medical workers for were punished for spreading rumors. One of the admonished, Dr. Li Wenliang, later died from the disease, and remains a symbol free expression and human decency for many in China.

Throughout January the government steadily issued propaganda directives and detained individuals for independently sharing information about the virus. On January 14, national and regional health authorities held a meeting to discuss the growing epidemic, but did not notify the public of its danger for several critical days. On January 20, Xi addressed the nation, informing them that the virus was capable of human-to-human transmission; the WHO had days earlier cited Chinese authorities’ recent claims to the opposite.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

A reminder: The two elections for regional leadership and public representatives in Taiwan took place on January 11.

1. After results are announced, refer to Xinhua News reports. Election results are not to be forecast in advance;

2. Voting and ballot information on the election may be briefly reported, but the quantity of reports must be strictly controlled; do not push pop-ups, do not open special topics or columns, and live reports are not allowed in any form of text, broadcast, television, online video, or mobile broadcast. Live broadcast is also prohibited on work unit or individuals’ social media including Weibo, WeChat public accounts, or other new media platforms. Do not interview relevant candidates, members of campaigns, or other politically sensitive figures on the island;

3. Taiwan-related emergency situations that occurred during, before, or after the elections may be briefly and objectively reported in accordance with Xinhua copy. Do not independently conduct interviews or reporting without authorization. (January 12, 2020) [Chinese]

The three instructions here are identical to those issued the previous day, governing coverage of Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections. President Tsai Ing-wen won a record victory, while her Democratic Progressive Party secured a slightly narrowed majority.

The directive’s reference to the "regional leadership" rather than "presidential" election reflects a longstanding ban on the use of official titles acknowledging Taiwan’s status as a separate country, "even with the use of quotation marks."

•••

Remove the segment "Type 055 Destroyer ‘Nanchang’ Enters Naval Fleet," which aired on CCTV’s “China News” on January 13, 2020 at 7:00. Upload the segment after it has been processed. Tidy up and check your work. (January 13, 2020) [Chinese]

The guided missile destroyer Nanchang was formally commissioned on January 13, marking what Xinhua hailed as a "generational leap" for China’s—or, rather, the Party’s—naval forces. The ship had previously sailed in the PLA Navy’s 70th Anniversary celebrations last year, but many of its systems were not yet complete. Chinese military sources reportedly told South China Morning Post that the event had been pushed back two days to avoid rocking the boat and stirring an electoral backlash in Taiwan.

•••

Concerning Comrade [Vice Premier] Liu He’s January 13-15 trip to the United States to sign Phase One of an economic trade agreement, with no exception: do not organize reports without prior arrangement, do not send push notifications, do not reprint unfavorable foreign reports without authorization. On social media platforms, do not set up special topics, recommendations, or other collections. Strictly supervise influential accounts, referring to the above requirements. Promotion without authorization is strictly forbidden. (January 13, 2020) [Chinese]

These instructions largely echo a similar order on Liu’s visit from January 9. Another directive issued repeatedly with minor variations barred independent reporting, unauthorized push notifications, republication of foreign coverage, special topic pages, and sensationalist coverage of the trade deal itself.

•••

Please take note in your reports: The official English translation of the expression 中缅命运共同体 is “China-Myanmar community with a shared future.” (January 13, 2020) [Chinese]

Xi Jinping met with Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in Nay Pyi Taw on January 18. The two sides agreed to jointly build a community with a shared future, and have since vowed to further advance ties, cooperation.

The vision of "a community of shared future for humankind" has been a core element of Xi-era foreign policy rhetoric. In 2019, the Communication University of China opened the country’s first research center devoted to the concept. The phrase has also been included in U.N. Human Rights Council resolutions, in what both China and its critics have described as a demonstration of the country’s "growing influence and ability to set the agenda in international human rights governance."

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

A new round of elections for regional leadership and local representation in Taiwan will be held on January 11, 2020. Related plans and requirements are as follows:

1. To report the election results, you may utilize or consult Xinhua copy. Election results are not to be forecast in advance;

2. Voting and ballot information on the election may be briefly reported, but the quantity of reports must be strictly controlled. Do not quote Taiwanese, Hong Kong, or foreign media without authorization. Do not send push notifications, do not create feature sections or columns, and do not provide any form of live coverage using text, radio, TV, livestream, or mobile clients. Do not provide live coverage through company or personal Weibo, WeChat public accounts, [WeChat] feeds or other new media platforms. Do not interview candidates, campaign team leaders, or other politically sensitive persons on the island;

3. Taiwan-related emergency situations that occurred during, before, or after the elections may be briefly and objectively reported in accordance with Xinhua copy. Do not independently conduct interviews or reports without authorization. (January 11, 2020) [Chinese]

This directive echoed a nearly identical one issued on January 9 as Taipei prepared for its January 11 presidential election. On election day, incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen took 57 percent of the vote, decisively defeating Beijing-backed Kuomintang challenger Han Kuo-yu. One year prior, Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party suffered a major slump in public approval, but over 2019 opinion shifted drastically in her favor. Tsai’s steady support for the Hong Kong protest movement and defiance of Beijing’s increasing belligerence towards Taiwan and her campaign allowed her to successfully turn the election into a referendum on democracy and self-governance. An earlier January 6 censorship directive also forbade live coverage of the election and its lead-up.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Regarding voting and results in the Taiwan election, do not open up special topics or columns, do not allow any form of text, online video, or mobile live broadcast reports, and do not conduct live broadcasts through work unit or individual Weibo accounts, WeChat public accounts or Moments, or any other social networking platform. (January 6, 2020) [Chinese]

This directive was issued in advance of Taiwan’s January 11 presidential election, which saw a decisive win for incumbent Tsai Ing-wen. In the run-up to the election, Beijing ran an aggressive influence and disinformation campaign in an effort to discredit Tsai in favor of her opponent, Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu.

•••

As an additional reminder: Regarding the signing of the “Phase One Agreement” on China-U.S. trade, with no exceptions: do not independently organize reporting, do not allow push notifications without direction, do not republish unfavorable foreign reports. Social media platforms such as Weibo, WeChat, and other forums are not allowed to launch [relevant] special topics or recommendations, etc., without authorization. Strictly manage influential online accounts. Consult the above requests, do not hype [this topic]. (January 6, 2020) [Chinese]

This directive echoed one issued on January 2, in advance of the January 15 signing of the Phase One trade deal between the U.S. and China.

•••

As an additional reminder: Regarding the pneumonia of unknown origin that emerged in Wuhan, Hubei, use information released by authoritative departments as the standard, do not write baseless conjecture. If in doubt, direct questions to the National Health Commission to prevent fake news reports from triggering mass panic. (January 6, 2020) [Chinese]

This directive was identical to another issued on January 2, restricting reporting on the emerging novel coronavirus, which had not yet been publicly identified as a major public health threat by Chinese authorities.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.

Independent bookstores have become a new battleground in China, swept up in the ruling Communist Party’s crackdown on dissent and free expression. The Associated Press found that at least a dozen bookstores in the world’s second-largest economy have been shuttered or targeted for closure in the last few months alone, squeezing the already tight space for press freedom. One bookstore owner was arrested over four months ago.

The crackdown has had a chilling effect on China’s publishing industry. Bookstores are common in China, but many are state-owned. Independent bookstores are governed by an intricate set of rules with strict controls now being more aggressively policed, according to bookstore owners. Printing shops and street vendors are also facing more rigorous government inspections by the National Office Against Pornography and Illegal Publication.

[…] It’s not just the books’ contents that are making Chinese authorities wary. In many communities, bookstores are cultural centers where critical thinking is encouraged, and conversations can veer into politics and other topics not welcomed by the authorities.

[… Former Shanghai bookseller Zhou Youlieguo] said his fully licensed independent bookstore, which sold art books and self-published works by artists and translators, was fined thousands of dollars and he was interrogated over a dozen times during the past four years. He’s seen colleagues jailed for selling “illegal publications.” All the self-published book artists and editors he worked with asked him to take down their work after warnings by local authorities. 

Zhou said he could not handle further harassment. He said it was as if he were “smuggling drugs instead of selling books.” [Source]

From Fu’s AP colleague Dake Kang, on Bluesky:

The AP article prominently features the resurrection in Washington D.C. of Jifeng Books, which was forced to close in Shanghai in 2018. This summer, The New Yorker’s Chang Che similarly highlighted the growth of independent Chinese bookstores in Tokyo and elsewhere in Japan, where they have become community hubs and event spaces.

Readers still in China, though, face tightening restrictions. Numerous officials have been disciplined for reading, importing, or otherwise handling “books that have serious political issues.” In April, an online repository of pirated ebooks closed its WeChat account under mounting pressure from authorities. The ongoing constriction of Hong Kong’s political environment has included a purge of sensitive books from public libraries. At South China Morning Post last week, Yuanyue Dang reported that the flow of books from Taiwan into China has been aggressively curtailed:

Three book editors, all of whom requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue, said the changes began in 2019, when works by Taiwanese authors started to require additional approval under new rules – even for literary works that were not previously considered sensitive.

The approval process can now take years, or even be “indefinite”, according to the editors. This has been especially true since former US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, after which publishing new books by Taiwanese authors became even more troublesome.

[…] Only four works of Taiwanese literature have been published in mainland China since Pelosi’s 2022 trip, including just one so far this year.

[…] One of the editors who spoke to the Post said that because of the uncertainty in cross-strait relations, “we no longer consider bringing in books by Taiwanese authors”.

“We can’t afford the cost of waiting indefinitely,” another editor said. [Source]

The first, by political scientist Ding Xueliang (丁学良, Dīng Xuéliáng), was published by the public WeChat account 學人Scholar (xuérén Scholar), which features articles on current-affairs topics by a range of academics. Ding Xueliang is a professor emeritus at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and has published extensively on topics related to PRC history and contemporary Chinese politics. CDT has translated a portion of Professor Ding’s article, “The World Is on the Cusp of a Dramatic Change,” which discusses Trump’s foreign-policy approach and how it could alter the existing U.S.-dominated global geopolitical order:

I would prefer to see Team Trump defeat Team Harris, mainly because of three particular characteristics that Trump has demonstrated thus far in the field of international affairs:

The first characteristic is his isolationism, a policy orientation that has guided U.S. policy-making since the nation was founded.

[…] The second characteristic is that while Trump is not particularly knowledgeable about certain international issues, he is nonetheless quite confident and not shy about speaking out.

[…] The third characteristic of Trump is that he is extremely unreliable, inclined to abruptly alter, or even repudiate, his past statements or positions.

[…] I am most concerned about what impact these three characteristics will have on the existing international order, which was established shortly after the end of the war in 1945, and which has existed for nearly 80 years.

[…] These three characteristics of Trump will undoubtedly have a direct impact on us here in Northeast Asia. If during his second term, he cuts the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and Japan by half (as he had hinted at during his first term), ceases upgrading and expanding U.S. air and naval bases in the Philippines, and declines to provide military assistance to South Pacific island nations, it would greatly diminish the ability of these strategic locations to project medium- and long-range force against targets in the surrounding region.

If Trump were to take it a step further and declare that the situation in the Taiwan Strait is not germane to U.S. core interests, then he would be disinclined to risk serious American casualties by ordering the U.S. military to directly intervene in the event of a large-scale armed conflict in the region. On October 19, when asked by a reporter [from the Wall Street Journal] how he would deal with a threat of war against Taiwan, it was intriguing that his only response was to suggest raising tariffs.

If Trump serves a full four-year term after taking office in January 2025 and is able to enact a fundamental reshuffling of America’s strategic priorities, then it should be clear to all that the geopolitical order that has stood since 1945 in the “powder-keg region” of Northeast Asia will be rocked by a series of chain reactions. The reverberations from these chain reactions (which could persist for three years or more) will have a major impact on global economic trade, politics, security, and cross-border migration, far exceeding the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war.

If so, Trump may have (inadvertently or not) opened up a space in which tremendous changes can occur, becoming a once-in-a-century catalyst for a new era that will end the legacy of the Second World War—that is, the so-called global order that Western politicians and diplomats so frequently espouse—and consign it to the pages of history, once and for all.

Global opinion about Trump is polarized, largely because he is an outsider, a political amateur. If he gains a second term, the [above] three characteristics of his foreign policy approach will be on full display. Trump’s amateurish approach will give global revisionist forces an excellent opportunity to showcase their skills. The world is on the cusp of a dramatic change, and Hong Kong, positioned in Northeast Asia near the “eye of the typhoon,” ought to be better prepared for it. [Chinese]

“The Most Powerful President in American History (and His ‘Dark MAGA’ Revolution),” by prolific WeChat blogger Chairman Rabbit, is a sprawling long-form article comprised of 15 different subject headings, and followed by links to 24 of the author’s previous articles on U.S. politics and the election. Once described as a “cosmopolitan patriot,” Chairman Rabbit (aka Ren Yi) is the Harvard-educated grandson of the late reformist politician Ren Zhongyi. His article, a portion of which is translated below, discusses the MAGA-driven “great realignment” in U.S. politics, and speculates about how Trumpian authoritarianism and strongman-style leadership could alter American domestic and geopolitical calculations:

Economic diplomacy: Under an anti-globalist, protectionist, anti-neoliberal economic framework, [there will be] an across-the-board escalation in the use of tariffs to exclude foreign goods, in order to create impetus and incentives for the promotion of U.S. domestic industries.

International politics: “Isolationist” and “non-interventionist.” Will reduce U.S. involvement in international and regional geopolitics, reduce expenditures on [maintaining] the U.S.-led international order, and re-evaluate the political and economic relationships between the U.S. and its allies.

[…] New American politics: Our previous analyses have found that young Americans tend to be “left-leaning” on economic issues, hold progressive beliefs, and are sympathetic to, or at least not opposed to, socialism. In other words, in terms of economic values, they will likely become more similar to us [Chinese] in the future. Whether Trump’s rise to power will alter young people’s views on economic issues remains uncertain. But after all, Trump’s party is a grassroots, populist party that focuses on the job prospects and living standards of ordinary people. Therefore, the party under Trump has room for left-wing economic policies. On the other hand, Trump’s (and Musk’s) techno-authoritarian, conservative political alliance will infuse American political culture with more authoritarianism, paternalism, and strongman-style leadership, which adheres more closely to the East Asian tradition. In other words, it is possible that the America of the future will more closely resemble us [China].

[…] Taiwan: Trump believes that Taiwan “stole” the American chip industry, and moreover, that it is using its chip industry to pressure and coerce the U.S. Trump’s plan is to use a “carrot-and-stick” approach to induce Taiwanese companies to invest in [chip-manufacturing facilities] in the U.S. This puts Taiwan in a very awkward position: losing its chip industry will not only have a negative effect on the Taiwanese economy, it will also greatly reduce Taiwan’s strategic value to the United States. Meanwhile, neighbors Japan and South Korea are eyeing Taiwan’s chip industry covetously, hoping to get a piece of it. And those American companies (such as Nvidia) that have made Taiwan a centerpiece of their business strategy will also experience more political pressure in the future. Lastly, under his isolationist framework, Trump has absolutely no interest in Taiwan or the South China Sea, and has no intention of becoming embroiled in a conflict with China. If there is any difference between Trump’s first and second terms in office, it is that he will be less influenced by the “deep state” and more independent in his foreign policy decision-making.

Towards China: Trump will roll out a comprehensive policy of decoupling and disengagement. His first type of policy will be to restrict China’s access to the U.S. market by imposing a 60% tariff across the board, with the possibility of even higher tariffs on key products. If there is any difference between today’s Trump and the Trump of the past, it is that in 2018, Trump hoped to leverage trade to open China’s markets and force China to abide by the rules. But at that time, the White House was not yet focused on the idea of ​​reviving U.S. domestic industry. Trump circa-2025 is guided by industrial considerations, and tariffs are just a means to exclude China from the U.S. market. Some ask, “Can’t Chinese companies just invest in the U.S. (through FDI, foreign direct investment) and build factories locally, generating American jobs and tax revenue, so that Trump will allow ‘Made in America’ Chinese brands access to the U.S. market?” In my opinion, that’s a no-go. Trump’s campaign agenda was about prohibiting China from investing in the U.S. and viewing China as a geopolitical enemy and security risk. I have written about this issue many times, exploring the “asymmetry” of Chinese and U.S. policy. Trump’s second policy will be to further crack down on China: for example, by restricting the export of key technologies to China; imposing sanctions on Chinese industries and companies; and restricting the flow of U.S. investment to Chinese industries and companies. It will be an all-out offensive, involving trade, economic, financial, and technological warfare. This is the stance Trump has taken. [Chinese]

On June 4, over 300 people joined an assembly in front of the Chinese Embassy in Britain to share and hear memories of the crackdown that took place 35 years ago, international media reported.

[…] Another assembly was also hosted in London’s Parliament Square on Sunday, two days prior to the anniversary, overseas media outlets reported. Several groups collaborated to organise the assembly, including Amnesty International, Hong Kong Labour Rights Monitor – a group founded by Hongkongers in the UK – and China Deviant, a group established by overseas Chinese youth following China’s Covid-19 protests.

[…] Vancouver’s David Lam Park was the site of a gathering on Tuesday, where attendees called for human rights to be safeguarded and to prevent the infiltration of the Chinese Communist Party. According to online photos, hundreds of people held up candles. The Collective reported that those present did so to mourn the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.

[…] On Sunday, around 2,000 people gathered in the Mel Lastman Square in the North York district of Toronto to commemorate the crackdown, according to the event’s organiser. Reverend Chu Yiu-ming, a Hong Kong democrat who now lives in Taiwan, flew to Toronto to attend the assembly. [Source]

Brian Hioe from New Bloom Magazine reported on the commemorations in Taipei, Taiwan:

Demonstrators Gathered in Liberty Plaza in Taipei tonight to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. According to organizers, by around 7:30 PM, there were 2,000 participants in the demonstration.

A number of tents were set up for NGOs and civil society organizations to set up stalls. This included many of the stalwarts of Taiwanese civil society, such as the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, Covenants Watch, Taiwan Labour Front, and the Green Citizens’ Action Alliance. Likewise, a range of Hong Kong organizations in Taiwan were present, such as the Taiwan Hong Kong Association, Hong Kong Outlanders, New School for Democracy, and other groups. Indeed, one of the event’s two MCs was Hong Kong artist Kacey Wong, who has been based in Taiwan since July 2021, given the crackdown on political freedoms there. As such, the proceedings of the event were conducted in Mandarin and Cantonese.

Several installations were set up. This included a 3D printed replica of the Pillar of Shame, the sculpture made by Danish artist Jens Galschiøt to commemorate the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1997. The numbers 8964 were spelled out with electronic candles next to the Pillar of Shame and again in a tent with photos of the Tiananmen Square protests. Furthermore, video artwork and performance art took place. This included Kacey Wong showing a video art on memorializing those lost in the killings and riding a bicycle with pro-democracy slogans on a banner around the rally. A noise performance also took place, referencing not only the recent Bluebird Movement protests, self-immolation by Tibetans, the 324 crackdown against the attempted occupation of the Executive Yuan that took place during the Sunflower Movement, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. [Source]

Discussing the relevance of the Tiananmen Massacre, newly elected Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te stated, “Any political power should bravely face the voices of the people, especially the young generation, because social change often relies on diverse opinions,” adding, “We must use democracy to build consensus, respond to autocracy with freedom, face authoritarian expansion with courage, and face challenges with unity.” Global Voices spoke to some attendees of the Taipei vigil including Loretta Lau, an artist from Hong Kong, who stated that participating in commemorative events such as this one is important for all Sinophone groups battling forms of oppression:

To best preserve the memory of the Tiananmen tragedy for future generations among all Sinophone communities, including those in exile and overseas, we must wholeheartedly support Taiwan’s democracy.

[…] For many of us, participating in this event is incredibly important. Our art and voices, which can no longer be seen or heard in Hong Kong, found a platform here. Some Hongkongers, despite living just a two-hour flight away, managed to participate last night. This means so much to the Hong Kong diaspora. Making real, personal connections with people still in Hong Kong is invaluable. It shows that even under brutal regimes, people care and remember, even if they can’t openly raise their voices. By supporting Taiwan’s democracy and fostering these connections, we ensure that the memory of the Tiananmen tragedy lives on and that the voices of the oppressed are heard. [Source]

The Japanese parliament held a ceremony on Monday to commemorate the anniversary. “It is important to hold such a gathering in the Japanese Diet, when it’s impossible to have one in mainland China or Hong Kong,” Wang Jinzhong, a Tokyo-based journalist who hosted the event, told Nikkei Asia. Patrick Poon, a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo, emphasized the significance of holding the gathering at the parliament complex, saying “it really has an impact” and is “not just symbolic.”

A small gathering to commemorate the anniversary took place in Paris, France, as well:

Members of U.S. Congress also gave speeches outside the Capitol to mark the anniversary. The House of Representatives invited Chinese researchers, student activists, and leaders from the 1989 Tiananmen movement and 2022 White Paper protests to testify at a hearing on the subject. Zhou Fengsuo, a former student leader who was invited to testify, said the Tiananmen crackdown is once again resonating today: “Be it the Western society, the general public or China’s younger people, they have shown unprecedented interest. […] Especially after the pandemic, many people have realized all is nothing without freedom.”

Kanis Leung and Tian Macleod Ji from the Associated Press described how overseas communities carry the torch to keep memories of Tiananmen alive:

As Beijing’s toughened political stance effectively extinguished any large-scale commemorations within its borders, overseas commemorative events have grown increasingly crucial for preserving memories of the Tiananmen crackdown. Over the past few years, a growing number of talks, rallies, exhibitions and plays on the subject have emerged in the U.S., Britain, Canada, Australia and Taiwan.

[…] Aline Sierp, a professor of European history and memory studies at Maastricht University in the Netherlands, said overseas commemorative activities allow the memories to travel and endure, providing access for other people and future generations.

But she said it can be “a double-edged sword” because adapting the memories to new places might risk fragmenting or de-contextualizing them in the future.

Alison Landsberg, a memory studies scholar at George Mason University in Virginia, said that overseas efforts carry the potential to inspire people from other places who are facing their own challenges in the pursuit of democracy.

[…] “It shows that how much sufferings that people had to endure all these years,” [Rowena He said about the play “May 35th” that was performed in London]. “If there’s anything we can do, I hope that we would bring the younger generation to understand this.” [Source]

Violet Law from Al Jazeera highlighted the role of New York City’s Tiananmen museum in preserving memories: 

The June 4th Memorial Museum opened a year ago through concerted efforts by Zhou [Fengsuo] and a few other veterans of the Tiananmen demonstrations now living in the United States. The urgency for a new museum came after the one in Hong Kong was closed down by the authorities there in 2021.

“We viewed this as the effort to erase the memories,” David Dahai Yu, the museum’s director, told Al Jazeera. “We want people to understand why [Tiananmen] happened and what it means…to tell the story.”

[…] Soon after Zhou and others spread the word on their new museum in the heart of Manhattan’s shopping district, they started receiving unexpected items: the blood-splattered blouse of a reporter who worked for the People’s Liberation Army newspaper; the leaflets distributed by Zhou; a medal and commemorative watch awarded to “the defenders of the motherland”, as Beijing dubbed the soldiers who suppressed the movement.

There was even a like-new Nikko tent, one of the hundreds ferried in from Hong Kong and kept as a memento by a pair of protesters who camped in the square as newlyweds. [Source]

China-focused media outlets also published Tiananmen-related retrospectives. China Media Project’s Lingua Sinica newsletter shared two pieces from their archives that underscore the relevance of media and speech freedoms in China. ChinaFile published a retrospective highlight reel of its work on the Tiananmen protests and crackdown. China Heritage published a two-part commemoration by highlighting pieces from Dai Qing, a Chinese reporter, novelist, and historical investigative journalist. Article 19 hosted a podcast episode for the occasion titled “The Legacy of Tiananmen Square: 35 Years of Silence and Censorship.” The Tibet Action Institute shared a podcast episode titled, “The Untold Story of Tibetan Students in the 1989 Tiananmen Movement.”

• “Republic” + “16th-term” + “President”
• “Inauguration” + “President Lai”
• “Hsiao Bi-khim” + “Inauguration”
• “Speech” + “Lai Ting-che”
• “Taiwan” + “China” + “Gobble Up”
• “People’s Republic of China” +  “not subordinate to each other” + “Republic of China”
• “May 20th” + “Republic” [Chinese]

To learn more about how these censorship rules were discovered, see the Citizen Lab report Missing Links: A comparison of search censorship in China.

In his inaugural address, Lai asserted: “We have a nation insofar as we have sovereignty […] The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” The speech raised hackles in China. State media headlines blared: “’Lai-style Taiwan independence’ agenda is a dead-end,” in Global Times; “Lai Ching-te’s treacherous gambit is doomed to backfire,” in China Daily; and “Lai’s address escalates tension across Taiwan Strait,” in Xinhua. People’s Daily, the Party’s flagship newspaper, dedicated an entire page to criticism of Lai’s speech. A host of headlines accused Lai of destroying stability in the strait and claimed international support for China’s One China Principle—which in fact differs markedly from the One China Policy observed by the United States, as well as from many other countries’ positions. 

Within Taiwan, Lai’s speech was also moderately controversial and seen as a major departure from his predecessor Tsai Ying-wen’s less confrontational approach to China-relations. At The Financial Times, Katherin Hille:

“Lai’s stance is a step back towards more confrontation, undoing much of Tsai’s line,” says Chao Chun-shan, a Taiwan academic who advised Tsai and her three predecessors on China policy. He argues that it puts China’s leader Xi Jinping in a difficult spot. “Xi doesn’t want a showdown now, before the result of the US election is clear.”

[…] So while Tsai would refer to the “Beijing authorities” or “the other side of the Strait” — phrases that do not highlight the existence of two different countries — Lai spoke of “China” throughout.

[…] DPP politicians argue Taiwan has been left with little choice. “China keeps removing the space for ambiguity,” says Chiu Tai-san, chair of the cabinet-level China policy body under Tsai. “So the more ambiguous we are about our sovereignty, the more ground we will lose.” [Source]

Not all agreed that Lai’s speech was a sea-change in Taiwan’s China policy. At The Council on Foreign Relations, Rush Doshi and David Sacks argued that Lai’s speech was mostly a reiteration of previous cross-strait policy and that it included important reassurances for Beijing: 

In his address, Lai regularly returned to the language of continuity and stability. “Peace is the only option,” he stressed, “and prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.” Lai called Taiwan’s leaders “pilots for peace” and indicated he would “neither yield nor provoke” and would instead “maintain the status quo.” Elsewhere in his speech, Lai spoke of providing “stable and principled cross-strait leadership.” Such reassurances are important given Lai’s 2017 statement that he was a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and questions in Beijing about his intentions. 

To that end, Lai mentioned the “Republic of China” over a dozen times – more than Tsai did in her last inaugural address – and pledged to lead “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system.” Beijing took exception to Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” That phrase has not appeared in an inaugural address before, though it was a formulation Tsai previously included in high-level speeches, and likely does not indicate any change in policy. [Source]

Lai’s inauguration banquet also included a subtle nod to Xi Jinping, according to Clarrisa Wei writing for Foreign Policy: 

Then the unexpected happened. As the seventh course arrived, the room suddenly erupted in cheers. “Bubble tea!” Kuo exclaimed. Servers carried in shrimp rice and the iconic Taiwanese beverage, sourced directly from two popular eateries in Tainan. It was essentially takeout on a plate—a jolting deviation from the intricately composed dishes that preceded it. The bubble tea, which came with fat black straws, looked almost cartoonish.

A special request from the president-elect, the course was rumored by the team to be a nod to Chinese President Xi Jinping. In a television interview last summer, Lai said that if he ever had the opportunity to dine with Xi in Taiwan, he’d order shrimp rice and a cup of bubble tea. For dessert, we finished off with a fruit popsicle dipped in a citrus-forward marmalade, surrounded by mango, pineapple, melon, and wax apple—all sourced from Taiwanese farmers.

After the tasting, I asked Lee Hou-ching, the secretary-general of the nongovernmental organization in charge of planning the banquet, about the official reason for the seventh course. He demurred. “Tainan is known as a food city,” he said. “Lai wanted to represent Tainan with a dish appropriate for a banquet.” [Source]

Bubble tea is a variation of milk tea, which became a symbol of solidarity between pro-democracy activists in Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Myanmar after the hashtag #MilkTeaAlliance went viral in 2020.

Lai’s first day in office was marked by massive protests against a controversial bill introduced to parliament by the two leading opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), that would dramatically increase the power of parliament at the expense of the presidency. (Although Lai won the presidency in January’s elections, his party lost its majority in the legislature, setting the two branches of government at odds.)

Chinese state media has remained mostly circumspect on the protests, but Xinhua wrote a short report on a separate protest organized by the TPP in front of the DPP’s headquarters in Taipei during which losing TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je claimed, “The DPP is the biggest criminal syndicate.” Global Times also covered the protest, framing it as a condemnation of “Green Terror” against “pro-reunification activists.” A search for “Taiwan + Protest” returned nearly no results on Weibo, an indication that censors are likely suppressing footage and commentary on the multi-day protests against the DPP and KMT attended by tens of thousands. 

At The Wall Street Journal, Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Duehren reported that during their phone call, Biden warned Xi against providing lethal aid to Russia to help in the latter’s invasion of Ukraine: 

“As time has gone on, we’ve really seen the PRC start to help to rebuild Russia’s defense industrial base,” a senior Biden administration official said using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China. 

China, the official added, has been helping to “provide the components that get slowly towards increasing Russia’s capabilities in Ukraine. And that has, of course, longer term impacts on European security.”

[…] Ukraine remains a concern. Following Russia’s February 2022 invasion, the U.S. urged Beijing to use its influence in Moscow to dissuade Russian President Vladimir Putin from considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 

But the senior administration official contrasted those gains with Beijing’s ongoing effort “to help Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base.” and added that the U.S. and its Western allies were “quite concerned” about where China appeared to be heading on that issue. [Source]

Biden’s warning to China not to sell weapons to Russia was mirrored by both Janet Yellen during her trip to China and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken during a trip to Munich. Yellen told journalists in Guangzhou that “we’ve been clear with China that we see Russia as gaining support from goods that China, Chinese firms are supplying to Russia,” and said there will be “significant consequences” if such support continues. A day after meeting Chinese foreign secretary Wang Yi at a security conference in Munich, Germany, Blinken said: “For the most part, China has been engaged in providing rhetorical, political, diplomatic support to Russia, but we have information that gives us concern that they are considering providing lethal support to Russia in the war against Ukraine.” Blinken also warned that this would be a serious problem in Sino-American bilateral relations. 

Biden and Xi also discussed other flashpoints, including Taiwan and Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, where Chinese coast guard vessels have been firing water cannons at Philippine resupply ships. Biden, according to the White House, also told Xi Jinping that the United States will continue to place limits on the export of U.S. technologies to China, which Xi holds “creates risks” in the relationship. Since 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce has placed substantial restrictions on the sale of advanced computer chips to China, as well as the tools to produce them. 

Biden’s call with Xi was followed by Treasury Secretary Yellen’s trip to China. At The New York Times, Alan Rappeport reported on one of Janet Yellen’s diplomatic goals—asking China to reign in its green tech subsidies even as the United States ramps up its own: 

Ms. Yellen lodged a direct complaint: Cheap Chinese exports of green energy technology are threatening the electric vehicle and solar sectors that the United States has been trying to develop, and the Biden administration is prepared to protect them.

[…] Treasury officials say that they fear that elevated Chinese production targets are causing its firms to produce far more electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels than global markets can absorb, driving prices lower and disrupting production around the world. They fear that these spillovers will hurt businesses that are planning investments in the United States with tax credits and subsidies that were created through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, a law that is pumping more than $2 trillion into clean energy infrastructure.

[…] “It’s a very tough sell when we’re doing much the same thing,” said Scott Lincicome, a trade expert at the free-market oriented Cato Institute. “Regardless of whether you think the United States should be pursuing these subsidies, the fact is that the rhetorical and political effect is inevitably going to be undermined when your argument is, do as I say, not as I do.”

[…] Mary Gallagher, a political science professor at the University of Michigan, argues that China’s embrace of excess industrial capacity is a feature of its central government’s economic plan rather than a “bug” because it has allowed the country to lead the world in green energy technology innovation while local governments grapple with the fiscal fallout. Because of China’s dominance of these industries, and of electric vehicles in particular, she said that the United States now has higher priorities than upholding traditional free trade principles. [Source]

Politics aside, Yellen has become something of a cultural icon online. During a 2023 visit to China, Yellen reportedly ate “magic mushrooms” at a Yunnanese restaurant in Beijing. (The mushrooms can be rendered non-hallucinogenic by proper cooking.) She told CNN: “There was a delicious mushroom dish. I was not aware that these mushrooms had hallucinogenic properties.” Her visit to the restaurant set off a craze for the restaurant and the dish, with other branches of the eatery selling out of the mushroom across the country. During this current trip, there has been “breathless state media coverage” of Yellen’s chopstick skills and food choices. A headline from the state-run broadcaster China Central Television read, “U.S. Treasury Secretary Yellen chooses authentic Cantonese cuisine and uses chopsticks well.” Netizens also focused on Yellen’s trip to a brewery in Beijing, where she shared a pint with U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns. Premier Li Qiang noted that Yellen’s visit has “indeed drawn a lot of attention in society.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to China inspired less social media fanfare but was also of great importance. At The Wall Street Journal, Austin Ramzy and Ann M. Simmons reported on Lavrov echoing “the language of the Cold War” during his trip to Beijing: 

“There is no place for dictatorship, hegemony, neocolonial and colonial practices, which are now being applied by the United States and all the rest of the collective West unquestioningly submitting to the will of Washington,” Lavrov said.

[…Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi] said China “hopes to see a cease-fire and an end to the war [in Ukraine] as soon as possible,” while Lavrov said Moscow was “grateful to our Chinese friends for their objective, balanced position, and for their willingness to play a positive role in the matter of a political and diplomatic settlement.”

[…] Xi and Putin declared a friendship with “no limits” between their two countries in early 2022, shortly before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. While Beijing has sought at times to play down that declaration, it has never condemned Putin’s war, or even called it a war, instead describing it as the “Ukraine crisis.”

The China-Russia relationship is underpinned by close personal ties between Xi and Putin. The two men have met dozens of times over the past decade, and the Chinese leader has called Putin his dear friend. China welcomed Putin for another visit last year, his first major foreign trip after he was accused of war crimes in Ukraine by the International Criminal Court. [Source]

At Foreign Affairs, Alexander Gabuev wrote on “Putin and Xi’s unholy alliance,” explaining how the tightening alignment between Russia and Ukraine is among the most important geopolitical outcomes of the war in Ukraine: 

China and Russia have grown notably closer in the critical area of security and military cooperation. Even amid Russia’s war of aggression, China’s People’s Liberation Army has increased the number of joint activities it performs with the Russian military. In September 2022, despite significant problems on the frontlines in Ukraine, Russia conducted a strategic exercise in its Far East to which China sent 2,000 troops. A few months later, in December, the Chinese and Russian navies held their annual exercise, this time in the East China Sea. In 2023, Beijing and Moscow held three rounds of naval exercises, and in 2022 and 2023, they conducted four joint patrols in Asia with nuclear-armed bombers. These activities still clearly lack the breadth and depth of the joint drills between the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia, but the Chinese and Russian militaries are undoubtedly deepening their interoperability.

[…] The overall warming of attitudes to China is reflected in opinion polls, too, including recent data produced by the joint efforts of the Carnegie Endowment and the Levada Center, the independent Russian polling organization. At the end of 2023, 85 percent of Russians viewed China positively, whereas only six percent had a negative opinion of the country. Nearly three-quarters of Russians do not believe China is a threat to them—against around a fifth of Russians who think China is a threat. Over half of Russians now want their children to learn Chinese, a stunning development. More than 80 percent of people still want their kids to learn English, but the number of people interested in Mandarin is rising rapidly. The most China-friendly attitudes are recorded in the Russian Far East, a region that shares a border with China and is most exposed to the country in day-to-day life. This generally positive public disposition to China has allowed the Kremlin to enter a closer economic, technological, and political embrace with Beijing than ever before.

[…] Unsurprisingly, this shift has only exacerbated the asymmetry that characterizes Sino-Russian relations. As a larger and more technologically advanced economy that maintains pragmatic ties with the West, China has stronger bargaining power and many more options than does Russia, and its leverage over its northern neighbor is growing all the time. Russia is now locking itself into vassalage to China. A couple of years down the road, Beijing will be more able to dictate the terms of economic, technological, and regional cooperation with Moscow. The Kremlin is not blind to that prospect, but it does not have much choice as long as Putin needs Chinese support to fight his war in Ukraine, which has become an obsession. [Source]

After Lavrov’s trip to Beijing, China announced that Zhao Leji, the third-ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee, will lead a Chinese delegation to North Korea to kick off “China-North Korea Friendship Year.” From The Associated Press:

Zhao’s visit to North Korea will be the first bilateral exchange involving a Chinese Politburo Standing Committee member since the pandemic started. In 2019, the two countries held a pair of summit meetings, for one of which Xi traveled to Pyongyang.

[…North Korean leader Kim Jong Un] traveled to Russia in September for a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The U.S., South Korea and others accuse North Korea of supplying conventional weapons for Russia’s war in Ukraine in return for advanced weapons technologies and other support.

[…] “China is key to North Korea’s economy. There is a limit that Russia can do for North Korea economically,” Park Won Gon, a professor at Seoul’s Ewha Womans University. “For the short-term assistance, shipments of food or crude oil can be made. But to make its economy grow in the long term, North Korea needs investments and markets. China is the only country that can provide those to North Korea.” [Source]

Chinese experts framed Zhao’s trip as a response to tensions between North Korea and the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and argued that the visit would bring stability to the Korean peninsula. Despite such talk, North Korea and China have an often difficult relationship, even as the former relies on the latter for almost all its economic and security needs. Recent reporting from The New Yorker has revealed that North Korea runs forced labor programs in China in violation of U.N. sanctions. China has denied all knowledge of the programs, claiming it adheres to sanctions despite sustaining “great losses.”

Xi Jinping also met with the former president of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou in Beijing on Wednesday. The meeting with Ma, who has consistently espoused the view that China and Taiwan should “unify,” was widely perceived as a snub to the incoming administration of Taiwan’s President-elect Lai Ching-te, who is set to assume office in a matter of weeks. At The New York Times, Chris Buckley wrote about the politics of Xi Jinping’s meeting with the former KMT leader of Taiwan:

The meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing was the first time that a Chinese leader has met a former president of Taiwan on Chinese soil. Mr. Xi and Mr. Ma held a handshake for around 15 seconds and smiled for the cameras. They then sat at a long table like two statesman entering negotiations, even though Mr. Ma has long been out of power.

[…] China’s “immediate focus is to push the incoming Lai administration to adopt a more accommodating political stance on cross-strait relations,” said Amanda Hsiao, the senior analyst for China with the Crisis Group, an organization that seeks to defuse wars and crises. “Ma’s visit helps to underscore Beijing’s position that cross-strait dialogue is conditioned on acceptance of the idea that the two sides of the strait belong to ‘one China.’”

[…] “The chances of restoring official dialogue [between China and Taiwan] are not high,” said [Chien-wen Kou, a professor at National Chengchi University in Taipei]. “Inviting Ma Ying-jeou to visit China is also intended to demonstrate that Lai Ching-te, in the Chinese Communist Party’s telling, represents only a minority of public opinion in Taiwan.” [Source]

Recently, the influential X (formerly Twitter) account “Teacher Li is Not Your Teacher” shared a compilation of topics on which Xi has “pointed the way forward” since 2015. The compilation, republished by CDT editors, is derived from articles published by People’s Daily and Xinhua. The non-exhaustive list finds that Xi has “pointed the way forward” on over 240 topics. They range from the grandiose (“humanity’s future development”) to the Party’s political concerns (“full implementation of the spirit of the 20th National Party Congress”) to the nitty-gritty of governance (“agricultural supply-side reform”). CDT has translated the list in its totality. Thus far, Xi Jinping has pointed the way forward on:

• the stock market’s future development (November 12, 2015) 
• the private economy (March 6, 2016)
• management of “Netizens’ Messages” (April 19, 2016)
• the future development of China’s internet (April 22, 2016)
• restructuring the Northeast (May 25, 2016) 
• agricultural supply-side reform (May 27, 2016) 
• charting a path for the global economy (September 6, 2016)
• educational reform (September 25, 2016)
• comprehensively deepening reforms (December 28, 2016)
• comprehensively deepening reforms based on recent trends (April 16, 2017)
• Chinese youth (May 2, 2017) 
• the distribution of medical and educational resources in Xiong’an New District (May 3, 2017) 
• Hong Kong’s future development (July 2, 2017) 
• promoting the implementation of the glorious “One Country, Two Systems” (July 2, 2017) 
• the healthy development of China’s financial sector (July 19, 2017)
• resolving unemployment issues (November 28, 2017) 
• progressing from a “cyber great power” to a “digital China” (April 18, 2018) 
• the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt (April 27, 2018)
• talented individuals in science and technology (May 28, 2018)
• the “vanguard” of scientific and technological innovation (May 28, 2018)
• the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (May 30, 2018)
• great-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (June 22, 2018) 
• Communist Youth League work (July 9, 2018) 
• state-owned enterprise reform (October 13, 2018)
• New Era Reform and Opening (December 14, 2018)
• the development of cross-Strait relations in the New Era (January 3, 2019)
• the construction of cadres (January 21, 2019) 
• high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative (April 26, 2019) 
• the creation of a modern-day “Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains” (June 4, 2019)
• the construction of the Party’s internal political culture in the New Era (July 30, 2019) 
• the development of China and the world (August 5, 2019)
• Macau (December 21, 2019)
• constructing a “civil defense line” (April 15, 2020)
• contemporary cyberspace work (April 20, 2020) 
• cultural and natural-heritage preservation work (June 12, 2020)
• Sino-European relations in the “post-pandemic era” (June 23, 2020)
• the maritime economy (July 12, 2020)
• how the Chinese economy will “weather the storm” (July 22, 2020)
• accelerating the construction of a better Anhui (August 22, 2020)
• the development of Tibet in the New Era (August 28, 2020) 
• responding to global challenges (September 9, 2020)
• innovation in science and technology (September 14, 2020)
• the future of the United Nations (September 22, 2020)
• creating archaeology with Chinese characteristics (September 30, 2020)
• China’s realization of high-quality development (November 8, 2020) 
• reshaping the world in the post-pandemic era (November 24, 2020)
• Chinese economic development (December 18, 2020)
• the promotion of people-centric new-style urbanization (December 30, 2020)
• building a better world (January 7, 2021) 
• the development of the internet and info-tech industry (January 28, 2021) 
• cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries (February 9, 2021)
• public health and hygiene work in the New Era (March 9, 2021) 
• technological innovation (March 16, 2021)
• the future of humanity (April 21, 2021)
• the promotion of high quality development in the next phase of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project (May 16, 2021) 
• the long-term development of Sino-Russian relations (July 1, 2021) 
• the grand new project of Party building (July 1, 2021) 
• the future development of the Asia-Pacific region (July 16, 2021) 
• Tibet’s development in the New Era (July 16, 2021) 
• achieving the centenary objectives of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (July 30, 2021)
• the creation of a system of internal Party rules and regulations in the New Era (August 11, 2021) 
• doing a good job of “ethnic-minority work” in the New Era (August 28, 2021) 
• becoming a great sports power (September 15, 2021) 
• unity in fighting the pandemic  (September 23, 2021) 
• management of human talent in the New Era (September 23, 2021) 
• pioneering a new journey for humankind’s high-level development (October 12, 2021) 
• the collective creation of a common community of life on earth (October 12, 2021) 
• conducting Taiwan work well in the New Era (October 13, 2021) 
• the development and perfection of the National People’s Congress (NPC) system and NPC work in the New Era (October 15, 2021) 
• cybersecurity (October 17, 2021) 
• how to pioneer a new journey for humankind’s high-level development (October 19, 2021) 
• “What has become of the world?” “What are we to do?” [The General Secretary pointed the way] (October 25, 2021) 
• responding to the climate challenge (November 3, 2021) 
• persisting in technological self-reliance and self-improvement (November 3, 2021) 
• forging our nation’s cutting-edge technological talent (November 3, 2021)
• a globally inspiring diplomatic philosophy (November 7, 2021) 
• China-Africa cooperation in the New Era (December 3, 2021)
• the creation of rule of law in China (December 3, 2021) 
• promoting cooperative global development (December 6, 2021) 
• balancing pandemic prevention and socio-economic development (March 20, 2022) 
• scientific and precise epidemic prevention (April 14, 2022)
• constructing a solid foundation for national security (April 15, 2022)
• Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization for sustainable development (April 22, 2022) 
• extricating the world from its current predicament (April 22, 2022) 
• technological self-reliance and self-improvement and becoming a great technological power (May 6, 2022) 
• the development of cultural and historical museums (May 18, 2022)
• promoting peaceful development in Asia and the world (May 21, 2022) 
• promoting the development of public security organs in the New Era (May 26, 2022) 
• becoming closer to the people by strengthening and reforming petitioning work (May 27, 2022) 
• how to deepen research into the history of Chinese civilization (May 29, 2022) 
• global development (June 25, 2022)
• the development of Mt. Wuyi’s tea industry [Mt. Wuyi, Fujian province] (June 28, 2022)
• government work by the new Hong Kong S.A.R. administration (July 3, 2022)
• grasping the historic opportunity offered by the information revolution (July 13, 2022) 
• governing Xinjiang in the New Era (July 17, 2022) 
• pandemic prevention in Africa (July 22, 2022) 
• cultural development in the New Era (August 1, 2022) 
• maintaining world peace (August 26, 2022) 
• national scientific and technological development (September 12, 2022) 
• forging a new path for country-to-country exchanges (September 25, 2022) 
• solving global security dilemmas (October 13, 2022) 
• human progress and development (October 18, 2022) 
• human society’s path towards peace and prosperity (October 29, 2022)
• the development of charitable giving (November 9, 2022) 
• the path to global digital development (November 10, 2022) 
• Sino-American relations (November 15, 2022) 
• opening a new chapter in Asia-Pacific cooperation (November 17, 2022) 
• preserving and celebrating the glorious tradition of the People’s Army and strengthening honorary military commendations work in the New Era (November 29, 2022) 
• comprehensively promoting rural revitalization and accelerating agricultural and rural modernization in the New Era (December 1, 2022) 
• improving bi-lateral relations and setting the direction for the next phase in Sino-Australian relations (December 9, 2022) 
• global biodiversity governance (December 17, 2022) 
• development of transportation in the New Era (January 21, 2023) 
• charting a new path for accounting and auditing work in the New Era (January 25, 2023) 
• full implementation of the spirit of the 20th National Party Congress (February 4, 2023) 
• better promotion of Chinese-style modernization (February 7, 2023)
• Chinese economic development (February 10, 2023) 
• developing into a major agricultural power (February 20, 2023)
• resolving the issue of “bottlenecks” (February 21, 2023) 
• progress on the “Three Rural Issues” [agricultural production, rural development, and farmers’ incomes] (March 3, 2023) 
• high-quality development and the healthy development of the private economy (March 7, 2023) 
• national defense and military construction (March 10, 2023) 
• cadres promoting rural construction (March 21, 2023) 
• protection of the Yellow River in the New Era, and transforming development in river basin provinces and regions (March 31, 2023)
• “character-building through education” (April 14, 2023)
• the correct path toward human progress and development (April 18, 2023)
• summiting the peak of aerospace technology (April 24, 2023) 
• digital infrastructure construction (April 27, 2023)
• doing the Party’s youth work well on a new path in the New Era (May 7, 2023) 
• overseas Chinese affairs work (May 10, 2023)
• promoting the economic integration of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei (May 13 2023) 
• cooperation between China and Central Asia (May 21, 2023) 
• the development of Chinese manufacturing, particularly high-end manufacturing (May 22, 2023) 
• preserving systemic perspectives during research and study trips (May 24, 2023) 
• promising developments in forums, technological innovation, and international cooperation and exchange (May 26, 2023) 
• accelerating the realization of high-level technological self-reliance and self-improvement (May 29, 2023) 
• fostering major development and prosperity in Chinese arts and literature (May 29, 2023) 
• global economic development (June 2, 2023) 
• endeavoring to build a modern Chinese civilization (June 4, 2023) 
• high-quality development in Inner Mongolia (June 10, 2023) 
• endeavoring to create a new culture fit for our current era (June 15, 2023) 
• ecological construction (June 21, 2023) 
• doing development work well (June 22, 2023) 
• mastering the “primary task” (July 7, 2023) 
• Party building and organizing work (July 10, 2023) 
• the development of the China-Solomon Islands relationship (July 13, 2023) 
• grasping the historic opportunity of the information revolution (July 13, 2023)
• accelerating and promoting China’s rise to a major cyber-power (July 15, 2023) 
• doing cyberspace administration work well on a new path in the New Era (July 21, 2023) 
• promoting high-quality development in the Yangtze River Economic Belt (July 28, 2023) 
• development of Sino-Georgian relations in the New Era (August 1, 2023) 
• China and Malaysia’s joint creation of a community with a shared future (August 15, 2023) 
• wetlands protection work (August 15, 2023) 
• healthy development of the artificial intelligence industry (August 16, 2023) 
• a thorough overhaul of Party propaganda and ideology work for the New Era, while maintaining innovation and a correct orientation (August 19, 2023) 
• development of Sino-American relations (August 23, 2023) 
• deepening unity and cooperation between nations, coping with risks and challenges, and working together to create a better world (August 24, 2023) 
• further developing Sino-South Africa relations (August 24, 2023) 
• deepening cooperation between China and Bangladesh (August 24, 2023) 
• joining forces to achieve global common development (August 26, 2023) 
• doing the Party’s overseas Chinese work well in the New Era (August 31, 2023) 
• laying a comprehensive foundation for food security (September 1, 2023) 
• nurturing human talent in the New Era (September 1, 2023) 
• high-quality development of the trade in services (September 4, 2023) 
• the development of “smart” industries (September 6, 2023) 
• the development of Longjiang (September 8, 2023) 
• opening new ground for development in the North (September 11, 2023) 
• technological exchange and cooperation (September 11, 2023) 
• accelerating and promoting China’s growth as a great cyber-power (September 14, 2023) 
• high-level development of China-Singapore relations (September 14, 2023) 
• the General Office of the State Council performing its work work well on a new path (September 14, 2023) 
• guiding China-Europe railways towards safer, higher-quality, more efficient development (September 16, 2023) 
• the future development of friendly relations between China and Indonesia (September 16, 2023) 
• solidifying cultural confidence, assuming the mission of creating a new culture for a New Era, resolutely promoting modern Chinese culture, and becoming a Socialist cultural power (September 20, 2023) 
• a new path toward the comprehensive construction of a modern Socialist country, while preserving cultural traditions (September 20, 2023) 
• promoting new-style industrialization (September 25, 2023) 
• innovating and developing the New Era Fengqiao Experience (September 27, 2023)
• constructing higher-level free trade pilot zones (September 27, 2023) 
• doing women and children’s work well (September 28, 2023) 
• a concept of building a community with a shared future for humankind that conforms to the times and sets the direction for improving global governance (September 30, 2023) 
• promoting world peace and development (October 1, 2023) 
• deepening China-Arab cooperation and exchanges on publishing (October 3, 2023) 
• doing poverty alleviation work well (October 6, 2023) 
• improving propaganda, ideology, and cultural work (October 9, 2023) 
• innovative developments on unions and the labor movement in the New Era (October 9, 2023) 
• creating a community with a shared future and furthering the development of bilateral relations between China and Uzbekistan (October 9, 2023) 
• trade union work (October 10, 2023) 
• doing the Party’s children’s work well and promoting the development of children’s causes in the New Era (October 12, 2023)
• promoting the high-quality development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt (October 13, 2023) 
• doing cyberspace administration work well on a new path in the New Era (October 15, 2023) 
• protecting and promoting Yangtze River culture (October 15, 2023) 
• doing cadre education and training work well in the New Era (October 16, 2023) 
• promoting the development and welfare of disabled people in China (October 18, 2023) 
• Pudong’s development (October 18, 2023) 
• the high-quality collective construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (October 19, 2023) 
• continuing ideological liberation and promoting Reform and Opening (October 19, 2023) 
• China and the world joining hands to collectively achieve collective development and prosperity, and to pave the way for better paths towards global prosperity (October 19, 2023) 
• humanity’s future development (October 19, 2023) 
• future cooperation with Turkmenistan (October 20, 2023) 
• entering a New Era of better relations between China and Brazil (October 21, 2023)
• creating better conditions for New Era working class and labor organizations to contribute, innovate, and create (October 24, 2023) 
• continue carrying out major projects that benefit the overall situation (October 24, 2023) 
• the development of women’s causes and Women’s Federation work under new conditions (October 31, 2023) 
• transforming global internet governance systems (November 7, 2023) 
• the development of Sino-American relations (November 14, 2023) 
• world peace and development (November 21, 2023) 
• promoting high-quality development in finance (November 30, 2023) 
• leading the way in promoting major breakthroughs in the integration of the Yangtze River Delta Region (December 2, 2023) 
• accelerating the realization of high-level technological self-reliance and self-strengthening (December 5, 2023 ) 
• the development of Hongkou township (December 9, 2023) 
• how China, as the largest developing country, should coexist with the largest coalition of developed countries (December 9, 2023) 
• leading the way in promoting the high-quality development of China’s economy (December 12, 2023) 
• building a magnificent Guangxi with Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era (December 17, 2023) 
• the development of the Zhuang Autonomous Region (December 18, 2023) 
• efforts to further deepen and solidify thematic education (December 19, 2023) 
• comprehensively advancing rural revitalization and common prosperity (December 20, 2023) 
• the correct direction for the common development, long-term stability, and mutual learning from other civilizations (December 28, 2023) 
• managing tumultuous Sino-American relations (December 28, 2023) 
• foreign medical-aid work in the New Era (December 30, 2023) 
• the development of the Party’s mass organizations (December 31, 2023) 
• strengthening cultural confidence and maintaining cultural independence (January 11, 2024) 
• the New Era People’s Police Force to perform their duty and carry out their mission (January 11, 2024) 
• promoting the accelerated development of winter sports in China (January 15, 2024)
• making continued bold advancements on the political and legal frontlines (January 15, 2024) 
• the development of finance with Chinese characteristics (January 17, 2024) 
• helping many regions to transform resource advantages into economic and competitive advantages (January 17, 2024) 
• a multipolar world (January 19, 2024) 
• guarding against financial risks and safeguarding the financial bottom line (January 22, 2024) 
• the future of Sino-French relations (January 27, 2024) 
• better preserving our historical and cultural heritage (January 30, 2024) 
• the whole Party engaging in “thematic” education (February 3, 2024) 
• promoting the comprehensive revitalization of rural areas (February 6, 2024) 
• endeavoring to build a modern Chinese civilization (February 7, 2024) 
• a shift in Xiamen’s developmental philosophy and methodology (February 21, 2024) 
• the economic integration of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei (February 26, 2024) 
• making strides towards the strategic goal of becoming a major cyber-power, building a modern socialist nation, and promoting the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (February 27, 2024) 
• solving the problems of natural resource development and energy security (March 3, 2024)
• strengthening the military (March 5, 2024) 
• establishing rule by law in China (March 6, 2024) 
• for regions to develop “new productive forces” (March 7, 2024) 
• the high-quality development of private enterprises (March 7, 2024) 
• breaking through the bottlenecks hindering the development of “new productive forces” (March 11, 2024) [Chinese]

Tony Hu and Cindy Carter contributed to this post.

In Foreign Affairs last week, Kenton Thibaut described how China has spent at least tens of millions of dollars on influence campaigns designed to bolster non-DPP candidates in Taiwan’s elections since the beginning of Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency in 2016:

For the 2024 contest, the Chinese Communist Party has continued to spread misinformation. It is, in particular, using local proxies to spread partisan narratives that play on fears of rising cross-strait tensions. This anxiety is authentic to Taiwan: the KMT’s presidential candidate, Hou Yu-ih, has depicted the vote as a choice between “war and peace,” stating that the DPP’s moves to deepen ties with the United States and promote independence will lead to conflict. But to help amplify this message, the CCP has turned to Taiwanese businesses to suggest a DPP vote could lead to war. The Want-Want Group, for example, a Taiwan-based media company that receives subsidies from the Chinese government, has posted multiple videos praising the KMT and playing up the prospects of war. One proclaims, in its title, that the “DPP is ‘on the road’ to corruption, to war, and to danger.” Another accused the DPP of “quietly preparing for war” and spread a rumor that the DPP vice presidential candidate met with U.S. political operatives to discuss a Chinese-Taiwanese conflict.

[…] Beijing has, of course, had proxies in Taiwan for years. According to Puma Shen, a professor at National Taipei University and the former chair at DoubleThink, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office has paid for local Taiwanese officials and leaders to take luxurious trips to the mainland since at least 2019 as part of an effort to shift public opinion. In past election cycles, Taiwanese businesses with operations in China have taken money from sources linked to the Chinese Communist Party and then donated it to pro-China candidates. Such laundering helps China avoid easily being named and shamed, and when Beijing launders its ideas through proxies, China’s messaging is more likely to spread. In a February post to Facebook, for example, a former KMT politician and pro-Beijing influencer spread the false claim that the United States had a plan for the “destruction of Taiwan,” citing Russian state media. The claim was both picked up by Taiwanese media and amplified by Chinese government sources. [Source]

Stuart Lau from Politico reported on other Chinese attempts to influence the election, including the publication of fake presidential polls deceptively showing the Kuomintang (KMT) in the lead:

On December 21, Taiwan’s authorities arrested an online journalist called Lin Hsien-yuan, working for a fringe outlet called Fingermedia over a poll that — for the first time — showed the Beijing-friendly candidate on track to win the presidential election on January 13.

Taiwanese prosecutors zeroed in on the suspect polls under the democratic island’s new Anti-Infiltration Act — designed to counter Chinese interference — saying Lin’s findings were faked and orchestrated by Chinese Communist Party officials in Fujian province, on the mainland across the Taiwan Strait. The prosecutors said Lin “pretended to have interviewed or sampled more than 300 citizens” over eight rounds of polling. The so-called phone interviews, the prosecutors continued, “never took place, and he fabricated false popularity polls.” [Source]

Many of China’s election-interference efforts have occurred in the digital sphere. Taiwan’s DoubleThink Lab (DTL) released a Chinese-language report analyzing a coordinated influence campaign by overseas Facebook accounts that circulated disinformation about the DPP in order to influence the election. Joseph Menn, Naomi Nix, Cat Zakrzewski, and Pranshu Verma from The Washington Post also described how propagandists often distort existing controversies online to incite Taiwanese voters:

And rather than push their own messages, the propagandists have been encouraged to amplify authentic local disputes and divisions, said Tim Niven, head of research at Taiwan’s Doublethink Lab.

Propagandists have also been quick followers of local news, putting together clips from the most incendiary comments on talk shows and giving misleading summaries.

Generative artificial intelligence and other new tools are helping, Niven said.

Fake news videos, with AI-generated hosts and voice-overs, have circulated on YouTube, Instagram and X, according to a Taiwanese national security official’s accounts to local media in Taipei. [Source]

Domestic politics have complicated Taiwanese authorities’ attempts to neutralize these threats. As Brian Hioe explained at New Bloom, “taking action against Chinese election interference is difficult when advocacy for unification is an acceptable view in the political spectrum, and this can be framed as election interference.” Nick Aspinwall wrote at Foreign Policy that Taiwanese government officials under the DPP have thus adapted their strategies for combatting disinformation: 

“If you want to curb disinformation by legal measures, it’s difficult and dangerous,” said Yachi Chiang, a professor at National Taiwan Ocean University specializing in intellectual property and tech law. It “opens a pathway for the government to control speech.”

[…By contrast, Taiwan’s successful communication during the COVID-19 pandemic] helped politicians realize that “you can’t count on laws to tackle disinformation,” Chiang said. “You need to create your own information.”

“Free speech is not the cost but the key to counteract disinformation,” said [Tzu-wei Hung, a scholar at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica,] who noted that in 2022, Freedom House found that countries that protect free expression and have robust civic society groups do a better job at mitigating false information.

[…] Lai’s win on Saturday is not an outright victory against disinformation itself—both Chinese and domestic actors will surely continue to create confusion and distrust whenever they can. It did, however, show that Taiwanese voters can’t easily be swayed, as long as public officials do their part to communicate rapidly, positively, and honestly. [Source]

Aside from using disinformation, the Chinese government has also sought to weaponize Taiwan’s economic ties to China amid the election campaign. The Atlantic Council produced a report last November that outlined some of Taiwan’s economic vulnerabilities. Earlier last year, the Global Taiwan Institute published an issue on China’s economic coercion against Taiwan, which includes “a combination of targeted bans of select goods, broadened import restrictions, arbitrary regulatory enforcements, and sanctions of individuals and organizations” that is meant to pressure Taiwanese voters. Erin Hale at Al Jazeera described how Beijing used economic coercion just before the election:

These efforts have continued in the lead-up to Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections on January 13. As campaign season kicked off last April, Beijing announced a major investigation into Taiwanese trade practices, ruling last month that Taiwan had unfairly imposed “trade barriers” on more than 2,000 Chinese products.

“This timeline aligns perfectly with Taiwan’s presidential election. There seems to be a clear correlation indicating China’s intention to leverage trade issues as bargaining chips to influence Taiwan’s voters’ distrust in the DPP’s governance and decrease their credibility in handling cross-Strait trade conflicts,” wrote Chun-wei Ma, an assistant professor for international affairs at Tamkan University, in a recent report on the issue.

[…] Taiwan’s government has also accused Beijing of election interference through economic coercion, such as when it ended tariff cuts on a dozen Taiwanese petrochemical imports in late December – just as voters were starting to make their final decisions.

Similar allegations were made when Beijing targeted Apple supplier Foxconn with a surprise tax investigation in November in what was widely seen as a rebuke of founder Terry Gou’s decision to run for president. [Source]

Following the election, Party journal Qiushi republished a 2022 speech by Xi Jinping that called on the CCP to do a better job of winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people, stating it must “develop and strengthen the patriotic, pro-unification forces in Taiwan, oppose the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence,’ and promote the complete reunification of the motherland.” As Thomas des Garets Geddes highlighted in his Sinification newsletter, Zheng Yongnian, a well-known returnee political scientist and founding director of the Institute for International Affairs at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, published a commentary articulating how to promote “national reunification”: 

“If Lai were also to remain in power for eight years [like Tsai], the sense of alienation between the people living on either side of the Taiwan Strait would probably become even more acute.” [如果赖清德也执政8年，那么两岸人民的疏离感很可能会变得更加严重。] […] “To promote the resolution of the Taiwan issue in the new era, we must pay attention to innovative cross-Strait communication platforms, with a focus on the use of new media platforms, such as [China’s Instagram-like] Xiaohongshu and Douyin [TikTok], to circulate and change the identity of young people in Taiwan [流转、改变台湾年轻人的认同].” [Source]

Perhaps partly as a result of Beijing’s constant threats against Taiwan and resolve to interfere in its democracy, Western media have largely framed the election outcome through a China-centric lens, potentially reinforcing China’s role in Taiwan’s processes of self-determination, at least in the eyes of Western readers:

Curious about the media framing of Taiwan's presidential election, I compiled a list of headlines from major English-language outlets published right after Lai's victory. Here's a snapshot. pic.twitter.com/HCstIhvLcw

— Arthur Kaufman (@arthur_kaufman_) January 17, 2024

The hashtag “frozen garlic” was also censored. Seemingly innocuous, it is actually an approximate homophone for “get elected” in the Southern Min dialect widely spoken in Taiwan and a stock chant at campaign rallies. 

Weibo routinely censors election discussions, even sometimes for China’s own “whole-process people’s democracy.” In 2023, Weibo quashed all commentary on Xi’s unanimous re-selection to China’s presidency during the National People’s Congress. When democracy-related discussion is permitted on Weibo, it is often focused on mockery of the American political system.

Efforts to suppress discussion of Taiwanese democracy likely went beyond such examples of visible censorship. Many Chinese netizens suspect that Weibo also aimed to “drown out” election talk by promoting the frivolous hashtag “Behind the Scenes of the Weibo Awards Ceremony.” Most popular Weibo hashtags have a “host” that curates top results. The lack of a host for the award ceremony-related hashtag stoked suspicions about its authenticity, as did its rapid rise to the top of the “hot list” just as Taiwan began to tabulate election results. 

Despite the censorship of hashtags, Chinese netizens still found ways to discuss Taiwan’s general election. After Xinhua made a Weibo post parroting China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesman Chen Binhua declaration that “the results showed the Democratic Progressive Party cannot represent mainstream public opinion on the island,” netizens had a field day mocking the statement in Xinhua’s comment section. One representative comment read, “[A]nd who are you to dismiss the results of a fair election with that one word: ‘unrepresentative?'” Others were less polite: “[TAO is] the most shameless, useless, piece-of-trash government department.” 

Despite the extensive online censorship of news related to the election, there was a rare outpouring of online commentary in response to a statement by China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesman Chen Binhua, who declared that “the results showed the Democratic Progressive Party cannot represent mainstream public opinion on the island.” Many Weibo users posted derisive comments below the news about Chen’s statement, which was issued through China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency. CDT editors have archived screenshots of the many comments (1, 2, and 3), a selection of which are translated below:

Haha, and who are you to dismiss the results of a fair election with that one word: “unrepresentative”?

He still claims it doesn’t represent “mainstream public opinion.”

Chinese-style “Ah-Q mentality” [i.e. deluding oneself into pretending defeats are victories] 

This is a gutsy comments section.

Pretty brave of them not to filter these comments.

Everyone knows what’s what, so there’s really no need to delude yourself and others like this.

Sure, go on deluding yourself!

Numb from winning! [For more on this and other popular online slang, see CDT’s new Lexicon, 20th Anniversary Edition.]

Shouldn’t you be filtering comments about the Taiwan issue???

This Weibo headline is interesting.

So what exactly were the election results?

So you’re saying that when the common people cast their individual votes, it doesn’t represent mainstream public opinion? I guess I’m too ignorant and uneducated to understand how the world works.

Enough, already—how can you criticize others’ elections when you don’t even allow elections at home?

So a general election doesn’t represent mainstream public opinion? What new sort of understanding is this?

Bury your head in the sand.

A great and impressive country is afraid of comments from its own netizens. No wonder so many foreign media outlets criticize you.

Question for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO): What exactly is “mainstream public opinion,” then?

[TAO is] the most shameless, useless, piece-of-trash government department. [Chinese]

On Substack, VOA’s Wenhao Ma noted responses to the TAO statement from Chinese nationalists frustrated with Beijing’s perceived lenience toward Taiwan:

“Stop lying to yourself,” one netizen commented on Weibo. “This election result is not surprising at all. It’s time to halt policies that benefit Taiwan and speed up rolling out policies aiming at trapping and retrieving Taiwan.”

“I feel like poeple from across the strait don’t want to come close to us and instead want to distance themselves,” another netizen wrote. “If we have to use violence then let’s do it.”

[…] “No more delays, the earlier we attack the better, the bigger the scale of the attack is the better,” prominent online nationalist “Ziwu Xiashi” wrote on Weibo on Saturday before Lai formally won but whose victory was clear. “I didn’t think so in the past, but I feel like we don’t have much time left.”

The post has since been deleted. [Source]

At Reuters, meanwhile, Eduardo Baptista reported on Chinese officials’ condemnations of American, British, and Japanese statements congratulating the winners, and even of a more cautious French message congratulating all participants:

The Chinese embassy in France said that a statement from the French foreign ministry on Sunday was a “provocation” against the Chinese government because it congratulated a separatist politician and political party in Lai and the DPP.

This was despite the fact that France, unlike several other countries, did not name Lai or his party in its statement, congratulating instead “all voters and candidates” who participated in the election.

“The ‘Taiwan independence’ candidate winning, and some so-called ‘congratulations’ cannot change fundamental framework and development trend of cross-Strait relations,” the embassy said.

But the Chinese embassy also took issue with the statement’s praise of Taiwanese democracy, accusing the DPP of corruption and repressing its political opponents.

“With such a stained and unsavoury track record, were it any western country, would it be championed as ‘democracy’?” [Source]